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REMINISCENCES OF THE INDIAN MUTINY (1857–58) AND AFGHANISTAN (1879)

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THE INDIAN MUTINY
(1857–58)
AND AFGHANISTAN
(1879)

BY
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PREFACE

THE following brief account of my recollections of the Siege of Delhi during the great Indian Mutiny of 1857 was published in the pages of the *Cornhill Magazine*, in October, 1913; and the paper on Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, and another, appeared in October, 1914, and April, 1914, respectively, and, by the kind permission of the Editor, are reproduced in this little book.

I have also included a Memoir of a most distinguished officer, the late General Sir Alexander Taylor, G.C.B., R.E., whose life was written by his daughter and published in 1913, and in whose memory a statue has been or is about to be erected at Delhi.

As is well known, it was in a great measure owing to the sagacity, skill, and courage of the late Colonel Richard Baird-Smith, C.B., the Chief Engineer of the Delhi Field Force, and the same qualities displayed by Major Alexander Taylor, that the assault and capture of the city were brought to a successful issue.

This memoir, and also an account of the capture of Lucknow in April, 1858, and a Memoir of the late Lieutenant-General James McLeod Innes, V.C., C.B.,

who successfully carried out the mining operations during the Defence of Lucknow in 1857 by the "Illustrious Lucknow Garrison," were published in the pages of the *Royal Engineers' Journal*, and are also reproduced by permission.

In conclusion, I have added two short articles, the first on the late Colonel Brasyer, of Brasyer's Sikhs, and the other on the late Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Taylor, the Repairer of the Taj Mahal, and also a few notes on natural history made from observations in Upper Assam many years ago when I was employed in that district.

E. T. T.

Bordighera,
April, 1916.

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REMINISCENCES OF THE INDIAN MUTINY

CHAPTER I

RECOLLECTIONS OF THE SIEGE OF DELHI *

I

It was with feelings of relief and joy that those of the troops at Meerut in May, 1857, who were under orders to move towards Delhi, received their orders to march on the afternoon of May 27.

Since the massacres which took place on May 11, the troops had been cooped up in Meerut without any active measures of retaliation being taken against the mutineers, who had been allowed to enter Delhi without being pursued, and who had again been able to perpetrate similar massacres in the streets of the royal city. At length the long-looked-for order was issued, and the column marched out of Meerut at about 6 p.m. on May 27. It consisted of two squadrons of the Carabineers (6th Dragoon Guards), a wing of the 60th Rifles, Scott's Light Field Battery, Tombs' Troop of Horse Artillery, two 18-pounders all manned by Europeans, with a small detachment

* From the *Cornhill Magazine*, October, 1913.

of native Sappers, and some irregular horse, under the command of Brigadier A. Wilson of the Bengal Artillery, afterwards General Sir Archdale Wilson, Bart., G.C.B. On May 30 the column arrived on the left bank of the River Hindun near to Ghazee-oo-deen-nuggur, a small town about nine miles from Delhi.

The writer, who was present at the action, revisited the place in 1868 and could remember the configuration of the ground. The ditch round the village, which he had seen heaped with dead mutineers, had been levelled together with the mud walls. A long causeway carried the grand trunk road across the valley within which the stream, shrunk during the scorching heat of May to a mere rivulet, wanders in a very tortuous channel.

At the camp on the Hindun, fourteen officers of Engineers occupied one private's tent with a single thickness of canvas. On arriving at the Hindun we had the tent pitched and had some stew for breakfast. The heat was so intense that we wrapped wet handkerchiefs or towels round our heads.

About three o'clock in the afternoon a round shot was fired into the camp from the opposite side of the river, killing a non-commissioned officer of the Carabineers.

The bugles sounded and the troops fell in, and at once marched towards the bridge that spanned the river. The mutineers, flushed with success, had come out from Delhi to give battle to the Meerut brigade before its junction with the Umballa Force. They planted some heavy guns to the right, and commenced

firing into our camp. Under cover of the fire of 18-pounders and Scott's Field Battery, the 60th Rifles advanced, and moving along the causeway came to close quarters with the enemy.

The rebel sepoys broke and fled under the galling fire pouring in upon them, and numbers were bayoneted.

They left five guns in our hands. Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Tombs with the Horse Artillery and Carabineers dashed across the Hindun to the right and successfully turned the enemy's left flank. Tombs' horse was shot under him.

A sepoy of the 11th Regiment fired his musket into an ammunition waggon just as a party of the 60th under Captain Andrews were seizing the guns. Captain Andrews and several men were killed by the explosion and others wounded.

During the action the writer had been ordered with a small detachment of sappers to throw up a traverse of earth and sandbags to prevent any rush from parties of the enemy who might attempt to cross the bridge.

While engaged on this he observed a spent round shot rolling along the road looking like a large cricket ball, and coming straight for the small entrenchment, and had barely time to call to the sergeant of sappers to look out. The sergeant was not quick enough, and the shot struck him on the inner side of the right thigh, hurling him for a distance of several yards, fortunately without breaking any bones. His leg swelled at once to a great size, and turned a livid blue colour, but the skin was

not broken, and he was only on the sick list for about four days.

On the following day the rebel sepoys again came out from Delhi and took up a position on the right bank of the Hindun, about a mile from our advanced posts. The artillery were sent forward to reply to the enemy's fire, the rifles with two guns and the sappers occupying the head of the bridge. The fight was one almost entirely of artillery. Lieutenant Perkins of the Horse Artillery was killed by a grape shot. Our men suffered fearfully from thirst and sunstroke, twelve of the rifles being struck down by the sun, of whom four died. When the enemy's fire slackened a general advance was ordered, and they retreated carrying off their guns to Delhi. Our men were so exhausted by heat and thirst that they were unable to improve their victory.

The Carabineers—6th Dragoon Guards—wore their brass helmets during the action, without cover or protection of any kind, and, strange though it may seem, there were but few cases of sunstroke, the burnished surfaces causing the heat to be reflected from the helmets.

On June 1 our column was reinforced by the arrival of the 2nd Goorkhas (Sirmoor Battalion), 600 strong, under the command of Major Reid (afterwards General Sir Charles Reid, G.C.B.).

We remained on our position on the Hindun from the 1st to the 5th of June, and then commenced the march to join the force that was moving on Delhi from Umballa under the Commander-in-chief. This flank march was a difficult and hazardous operation,

and the strictest precautions had to be taken to guard against surprise. It seems scarcely credible that the enemy, on ascertaining our departure from the Hindun, should not have attempted to attack the column. Probably the rebels were paralysed by the combats of May 30 and 31 and by the loss of their guns.

On the morning of June 7 we reached Paniput and learnt that the Commander-in-chief, General the Hon. A. Anson, had died of cholera, and had been succeeded by General Barnard.

The force under General Barnard consisted of H.M.'s 9th Lancers, the 75th, the 1st and 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, Money's Troop of Horse Artillery, and the siege-train. The latter had arrived from Phillour on the 6th. On the 8th we marched out of Alipore at 3 a.m. to attack the enemy, who were strongly entrenched at Badle-ka-Serai, their force consisting of cavalry, infantry, and thirty guns.

After we had marched from two to three miles, the sound of heavy firing was heard in our front. As we drew near, the round shot and shell whistled past, tearing up the ground and striking down many men, horses, and bullocks.

We passed one of our batteries, commanded by Major Alfred Light, which had to bear the brunt of the enemy's fire. A tumbril had blown up, and two or three artillerymen were lying dreadfully scorched and dying in the road. Dead bullocks were lying all about, killed by the round shot. Many of the rebels had posted themselves in a walled village, the entrance to which was barricaded. After capturing

the position of Badle-ka-Serai our force rested for about half an hour, and then, as we again advanced, the enemy retired to the ridge above Delhi, and finally fled into Delhi leaving twenty guns in our possession; Colonel Chester, Captain Russell, and Lieutenant Harrison were killed, and fifty men, and about 150 wounded. The enemy lost great numbers.

The troops were posted at intervals along the ridge. We were all much exhausted after the action and the march under the burning sun.

Wounded men were continually brought in to Hindoo Rao's house, a large building on the ridge overlooking the city.

The camp was pitched in rear of the ridge. A bungalow, which had escaped the conflagration after the Delhi massacres, was told off for the Engineers' headquarters. The enemy opened a heavy fire from the city on discovering the earthworks that we had thrown up during the night.

The result of the successful action on June 8, 1857, at Badle-ka-Serai was to give to the field force under the command of Major-General Sir Henry Barnard complete possession of the low ridge of hills to the westward of the city. The highest parts of the ridge rise to a height of about fifty to sixty feet above the general level of the interior of the city, while the average command may be taken for practical purposes at about forty feet. The greatest length of the ridge occupied at any time during the preliminary operations was a little more than two miles, and of this position the extreme left was so far retired from the place as to be in no serious

danger at any time, while the right invited attack from the moment of occupation to the close of the operations.

Along the crest of the ridge, posts of considerable strength existed. They were formed either of ancient or modern buildings of good materials and substantial construction.

Of these the group on the extreme right, distinguished during the progress of the siege as Hindoo Rao's house, was at once the most important and most exposed. The Mahratta Prince, by whom it was built, had occupied it for many years, regarding it as his home, and had surrounded the principal house with many inferior offices, all of which were capable of supplying shelter, though not by any means shot-proof shelter, for men and cattle.

Hindoo Rao having died some time before the Mutiny broke out, the place was unoccupied. About 180 yards to the left of Hindoo Rao's house stands "the Observatory," an ancient structure suited to the purposes of Hindoo astronomy, built by the Rajpoot astronomer, Rajah Jai Singh. It was of irregular form, dark and ill-ventilated, but as a support to Hindoo Rao's house was found very useful and was permanently occupied during the siege. About 650 yards further to the left there was an abandoned mosque of the oldest Pathan type in a somewhat ruinous condition, but still affording accommodation for an outpost of considerable strength. This also was suited for a permanent position.

At the distance of nearly a mile from Hindoo Rao's house stands or stood the Flag Staff Tower,

a double-storied circular building of Gothic design, which commands an excellent view of the ground lying between the city and the ridge. This building offered sufficient means of shelter to make it useful as a post. Other posts were decided upon from time to time during the siege.

On driving the enemy from every point of the ridge on June 8, Sir Henry Barnard occupied at once, in strength, the four points just alluded to. He established the headquarters of the Sirmoor Battalion, 2nd Goorkhas, under Major Charles Reid, in Hindoo Rao's house, and there this distinguished corps remained unrelieved from the first day of the siege to the last.

The headquarters camp was established on the plains to the westward of the ridge, and occupied the old parade ground of the Delhi cantonment. Immediately in rear of the camp there runs a broad, rapid stream, being a drainage channel from the Nujufghur Jheel to the River Jumna, and along the right flank, at a distance of about a mile, flows the Western Jumna Canal, which, crossing the ridge by a bold cutting through the solid rock, executed in the time of the Emperor Shah Jehan, passes through the suburbs of Kissengunge, and enters the city through a culvert in the wall near the Lahore Gate, and, traversing the entire breadth of the city, falls into the River Jumna close to the Begumabad Gateway.

For operations in the open field the sole strength of the garrison was in the trained soldiers, but for the operations in the rugged ground around Delhi, resolute men, familiar with their weapons and

profiting by the universal cover everywhere supplied in some house or other, were antagonists whom it was necessary to respect.

In all the important materials and munitions of war the command of the arsenal in Delhi made the resources of the enemy, practically speaking, unlimited. Food was drawn with unrestricted freedom from the whole of the open districts to the east, south, and south-west, and there is no reason to suppose that money was deficient. With all the primary elements of a successful and vigorous defence the enemy was, therefore, abundantly provided.

The permanent posts for the ridge had scarcely been occupied on June 8 when the enemy, rallied with such reinforcements as the garrison could supply, attacked the position on its whole length, but were immediately driven back on the picquets being reinforced.

The most notable point in connection with this attack was the vigorous support it received from the fire of the heavy guns on the Moree and Cashmere bastions, and the first engineer operations resolved on were directed against the former of these works.

The range to the Moree Bastion was about 1500 yards, and to the Martello Tower, between these two main works, from which occasional support was given to them, about 1830 yards.

The enemy again attacked on the right flank in great force, but were beaten back with heavy loss.

Heavy fire continued uninterruptedly on both sides, and it very soon became apparent that a decided superiority was with the enemy. The fire of the four

guns in Salkeld's and Wilson's batteries produced no apparent effect on any of the enemy's works; casualties became serious, and it was clear that if any result was to be produced it was essential that the strength of the batteries on the ridge must be increased.

Accordingly, a mortar battery, called Maunsell's * Battery, for two mortars, was commenced, and an additional gun portion was added to Salkeld's, Wilson's, and Maunsell's batteries respectively. While these works were in progress the enemy attacked the right of the position with great vigour, but was repulsed, and on the 11th the whole of the guns, aided by the mortars, opened fire.

At this time the enemy made a very dangerous movement of advancing from Kissengunge with field guns up to the crest of the ridge on the extreme right, and from thence enfilading the entire line of the English batteries. The movement, however, was not persisted in, but it was plain that he had observed a very weak point in the position, and was likely to renew his attempt upon it.

On the 15th the enemy was very quiet all night and day, and no attack was made on the position.

It was observed, however, on the 17th, that the enemy had commenced work on a battery in the suburbs of Pahareepore, and although the mortar practice from the batteries on the ridge was excellent, progress was not stopped.

It being of the greatest importance that no permanent lodgment should be permitted on a site where

* Named after General Sir R. Maunsell, K.C.B., R.E.

guns would take all the ridge batteries in reverse with disastrous effect, Sir Henry Barnard determined on an attack in order to clear the suburb. This duty was effected by Major Charles Reid and Major Henry Tombs with the small columns under their respective commands, supported by four guns. The enemy's battery was captured and entirely destroyed, some loss was inflicted, and the only gun he had brought out from the place was taken.

On the night of the 17th, a new 3-gun battery, called Johnson's Battery, named after Captain Johnson (afterwards General Sir Edwin Johnson, G.C.B.), was constructed on the rocky plateau, about three hundred yards from Hindoo Rao's house.

During the early part of the siege Lieutenant T. Cadell * of the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers greatly distinguished himself by carrying to safety a wounded soldier under a very heavy fire, and was awarded the V.C.

On the 24th the suburb of Subzee-Mundi was attacked by the enemy in force, and held with much tenacity. Johnson's battery was attacked, and from Paharcepore the works near Hindoo Rao's house were taken in flank by a battery of field guns, and some loss inflicted on the troops occupying them.

But the result of the fight was, as it had ever been, the defeat of the enemy at all points, heavy loss being inflicted on him while he retired sullenly into the city. Subzee-Mundi was subsequently held in strength by a regiment of Europeans; a large

* Now Colonel Thomas Cadell, V.C., C.B., formerly Chief Commissioner of the Andaman Islands.

serai, or traveller's resting-place, and a Hindoo temple being prepared for occupation by the troops, and fortified as efficiently as means would permit. Considerable clearances of old ruins and jungle were effected in the vicinity of this post, and its maintenance in support of the advanced battery on the ridge was found to be of much use.

Reports having been received of the intentions of the commander of the garrison to convert the dry ditch of the fort into a wet one by turning into it the waters of the West Jumna Canal, it was determined to cut off the supply at the ancient aqueduct before mentioned. This was done in the first instance by a party of sappers, under Lieutenant Champain (afterwards Colonel Sir John Champain, K.C.M.G., who cut through the bank of the canal above the aqueduct, and thus turned the whole stream into the Nujufgurh Jheel drain.

From June 28, accordingly, no water entered the city through the canal channel, but no practical inconvenience was thereby caused to the garrison, as they had complete command of the river Jumna.

On June 28 the Engineers Brigade was strengthened by the arrival of Captain Alexander Taylor (afterwards General Sir Alexander Taylor, G.C.B.) and Lieutenant W. W. Greathed (afterwards Major-General and C.B.), who had up to that time been acting as extra aide-de-camp to the Major-General commanding.*

* Lieutenant R. C. Low (afterwards General Sir Robert Low, G.C.B.), and Lieutenant Evans, 9th Lancers, were at this time aides-de-camp to the General commanding.

During the first three weeks of the siege the Delhi field force was engaged in repelling the enemy's sorties. There were usually three or four sorties in each week, and some of these were on a very large scale. Large bodies of the rebels could be seen issuing from the Lahore Gate; cavalry, artillery, and infantry.

Perhaps an incident which happened to the writer may not be without interest as an example of the responsibilities that devolved on very young officers at this critical time.

A few days after the commencement of the siege I was ordered to take a party of about a hundred unarmed coolies, a few native sappers, three non-commissioned officers, and six elephants to Metcalfe's house to clear the ground around, and to destroy some walls around the picquet which was stationed at this spot.

Metcalfe's house, which had been the residence of Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, the Commissioner of Delhi, was a large building surrounded by a beautiful park. It was situated on the right bank of the Jumna, about halfway between the ridge and the city. After the massacre of Europeans in May the house had been gutted, the valuable library and all the furniture and effects plundered and destroyed by the mutineers. I had explained to the sergeant in charge of the elephants that on arriving at the entrance to the park he should take the turning to the left, and we started as it was getting dusk. I rode at the head of the little party, and on arriving at the park gates turned to the left with the sappers and coolies. After going

some distance towards Metcalfe's house I halted the party and galloped back to the gates. It was very dark and I could see or hear nothing of the elephants. I then conjectured that the sergeant in charge must have tarried somewhat behind, and had not been able to see that we had turned to the left through the gates, and in fact that at that moment he must be quietly walking along the road towards the enemy's picquets at Ludlow Castle about three hundred yards distant. All this passed through my mind in much less time than it takes to write it. I galloped in the darkness in the direction of Ludlow Castle, and was only just in time. The sergeant was calmly walking along the road to destruction with the six elephants and their mahouts, and some of the coolies.

I touched him on the shoulder, and turned him round without speaking. The enemy's advance post at Ludlow Castle could not then have been more than eighty yards distant, but the night was very dark and they heard no sound. We got back to the park and reached Metcalfe's house safely.

Scarcely a house in the old cantonment was left untouched by the rebels. At this time about twenty native regiments of the Bengal native army had mutinied, and we received accounts daily of the mutiny of some regiment.

On June 18 the rebels were reinforced by the mutinied brigade from Nusseerabad, bringing six guns with them. To celebrate the event they came out in force, and made an attack on our rear. The contest was most desperate, and the loss on both sides was great. Major Yule, of the 9th Lancers, was killed ;

Daly, of the Guides, and Becher, the Quartermaster-General, were wounded. Some of the officers who happened not to be on duty, hearing the sound of heavy guns in our rear, rode out in the direction of the firing. Clouds of dust obscured the air as we approached, and numbers of wounded men were carried by us. We heard that several officers had been killed or wounded, but could not judge from the uncertain accounts of the wounded men how the battle went. As it became dusk, we started back at a gallop, but my horse stumbled in a rut in the road, and came down heavily with me. I then discovered that the saddle-girth had snapped, and I had to ride the rest of the way to camp without a saddle. Of our troubles at this period of the siege, that great soldier, Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, wrote at this time, June 22: "The wounded generally are doing well, poor fellows, considering the heat, dirt, and want of bed but the dry ground. Their pluck is wonderful, and it is not in the field alone that you see what an English soldier is made of."

The Commissioner of Delhi, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, was in our camp at this time. His house, as before mentioned, which had been completely gutted by the rebels, was occupied by our picquets. The mutineers used our bugle calls, and frequently came out to fight wearing their red coats. The buttons on the uniforms of the corpses bore the number of the regiments that had mutinied. The work of the artillery in the batteries at this time was most arduous. One man was told off to watch for the flash of the enemy's gun; and when he saw the flash

from the batteries, he shouted "Down," and every one closed up under the shelter of the parapet. The most dangerous part was getting into the batteries, as the enemy had constructed a battery on the right of our position, at a place called the Eed Gurh, from which their shot enfiladed the ridge, the shot and shell crashing along the ridge and striking down any one who happened to be exposed. One shot fired from this battery entered the doorway of Hindoo Rao's house and killed an officer, Lieutenant Wheatley, and eight men of the 2nd Goorkha Regiment, and wounded seven men. After this a large earthen traverse was thrown up in front of the doorway, which stopped the shot from entering the building. The Goorkha Regiment (Sirmoor Battalion) made use of the upper storey of Hindoo Rao's house as a hospital. I remember one of the Goorkha officers asking me to have some dinner with him one evening. While we were eating there was a tremendous crash in the upper storey. The officer merely remarked that there was a shot upstairs, and a dead Goorkha soldier was carried past us a few minutes afterwards.

At this time we received the news of the revolt of the whole of the Province of Oudh and the Gwalior contingent. The enemy received reinforcements almost daily. We could hear the strains of the bands of the mutineer regiments as they marched into the city across the bridge of boats. They played "Cheer, boys, cheer," and other English tunes. After hearing the bands, we were always on the look-out for an attack, as the best regiments were sent out immediately on arriving to make a grand attack on

our position. However, we also received some welcome reinforcements. A battalion of the 8th King's, a detachment of the 61st Regiment, and two regiments of Sikhs, marched into camp at this period. We lost eight officers killed between the 8th and 20th June. Two native sappers were struck by fragments of a shell close to me, as we were going into one of the batteries. One poor fellow had his leg taken off and died in an hour; the other was severely wounded. As there was no medical officer present I tied up the wound with a handkerchief. The behaviour of the men in all the regiments was beyond all praise. One of the Carabineers was struck by a shot, which carried away his arm and leg. He said, "Oh! there goes my arm and leg; give me a drop of water, please."

July 3rd.—Last night we were all ready for the assault, and very eager for it, but the order was countermanded. Plans had been prepared on tracing cloth by the engineer officers, and everything was in readiness. There were to have been five storming parties, with engineer officers to each party. Lieutenants W. Greathed, A. McNeill, and Thackeray were told off to head one of the storming parties, and to blow in with powder-bags a grating through which the canal entered the city, but from which the water had been turned off. At this time we had twenty-two officers of Engineers with the Delhi Field Force, Colonel Baird Smith being in command.

Lieutenant Walker * was severely wounded on

* Afterwards General Walker, C.B., F.R.S., for many years Surveyor-General of India. General Walker died in London in February, 1896.

July 14. The Chief Engineer thus alludes to this incident—

"The casualties in the engineer brigade included three officers . . . Lieutenant J. T. Walker, of the Bombay Engineers, a young soldier of rare daring and self-possession, who was shot through the thigh after performing one of those noble acts of devoted valour. Directed to blow in the gate of a serai occupied in force by the enemy, he could only obtain a number of cartridges from the nearest field battery, as the supply of powder needful for the purpose; carrying these cartridges himself in full view of the enemy under a heavy fire, he was fortunate enough to succeed in lodging them against the gate without being hit. He lit the match and retired; but seeing after a time that the port-fire had burned out, he advanced again and re-lit it, when again it failed.

"He then procured a musket, moved out to the vicinity of the gate and fired into the powder, exploding it at once and blowing away the woodwork effectually. The attacking party at once rushed in and slew the whole of the enemy found inside. After this successful shot, however, Lieutenant Walker received a very severe gunshot wound in the thigh, the ball passing quite through the leg. Before recovering from this wound an attack of cholera supervened, and his services were lost for the remainder of the siege, just at a time when his excellent qualifications as a military surveyor, his clear intellect, and proficient and cool courage would have made his aid invaluable."

Commencing on June 8, the attacks by the garrison on all points of the ground held outside the walls were incessant. The casualties of the force day by day were

most serious. Many of its bravest and best officers had been killed or severely wounded; the daily average of casualties among the soldiers averaged from about thirty to forty, and on occasions of vigorous combats the loss rose from 100 to 150. It was scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the army was steadily and surely being used up by the ordinary process of the siege, and it seemed as though a simple calculation would show how long such a rate of waste of life should be sustained in presence of an enemy by a force numerically so feeble; long it plainly could not be. To shorten the siege, or limit the waste of life, was the urgent necessity of the position. The former could be effected only in one of two ways—the first by regular operations against the place, or, second, by an assault *de vive force*. The insufficiency of artillery and engineer material for even the most limited formal operation made the first plan wholly impracticable.

Such fire, indeed, as the batteries on the ridge were competent to sustain was sustained by purchase from day to day of the shot fired by the enemy, which were sedulously picked up by the camp followers. The whole supply of ordnance powder for seventeen siege pieces in position was no more than 11,600 lbs., barely sufficient for one day's active firing, and even the musketry powder had sunk to 12,900 lbs.

It is questionable whether batteries could have been maintained, even if their first construction had been practicable, as revetting materials were in extremely small numbers. Hence there was no hesitation whatever in abandoning all idea of operations of this class.

The second course—viz. an assault *de vive force*—was plainly a most desperate expedient in the actual condition of the force at the moment. It could only have been justified by assurances of the highest authority that the critical emergency of political circumstances had been such that all risks must be run to achieve a success.

The possibilities of success were sufficient to have warranted the General in making an attack even so desperate as that on Delhi would have been. The Chief Engineer came to this conclusion at the time, and adhered to it until circumstances, to be explained hereafter, had completely changed.

Assuming, however, that an assault involving such undeniable risks might be deferred, systematic provision for reducing the waste of life on the ridge was of the most urgent necessity, and though the means were small, both in men and material, it was absolutely necessary that they should be used and multiplied if the position were to be maintained for even a day.

On the morning of July 5, Sir Henry Barnard received the Chief Engineer at a confidential interview, which lasted about three hours.

The General-in-command explained in the most unreserved terms his views of the position of the force, and at first, especially, he was evidently and most justly impressed with the deepest anxiety for its safety, and felt acutely the heavy weight of personal responsibility that must attach to his own decisions. The general conclusions to which the Chief Engineer had come, as briefly detailed above, were

duly submitted to the General, and were fully discussed. Reserving his final decision, however, at the moment, he appointed a second meeting at noon of the same day, when he expected to be prepared to give definite orders.

There were no external signs of fatal sickness at that time apparent about Sir H. Barnard. A worn and anxious expression of face, with a certain heaviness and dimness of eye, not at all natural to him, were the only signs of suffering that attracted the Chief Engineer's notice. And even these passed away as the discussion advanced, till the general cheerfulness of bearing under all difficulties, which did so much to win for him the warm affection of the whole force he commanded, resumed its usual glow, and the Chief Engineer left Sir Henry Barnard at the close of the interview as resolute for the present and as hopeful for the future as ever.

Scarcely on hour or two passed before the General was stricken with a deadly attack of cholera, and on the Chief Engineer's return to headquarters at about 11 a.m. he was met by the medical attendants with the assurance that he could now see no one, and that the worst was to be feared as to the issue of the disease. The anticipation was realised the same afternoon, and it was with the truest sorrow that the army learnt of the loss it had sustained in the premature death of a chief admired by all for his undaunted courage, his unwearying activity, his single-hearted devotion to duty, and beloved by all for his thoughtful care, courteous bearing, generous appreciation of the efforts of his officers and men, and the general spirit

he diffused around him. No one can make the conduct of Sir Henry Barnard, during that terrible month of June, a careful study without feeling that few soldiers have ever faced sterner perils with a stouter heart, and none have surpassed him in devotion to the Crown, or in the resolute discharge under physical and moral conditions so exhausting that life sank beneath their pressure.

On the death of Sir Henry Barnard, Major-General Read, C.B., assumed the command of the Delhi Field Force.

The Major-General having communicated to the Chief Engineer his opinion that an assault *de vive force* was not expedient, attention was sedulously given to strengthening the position on the ridge, providing cover for the troops, clearing jungle and brushwood on the slopes, so as to diminish as much as possible the cover for the enemy, and finally to the security of the communications, by the demolition of all the bridges by which the enemy could cross the Western Jumna Canal or the Nujufghur Jheel Drainage Cut with his artillery.

As part of a concerted scheme, a detachment of the enemy's cavalry charged into the camp on the 9th, and after causing considerable confusion and some loss was repulsed with heavy slaughter. A general attack was also made on the position under cover of a very hot fire from the place. A strong column under Brigadier-General Chamberlain advanced through the suburbs, clearing them of the enemy and driving him into the city.

It suffered most severely, however, the loss on

this day being 228 in killed and wounded, considerably heavier than any other action in which the force had previously been engaged.

Between July 10 and 14 active work was carried on in strengthening the right flank of the position. Early in the siege, a lofty mound, evidently a disused brick-kiln, had been taken possession of, its crest roughly formed into a battery for three heavy guns, an approach of easy slope cut along its face.

It was called "The General's Mound," from having been a favourite position of Sir Henry Barnard during the many fights of which he was an eye-witness. It was between this mound and a mass of ancient Mahomedan buildings abutting on the Nujufghur Jheel Channel that the enemy's cavalry broke through on the 9th, and it was necessary to make the ground impracticable for horsemen. Strong parapets, deep ditches, and thick abattis of trees and brushwood were carried over all the open spaces; provision was made for placing field guns in battery behind the bank on the right of the mound. The line to the Drainage Channel was thereby strengthened to be safe against attack. On the morning of July 13, the Engineer Brigade lost one of its best and bravest officers by the death from cholera of Lieutenant Edmund Walker. Young in years, but ripe in varied experience, an accomplished soldier, a gallant gentleman, and a friend endeared to his brother officers by many noble qualities, his premature death was felt as a general private sorrow, and a severe public loss.

A battery called Taylor's Battery, named after

Captain Taylor,* was constructed in front of the Pagoda piquet.

About sunrise on the 15th the enemy attacked, as was expected, and the contest continued with variable vigour throughout the day. The position had been so gradually strengthened in all its parts that no impression could be made upon it. The troops remained quietly under cover of their parapets, and the artillery inflicted heavy loss on the enemy from all the batteries on the right.

Scarcely any casualties had occurred until it was determined to move out and drive the enemy from the strong and rugged ground he usually held. This was done, of course, but with some loss, and in the impetuosity of pursuit the column followed the retreating enemy close up to the walls of the city. There they were received with a murderous grape-shot fire, and officers and men fell thick and fast.

The commander of this column, Brigadier Chamberlain, was struck down by a dangerous wound, and before the troops could be extricated from their position, thirteen officers and 209 men were placed *hors de combat*.

The total casualties in the two actions of the 10th and 15th having risen to nearly 500 men, it was necessary to abandon all idea of any active operations against the place from the latter date. Up to that date it had been the personal conviction of the Chief Engineer, duly submitted to the consideration of the Major-General commanding, that the possibilities of success by assault were such as would justify the

* Afterwards General Sir Alexander Taylor, G.C.B.

attempt being made, should the political necessity for it be so great as to warrant very grave risks being accepted.

In the afternoon, a column under Brigadier Jones advanced, and drove the enemy out of the Subzee-Mundi and Trevelyan Gunge. Lieutenant Crozier, of the 75th Regiment, was killed on this occasion. On the 21st and 22nd the rear breastwork at the Metcalf picquet was completed, very much improving the defences at that part, and placing them in a most satisfactory condition.

On July 25 and 26, the lines of fire of the centre battery were altered, and readjusted, so that one embrasure should bear on the Moree, a second on the Cashmere Bastion, and the third on Ludlow Castle.

In addition to the above works, the preparation of gabions and fascines in the engineer park was continued daily without interruption.

II

On July 26 we had received no letters for six weeks, all having been stopped or lost, and we were still waiting for reinforcements. The enemy continued to make attacks on our position three or four times a week. Their average losses on each occasion amounted to some three hundred or four hundred men killed or wounded. Our position at this time was thoroughly entrenched on all sides and perfectly secure from the enemy's attacks. At this time we had been seven weeks in front of the city with a force of about three thousand men, and had to

repulse the enemy's sorties, which were sometimes made with a force of about ten or twelve thousand men. One of the greatest discomforts at this period of the siege was the great plague of flies. On picquet duty the officers amused themselves by making labyrinths with sugar and water on paper, a little gunpowder being also sprinkled on the paper. When the flies accumulated into a black mass the powder was ignited and the flies were then got rid of, but only for a short time, after which they would collect as thickly as before.

It was usual to watch the enemy's sorties from the batteries on the ridge. They sometimes occupied an hour in issuing from the city—cavalry, artillery, and infantry. The ground between the ridge and the city was very favourable for the enemy, being covered with rocks, trees, and bushes, from behind which they were able to pick off our men.

It may be remembered that the siege took place during the rainy season, so that the troops were continually drenched. The engineer officers had to take parties of unarmed coolies out at dusk, and to work between the ridge and the city, their work usually consisting of felling trees and bushes and clearing the ground in front of the picquets. Attacked by the enemy in the darkness and rain, it was really wonderful how patiently these poor coolies bore their sufferings, and their conduct was a matter of universal admiration. All the troops suffered alike. The officers received a daily tot or ration of rum like the men. Many of us carried a soda-water bottle, containing the rum ration, into the trenches,

and I attribute having survived the exposure and wet at this time in a great measure to this cause.

Many of us suffered from dysentery, and cholera had now begun its dire work. The Commander of the Delhi Field Force, Sir Henry Barnard, was seized with cholera on July 5, and died in a few hours. All the officers who were not on duty at the time attended his funeral. Our uniforms were in rags, and we were glad to purchase articles of uniform or clothing of any kind at the sale of the effects of officers who had been killed or died. These sales took place almost daily; a bottle of beer sold for 4 or 5 rupees, and a bottle of brandy for 20 rupees. I dined at the Staff Mess on the evening of June 17, after an attack which had been made on the enemy's battery at the Eed Gurh, under command of Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Tombs.

Captain A. Taylor was at this time second-in-command of the engineers. He seemed to have a charmed life. It was his habit to go about alone, sometimes mounted, but more frequently on foot, between the ridge and the city, reconnoitring the enemy's position, and he seemed to have the faculty of dispensing with sleep. On several occasions he succeeded in penetrating, alone, and in daylight, through the enemy's outposts, to study the ground on which our operations would have to be conducted. Captain Greensill, H.M. 24th Regiment, who was attached to the Engineer Brigade as an assistant engineer, was shot dead by one of our piquets at night, being mistaken for one of the enemy. On July 9 the enemy's cavalry broke into our camp and

cut up several grass-cutters whom they happened to meet. The morning was very dark and misty, and they were at first mistaken by our own men.

On this occasion Major Tombs saved the life of his subaltern officer, Lieutenant Hills (now Lieutenant-General Sir James Hills Johnes, G.C.B.). Hills, who had charged into the mass of the enemy's troopers, after desperate combats with several of the sowars, received a very severe sabre wound and would have been killed had it not been for Major Tombs, who on hearing the firing rushed from his tent and shot two of Hills's assailants. Both officers were awarded the V.C.

The moment that Hills saw the enemy he shouted "Action front," and in the hope of giving his men time to load and fire a round of grape he gallantly charged the head of the column single-handed, cut down the leading man, struck the second, and was then ridden down himself. It had been raining heavily, and Hills wore his cloak, which probably saved his life, as it was cut through in several places.

As soon as the body of the enemy had passed on, Hills, extricating himself from his horse, got up and searched for his sword, which he had lost in the *mêlée*. He had just found it when he was attacked by three men, two of whom were mounted; he fired at and wounded the first man, then caught the lance of the second in his left hand and ran him through the body with his sword. The first assailant coming on again, Hills cut him down, on which he was attacked by the third man on foot. Hills fell in the struggle, and would have been killed if Tombs, who

had rushed out to the piquet, had not come to his rescue.

The route by which the troops marched from the camp to the ridge before arriving at the latter was much exposed to fire from the enemy's shot and shell throughout the siege. The shot fired from the city which missed the batteries on the ridge just cleared the top of the ridge and fell in the valley beyond. Dead camels, horses, and bullocks lay in every direction in this valley, and the stench was almost unbearable. Lieutenant Edward Jones, of the engineers, while engaged in superintending the construction of a breastwork, was struck by a round shot on the left leg, the shot also carrying away the calf of his right leg. His left leg was amputated immediately, and for two days he went on well. I saw him on the afternoon of the day on which he was wounded, and he seemed in good spirits and spoke cheerfully. He was lying on a small camp bed in the hospital tent. On the third day after he was struck he was seized with fever, and died on the fourth day. The swarm of flies that invaded every part of the camp, and especially the hospital tents, greatly aggravated the suffering of the wounded.

It now began to be understood in the camp that the mutineers had broken out into mutiny some days before the time decided upon by the confederation, at the head of whom was the Moolvie of Fyzabad. This is also the view taken by Colonel Malleson in his history of the Indian Mutiny, and he states that the date fixed upon was May 31. The punishment at Meerut of the eighty-nine troopers of the 3rd Light

Cavalry, who were sentenced by a court-martial to periods of imprisonment varying from six to ten years for refusing to take the greased cartridges, precipitated the mutiny. In a letter written from Delhi on July 26, 1857, I find that even as early as that time it was commonly reported that out of seventy-four regiments of infantry in Bengal it was believed that only five remained staunch. We heard at this time that the Europeans at Agra had been compelled to retire into the fort, and we also heard of the capitulation of Sir Hugh Wheeler at Cawnpore, and the subsequent massacre of all the Europeans at that station with the exception of Lieutenants Mowbray, Thompson, and Delafosse, and two privates, who escaped after undergoing wonderful adventures and sufferings. It was frequently believed, and stated by officers and men, at this period of the siege, that death would be preferable to falling into the hands of the rebels.

There were present at the siege two officers, who both rose to be commanders-in-chief in India, Lieutenant Roberts (afterwards Field-Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar) and Sir Donald Stewart, G.C.B. Lord Roberts was deputy-assistant quartermaster-general of artillery during the siege, was wounded on July 14, and had his horse shot under him on September 14.

It may not be out of place here to recall the act of gallantry for which Lieutenant Roberts was awarded the V.C. at Khodagunje a few months afterwards.

At the close of a pursuit which had continued for nearly five miles a body of mutineers had been

overtaken who faced about and fired into the squadron at close quarters. Roberts saw Younghusband fall, but could not go to his assistance, as at that moment one of his sowars was in dire peril from a sepoy who was attacking him with his fixed bayonet, and had he not helped the man and disposed of his opponent he must have been killed. Roberts then descried a sepoy making off with a standard and rode after the rebels and overtook them, and while wrenching the staff out of the hands of one of them, whom he cut down, was nearly killed by another man who put his musket close to his body, but the weapon fortunately missed fire, and he carried off the standard.

Sir Donald Stewart commanded the Volunteers serving in the Allygurh District in May and June, 1857, and, all communications with the upper provinces having been cut off, he volunteered to carry dispatches from the governor of the North-West Provinces to the officer commanding at Delhi. On arriving at the camp he was appointed deputy-assistant adjutant-general of the Field Force, and served throughout the siege, and afterwards as assistant adjutant-general at the siege and capture of Lucknow, and in Rohilcund.

Among other distinguished officers who were present at the siege were General Sir Henry Norman, G.C.B., Governor of Queensland, who was adjutant-general after the death of Colonel Chester, killed at the battle of Badle-ka-Serai; General Sir Charles Reid, G.C.B., who commanded all the advanced posts on the right of the Delhi ridge, including Hindoo

Rao's, the key of the position, during which twenty-six separate attacks were made, and also a column on June 17 for the attack of Kissengunge, and the fourth column of assault on September 14, being severely wounded on that occasion; General Sir D. M. Probyn, G.C.B., V.C.,* who commanded the 2nd Punjab Cavalry; General Sir John Watson, G.C.B., V.C.; Colonels Waterfield, Sconce, and Cantor, the latter of whom was selected as one of the subalterns of the ladder parties at the assault; and many others.

My diary marks July 29 as the fiftieth day of the siege. The drainage of the camp and of the whole position was improved, and the ground in front of the centre battery cut away to enable the guns to fire on the ground 300 yards in their front. These and works of a similar nature were continued without intermission during the month of August.

At dawn on August 12 a column consisting of 1150 infantry, with cavalry and six guns in support, moved down to Ludlow Castle to capture the two field guns which had been annoying us from the front of the stable of Metcalfe's house. The operation was successful, four light guns being seized on the road by Ludlow Castle, many of the gunners being bayoneted, and considerable loss inflicted on the enemy. Our loss was nineteen killed and ninety wounded. Lieutenant Sheriff, 2nd Fusiliers, was

* Captain Probyn afterwards greatly distinguished himself. On October 10 he got separated from his men and was for some time surrounded by the enemy, two of whom he slew. In another charge he captured a standard.

wounded mortally; Brigadier Showers and Major Coke, severely; Lieutenant Owen, 1st Fusiliers, and the orderly officer to Brigadier Showers, slightly.

On August 25, Brigadier-General Nicholson, with a force consisting of about 2200 men of all ranks, and twelve guns, started at 4 a.m. to meet a body of the enemy, which, it was understood, had left the city on the previous day for Nujufgurh, with a view of coming upon our rear. In the evening he came upon them posted in strength near the village of Nujufgurh, and drove them from it with small loss, taking thirteen guns. Several men from Coke's Corps and the 61st were wounded in an attack on another village, in which the enemy had taken refuge, and which was walled and difficult of access. Here Lieutenant Lumsden, acting commandant of the corps, a most excellent officer, was, unfortunately killed, and also Lieutenant Gabbett of the 61st, and Lieutenant Elkington of the same regiment. The rebels left all their camp equipment behind them. Lieutenant Geneste and thirty sappers destroyed the Nujufgurh Bridge after the action, though still under a heavy fire.

On the afternoon of the 26th the rebels attacked our right, bringing out six guns. Apparently they supposed that the main body of our troops had gone out with Nicholson's column. About fifty sowars rashly charged up to within fifty yards of Salkeld's Battery, where many paid the penalty of their rashness with their lives. Our casualties were twelve in this affair. General Nicholson's column returned at dusk.

On the 27th a battery for six light guns was marked out in the Pagoda left trench. The enemy fired a good deal at our working parties, but without doing any harm, and our batteries sustained their fires.

On August 30, Lieutenant Warrand (afterwards Major-General, retired list), the field engineer on duty, was dangerously wounded by a fragment of shell while laying out an embrasure. His arm was amputated close to the shoulder.

On September 1, a shell fired from the other side of the river, bursting in the Metcalfe stable, killed and wounded nine men, these being the first casualties that had occurred from this battery.

On the nights of September 3 and 4, Lieutenant Tennant (afterwards Lieutenant-General, C.I.E.) was sent down to construct a battery for two light guns on the right of the 6-gun battery, to fire across the front of the Sammy House, but the fire was too hot to enable any work to be done. A road for light guns was, however, made to the 6-gun battery. A magazine was commenced for the 6-gun battery.

The siege guns arrived on September 5; the remainder of the 60th Rifles; and the Jummo contingent, led by Richard Lawrence, on the 8th. All was now ready for the breaching of the city walls and the subsequent assault.

In anticipation of the siege, means had been taken to store the engineer park with all the materials and tools required during the operations. The arrival of the siege train having placed the artillery in an equally satisfactory condition, ground was

broken as soon after its arrival as possible, being on the night of September 7, 1857.

The project of attack submitted by the Chief Engineer to the Major-General commanding, and honoured with his sanction, provided for a concentrated rapid and vigorous attack on the front of the place included between the Water or Moree and Cashmere bastions, provision being made at the same time for silencing all important flanking fire, whether of artillery or musketry, that could be brought to bear on the lines of advance to be taken by the assaulting columns. Due care was also taken to protect the exposed right flank of the trenches from sorties. The left was secured by being rested on the river, and by the occupation of the Koodsea Bagh, a very strong post in front.

The best information procurable indicated that on the front of attack the fire of some twenty-five to thirty pieces would have to be subdued. To effect this fifty-four siege guns were available.

Captain Taylor, as has been before mentioned, succeeded on several occasions in penetrating alone through the enemy's outposts for the purpose of studying the ground, and on the general information so obtained, and his own knowledge of the locality, Major Baird Smith prepared the project of the attack. On the evening of September 6 the project was formally considered by General Wilson. General Nicholson volunteered to accompany Taylor to see the ground and the points selected for the batteries. It was now dark, and they did not know the strength or disposition of the rebels. They went to some of

the places of most importance, and found them unoccupied. Nicholson was satisfied, and reported what he had seen to General Wilson, who then gave his sanction to the Chief Engineer's proposals.

The plan of attack consisted, in principle, in establishing on the front of the fortification selected an artillery fire so much more powerful than that of the enemy on the same front that the result must be to silence his guns and crush his works. The Chief Engineer had good information that on the front between the river and the Cashmere Bastion not more than thirty heavy guns could be brought to bear upon our approaches. So arrangements were made for placing fifty-six pieces of siege ordnance, of various calibres, against this front, and in about four days the whole opened with terrible effect. Two excellent breaches were made in the walls within forty-eight hours; the cover for the enemy's infantry was at the same time utterly swept away; an incessant storm of shot and shell poured into the place, and on September 14 all was ready for the final assault, which was accordingly given with brilliant success.

On September 7 General Wilson issued an address to the troops, complimenting them upon their past conduct, warning them that the hardest part of their task was now about to begin, but assuring them that if they maintained their discipline they could not fail to succeed, and bidding them spare women and children, but give no quarter to mutineers.

About the same time the last reinforcements arrived from the Punjab.

The officers and men were regularly practised in

the loading and unloading of the siege materials on camels, and every vicissitude that would be likely to occur was duly provided for. It was necessary that the attack should be directed against the northern face, represented by the Moree, Cashmere, and Water Bastions, with the curtain wall between them. The evening of the 7th was fixed for the commencement of the tracing of the assailing batteries. Under the orders of Lieutenant W. Greathed, I was told off to assist in the tracing out of No. 2 Battery. This battery was situated in front of Ludlow Castle, 500 yards distant from the Cashmere Gate. It was designed with the object of silencing the fire from the Cashmere Bastion, to dismantle the parapets of the walls to the right and left which gave cover to the defenders, and to open a breach to the stormers. If I remember rightly, about 1400 camels were employed to carry the fascines and other siege materials. The camels were quietly loaded, and the working parties marched off at dusk on the evening of the 7th.

For about a fortnight previous to the commencement of the siege batteries, large working parties were sent out to cut the trees and bushes near the sites proposed for the batteries, and from letters written at this period I find that, of all the duties during the siege, the supervision of these parties was the most arduous. The men were at work from dusk to dawn, groping and stumbling about in the long, rank jungle, wet through with the rain and dew, and frequently attacked by the enemy.

On the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th the batteries

were completed. These were of great size, built up to the soles of the embrasures with fascines! 1500 camels were employed nightly in carrying down the fascines.

Every one expected that the attention of the enemy would be attracted on the first night to the grunting and noise of the camels, but, strange to say, the animals were unusually quiet. Strange, also, though it may seem, the enemy fired very little on the batteries which were under construction, although a heavy fire was concentrated upon them after they were completed and had opened fire. Almost all the engineer officers present and fit for duty were on duty for three nights continuously at this period.

On the 12th the batteries opened fire, and the first salvo carried away a large portion of the wall of the Cashmere Bastion. No. 1 Battery consisted of five 18-pounders, one 8-inch howitzer, four 24-pounders. No. 2 Battery was placed in front of Ludlow Castle, and consisted of two 18-pounders, nine 24-pounders, and seven 8-inch howitzers. A battery of six 9-pounders and two 24-pounders, under Major Remington, had been placed below Hindoo Rao's house so as to play on the Moree Bastion. No. 1 Battery, which was within 700 yards of the walls, was planted in advance of this. Four guns of this battery were directed against the Cashmere Bastion, and six against the Moree Bastion. The batteries in this position were under the command of Major Brind.

There was also a battery of ten mortars under Major Tombs, and another battery at the Custom House under Major Scott. During the construction

of the former battery, a rocket fired from the Moree Bastion ricochetted among the coolies employed in the battery, killing thirteen. Their comrades laid the bodies in a row, and went on with their work as before.

To reach the battery in the Custom House was a matter of great danger owing to the continual storm of bullets fired from the Water Bastion. I remember looking up at the trees and seeing the leaves falling from the hail of bullets.

From the 9th to the 14th, the morning of the assault, the pounding went on day and night from about fifty guns and mortars. The Moree Bastion was soon silenced, and the line of parapet which sheltered the sharpshooters was stripped. The Cashmere Bastion was silenced in ten minutes after the Ludlow batteries opened upon it.

There were seventy casualties in the trenches on the first day of the opening of the siege batteries. In a letter from the chief engineer to Major Brind, commanding the artillery, the former wrote—

"No. 1 Battery was unquestionably the key of the attack, and on its success depended the opening of Delhi to our assaulting columns. The progress of the other batteries depended essentially on its efficiency, and but for your moral courage, clear perception, and unwavering resolution in arming and working it in spite of all obstacles, consequences would have followed causing the greatest embarrassment."

The fire from the left section of No. 1 Battery had been steadily directed against the Cashmere

Bastion, when about noon on the 10th the half-battery caught fire from the constant discharge of the guns. The rebels at once directed on the burning battery every gun they could command, and it was only saved by the gallantry of Lieutenant Lockhart, who was on duty at the battery with two companies of the 2nd Goorkhas. Calling for volunteers, this officer jumped on the parapet, followed by six or seven Goorkhas, and, taking the sand-bags from the top, they smothered the fire with the sand. Two of the Goorkhas were shot dead, and Lockhart was shot through the jaw, but by great exertions the survivors succeeded in extinguishing the fire.

On the 11th the mortar battery opened fire, and Scott's heavy battery was unmasked.

An hour before noon on the 12th, No. 3 Battery, on the left, was unmasked. It was situated in the old Custom House, and was constructed to a great extent of sand-bags. It was here that Major Fagan, of the Bengal Artillery, was killed on the afternoon of the 13th. I entered the battery a few minutes after this sad event. The Major's helmet, with the fatal hole through it, was lying in the battery.

On September 10, Private Divane, 60th Rifles, distinguished himself by leading a successful charge, and on September 13 Bugler Sutton was one of the party which reconnoitred the breach. The bugler had previously, on August 2, when the enemy were attacking in force, rushed forward and killed a bugler who was in the act of sounding. Both of these men obtained the Victoria Cross.

In the Water Bastion the fire from the heavy

guns at the Custom House, at 160 yards, played with fearful effect, the guns were dismounted and smashed, and the breach opened; while under the play of Tombs' mortars the curtain was literally stripped. The losses of the British from the enfilading fire of the enemy were very heavy, but the assault was no longer to be delayed, and on the night of the 13th the order was issued for the assault to take place at daybreak on the following morning.

The dangerous duty of examining the breaches was performed by three engineer officers, Lieutenants Medley,* Lang,† and Greathed.‡ Medley and Lang crept out and reached the edge of the ditch undiscovered, descended into it, and although they saw the enemy was on the alert they carefully examined the breach. A volley was fired at them, but they returned unhurt, and reported the breach practicable. A similar report was received of the breach in the Water Bastion.

I was on duty in the Custom House Battery on the night of the 13th, and about midnight received an order to return at once to the camp, and to join the reserve columns under Brigadier Longfield, Lieutenant David Ward being also told off to this column. The engineer officers were told off to the several attacking columns by seniority.

There were to be four columns of attack, with a reserve; the first was to storm the breach in the

* Lieutenant-General Medley entered the service in 1847, and died in 1886.

† Colonel Lang, C.B., R.E., formerly Head of the Thomason Civil Engineering College, Roorkee.

‡ Major-General W. W. Greathed, C.B., died December, 1878.

Cashmere Bastion, the second that in the Water Bastion, the third to enter by the Cashmere Gate when blown in by the Engineers, and the fourth on the extreme right to clear the Kissengunge suburb and then enter by the Lahore Gate, while the reserve was to follow in the wake of the first three columns, and throw in supports when necessary.

The columns consisted of—

No. 1.—Under General Nicholson, 1000 men.
No. 2.—Under Brigadier-General Jones, 61st Regiment, 800 men.
No. 3.—Under Colonel Campbell, 52nd Light Infantry, 1000 men.
No. 4.—Under Major Reid, commanding Sirmoor Battalion, 780 men.
Reserve.—Under Brigadier-General Longfield, 1200 men.

After being told off to the different columns, the officers joined the storming-parties, and marched with the column to their respective posts. I remember that on arriving with the reserve column at Ludlow Castle it was just daylight. The guns from the batteries, which had kept up a heavy fire during the night, suddenly ceased, and for a few minutes there was a lull in the firing, and an unusual stillness seemed to prevail. This was suddenly ceased by a loud explosion from the Cashmere Gate and by a fierce rattle of musketry from the different columns of assault. As the accounts of the blowing in of the Cashmere Gate by the party under Lieutenants Home and Salkeld have varied in some slight particulars,

I will merely in this narrative extract from a letter written immediately after the siege.

It was just daylight when the third column halted at a turn in the road which concealed them from view of the walls, but close to the Cashmere Gate. Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, of the Engineers, and Sergeants Carmichael, Burgess, and Smith, and four sappers, with Havildar Madho and Bugler Hawthorn, H.M. 52nd Regiment, advanced from the column up to the gate. It was an immensely heavy wooden gate, flanked on all sides by the walls. Home laid the powder-bags at the foot of the gate. The party was instantly discovered, and a heavy fire opened upon them from all sides. Sergeant Carmichael took the fuse, and was on the point of firing it when he was shot dead by a sepoy who placed his musket through a hole in the gate. Sergeant Burgess took the fuse from his hand, and was also shot dead. Lieutenant Salkeld then took the fuse, and was shot through the arm and fell into the ditch, breaking his leg in the fall. As he fell he threw up the fuse, which Sergeant Smith seized and fired the charge, and jumped into the ditch. At the same time the bugler sounded the advance, and on rushed the column. The charge blew up the gate and about seventeen of the enemy who were close to it. Lieutenant Home was most unfortunately killed on October 1, while superintending the blowing up of Fort Malagurh. The train had been laid and the slow match lighted, but the explosion not following as quickly as he expected Home thought the match had gone out, and went forward again to re-light it.

At that moment the charge exploded. Our troops rushed in at the gate, up the bastion, and along the walls. At the same time the first and second columns attacked by the breaches, and the walls were cleared of the defenders. The Cashmere Gate presented a terrible sight; several sepoys had been blown up by the explosion, and others, bayoneted or shot by the assailants, were lying all about. I noticed that the men on guard at the gateway were for the most part men of the Hurrianah Light Infantry. The same scene of carnage and destruction was visible along the walls and bastions. No quarter was asked or given. I went into the Cashmere Bastion, and such a scene of destruction has seldom been witnessed. Almost every gun was dismounted and smashed by the fire from our guns, large pieces of iron being in many cases knocked out of the guns. Dead sepoys lay about in all imaginable positions. The troops took up positions in the college and church, but the enemy fired at us during the whole of the night of the 14th. I saw hundreds of wounded men carried by in doolies. I also saw the dooly carried by that contained General Nicholson. At dusk we made a battery by the college, and commenced shelling the town and palace. The battery was, as far as I recollect, under the command of Captain Hamilton (now Lieutenant-General Sir W. Hamilton, Bart, C.B.), and a heavy fire was kept up on the city from this battery during the whole of the night of the 14th. We lost most of our men in the town. They advanced too far without supports, and were fired at from the walls and houses. Our losses in the assault and taking of the city

were sixty-four officers and 1380 men killed and wounded.

Surgeon H. T. Reade (afterwards Surgeon-General and C.B.) was one of the first in the breach, and succeeded in spiking a gun.

Captain R. H. Shebbeare, 60th Native Infantry, was severely wounded while endeavouring to capture a loopholed serai. The name of Ensign Everard Phillipps, 11th Bengal Native Infantry, was proverbial in the Delhi Field Force for the number of gallant acts performed during the siege. He was thrice wounded, and captured the Water Bastion on September 14 with a small party of men. This gallant and promising young officer was killed during the street fighting on the 18th. These officers were awarded the V.C. for their conduct on the 14th.

At the assault on the 14th, the storming-party, under Captain Baynes, H.M. 8th Regiment, lost the greater part of their number.

On the same day, from a detachment of 200 men of the 9th Lancers, the losses were six officers and forty-two men. Of the seventeen Engineer officers engaged, Lieutenant Tandy was killed, and Salkeld died from his wounds a few days afterwards. Lieutenants Greathed, Maunsell, Medley, Hovenden, and Pemberton were wounded. The losses during the fighting on the 14th were eight European officers and 162 rank and file killed, and 510 wounded, while Lieutenant Bristowe, H.M. 8th Regiment, was killed on September 18.

On the 16th the magazine was stormed by H.M. 61st Regiment, Wilde's Punjabees and Beloochees,

the whole under Colonel Deacon of the 61st. I was attached to this column. The enemy were surprised, and offered very little resistance. But in the afternoon they returned and made an attack in great force on the magazine. They opened a heavy fire on the turrets, where men of the 61st were posted to keep down the enemy's fire. A soldier of the 61st was shot through the head by my side in one of these turrets. The poor fellow lived for about twenty minutes, writhing in agony on the ground. The rebels set fire to the roof of the magazine, the fire being extinguished with much difficulty, and Renny, of the Artillery (afterwards Major-General), got upon the roof with some shells, which were handed up to him, and which he dropped on the enemy's heads. He dropped five or six shells in this manner, and many of the enemy must have been killed, as they ceased their attack soon afterwards. We afterwards heard that the rebels who attacked the magazine were ghazis. On this occasion I succeeded in extinguishing the fire on the magazine roof by pouring water on the fire from mussuks (leather bags), which were filled below and handed up to me by a bheestie (native water-carrier). The men who set fire to the roof stood on ladders propped against the wall and fired at Renny and myself at a few paces distant, and I could never understand how we escaped.

On the 18th a reconnaissance was made by Taylor, who penetrated as far as the Chandene Chowk; he found the houses partly occupied by their usual inhabitants, and not by an armed enemy. On the

19th, with a small detachment, Taylor worked through the houses and captured the Burn Bastion.

On the night of the 19th I was again on duty in a large house facing the palace, and received orders to place it in a state of defence. This was done by placing sand-bags between the interstices of the parapets on the top of the house. The enemy kept up a slack fire during the night. I was relieved at daybreak and returned to the Engineer camp, which had been removed down to the glacis outside the Cashmere Gate; and shortly afterwards we heard that the palace had been captured, and that the whole city was in our possession. The defeated rebels fled in every direction, and the British flag once more waved over the walls of the capital of Northern India. A memorial monument commemorates the capture of Delhi. The besieging army subscribed one day's pay towards its erection, but this sum, though amounting to nearly 20,000 rupees, falling short of the estimate, the building was taken in hand by the Government and completed at a cost of 24,000 rupees.

It is built on the Ridge, on the site of the right battery, and being 110 feet high is seen from every point. It bears on its faces the names of the officers and men of the several British regiments, and of the English officers of the native regiments who fell during the siege.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL SIR ALEXANDER TAYLOR, G.C.B.

At the conclusion of the short account of my recollections of the Siege of Delhi it may not be out of place to reproduce from the pages of the *Royal Engineer Journals* of May and June, 1912, a Memoir of the late General Sir Alexander Taylor, G.C.B., R.E., to whose eminent services during the siege many references have been made, and to whose energy and ability, together with that of the late Colonel Richard Baird Smith, C.B., R.E., the successful issue of the siege was mainly due.

In the death of General Sir Alexander Taylor, G.C.B., late President of the Royal Indian Engineering College at Cooper's Hill, which took place at his residence at Englefield Green, on Sunday, 25th February, at the age of 86, we have to deplore the loss of one of the most distinguished of the old Punjab officers trained in the school of the Lawrences, and one who took a most important part in the Siege of Delhi during the great Indian Mutiny of 1857.

Sir Alexander Taylor belonged to a family of Scotch extraction, settled in Ireland. Among his earliest recollections were the venerable figures of his

great-uncles, Major Alex. Taylor, R.E. (b. 1746), Major Archibald Taylor, H.M. 81st Regt. (b. 1747), and that of his grandfather, Capt. George Taylor (b. 1748), all of whom were born near Aberdeen, and were able, strong-brained, and strong-tempered men. They were all three Commissioners of Lighting and Paving in Dublin, in the neighbourhood of which they held property.

The career of George, the youngest of these brothers, is characteristic of the family predilection for engineering and military adventure.

He began life as a Civil Engineer at Aberdeen, where his father, Alex. Taylor of Anfield, lived. Before he was thirty he had planned and superintended the construction of the Aberdeen-Inverarie Canal. He was also employed on the construction of the harbour of Howth (Dublin).

In 1776 he published, in conjunction with his friend, Mr. Skinner, a detailed survey of the roads of Scotland; and, in the following year, a similar survey of the Roads of Ireland.

Next year the background of his life changed suddenly. We find him in 1779 serving as a Volunteer in the British Army, fighting under Sir Henry Clinton in the United States, first at New York, and then at the successful Siege of Charlestown. His force of character and ability speedily made themselves felt; in 1781 he was attached to the guides, and was appointed Captain Surveyor to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Clinton. In the following year he held the same office under Sir Guy Carleton. He afterwards went to Jamaica, where he immediately

received a commission as Captain in the Duke of Cumberland's local regiment.

Shortly after this he returned to Aberdeen, married his cousin, Barbara Thompson, daughter of Alex. Thompson, of Mount Haillee, inherited, or bought, his father's place, Anfield, was made a Free Burgess of the City, and became the Captain of the Aberdeen Volunteers.

Ten years later he left Scotland for Dublin, where he remained until his death, at the age of 88, in 1836. In conjunction with his two brothers he undertook, in addition to other charges, the management of certain high-roads connecting Dublin with the South and West of Ireland.

He had three sons: Archibald, who joined the Royal Engineers; George, who in his turn became Commissioner of Lighting and Paving in Dublin; and William, the father of the subject of this Memoir.

The profession towards which every member of this family had a natural bias was engineering; it was towards this that William Taylor turned, not so much as a scientific art, but as an instrument for promoting certain social and economic public ends which were the chief interests of the little group of Scotsmen (his father and uncles), in the midst of which he had grown up.

Having entered into partnership with the celebrated engineer, Sir John MacNeill, he moved to London in 1833, returning to Dublin, however, after five years' "exile," to devote himself to furthering the introduction into Ireland of the new steam locomotion, the use of which he confidently expected would launch

his country on an era of prosperity. To the energy, tact, and enthusiasm with which he prosecuted this difficult work was largely due the rapidity with which, in spite of almost disabling difficulties, the Great Southern and South-Western Railway of Ireland was opened. This railway was his passion. He worked for it *con amore* from the day when it was but a project in a few eager minds, to the day of his death in 1870.

Alex. Taylor, the subject of this Memoir, was William Taylor's eldest son, and was born in Dublin in 1826.

At the age of 12, he was sent to the celebrated school at Hofwyl, near Berne, founded and personally managed by Pestalozzi's famous collaborator, Herr von Fellenberg. The foundations of this great educationalist's system were religion and altruism; the love of man being considered the natural outcome of love of a divine Creator. His own life was the embodiment of his teaching. Aiming at the production of healthy, capable, public-spirited, and god-fearing citizens, he devoted as much attention to the education of his pupil's bodies and characters, as to that of their intelligences. He trained their hands, their eyes, and their ears as carefully as he did their brains; a circumstance to which Alex. Taylor owed much of his success in after life.

The practical and public-spirited bias of Herr von Fellenberg's teaching, so different to the purely scholastic system then in vogue, appealed to William Taylor; for the character and activities of his progenitors, and his own connection with great engineering

works had taught him to value all that tends to promote the civilisation of a country by developing its material resources.

Alex. Taylor remained at Hofwyl till he was fifteen: three years, to which he always looked back as among the happiest of his life. He rose rapidly to a position of mark in the school, more especially in bodily exercises: he was one of the best gymnasts of the place, a notable skater, a good rider, boxer, and fencer. He was also one of those selected to recite on public occasions. The moral influences to which he was subjected in Switzerland formed the man of the future.

He entered the H.E.I. Company's Military College at Addiscombe in August, 1841, and passed out in the Engineers in June, 1843. His contemporaries of the same term were the late General Charles Waterloo Hutchinson, Inspector-General of Military Works in India, Colonel Commandant, R.E.; the late Colonel Daniel George Robinson, C.B., Director-General of Indian Telegraphs; and the late Captain George William Wright Fulton, who was killed at Lucknow during the defence of the Residency in September, 1857.*

Lieutenant Taylor arrived in India in 1844, joined the headquarters of the Sappers at Meerut in

* Captain Fulton was one of the leading spirits of the defence; active, resolute, and cheerful under all difficulties. He had been inspecting a new battery, and, lying at full length in one of the embrasures with a telescope in his hand, had turned his face, with a smile, towards his comrades, saying, "They are just going to fire," when a round-shot carried away the back of his head. His loss to the garrison was said to have been the most important after that of Sir Henry Lawrence.

September, 1845, and was shortly afterwards sent to Ferozepore in command of a company of Sappers.

His chief amusement at Chatham had been sailing, a pastime which, if it had militated somewhat against the attainment of the highest places in the list, now stood him in good stead; for, on the strength of his reputation as a yachtsman, he was put into temporary charge of Lord Ellenborough's flotilla of some 56 boats for military bridging, which, built in Bombay, had just made its appearance on the Sutlej.

On the outbreak of the first Sikh War (1845–1846) he had orders to sink these boats and to fall back on Ferozepore, which shortly afterwards was threatened by Tej Singh, at the head of 30,000 Sikhs, to whom General Littler could oppose 10,000 men only, chiefly sepoys.

Although a young subaltern, Taylor was put in command of the Sappers and Miners, on whom depended the defence works of the city at this critical time. He was a member of the skeleton army, 1000 men only, left to deceive Tej Singh, when Littler, slipping out of Ferozepore, reinforced the hardly-pressed British troops at Ferozshah (December 21, 22, 1845).

After this dearly-bought victory, the Sikhs having withdrawn from the neighbourhood, he had orders to raise the boats he had sunk, which afterwards formed the bridge across which the victorious British Army marched to Lahore after the Battle of Sobraon (February 10, 1846).

For this campaign Taylor received a medal and two clasps.

On the outbreak of hostilities at Mooltan (1848) he carried down 200 miles through the dangerous shoals and rapids of the Sutlej to the neighbourhood of Bhawalpore, in the same unwieldy boats built not for purposes of locomotion but for bridging, the heavy Engineer train required for the siege.

He served during the double siege of Mooltan under Robert Napier,* who had been his sole passenger throughout this adventurous voyage. It was during this journey that the Chief Engineer learned to know and value the qualities of the subaltern of whose promptitude and resource he availed himself largely during the siege; to whom, as will be seen, he afterwards committed the construction of the Grand Trunk Road lying between Lahore and Peshawur; and finally to whom, long years later, he offered the post of Quartermaster-General of the Bengal Army.

Alex. Taylor was in charge of the Engineer's Park † throughout both sieges, and made himself a reputation both as an Engineer and as the maker of brilliant and hazardous reconnaissances.

He guided the cavalry at the affair of Sooruj Koond (November 8), at which engagement five guns, which had been firing for some days into Edwardes' Camp, were taken—the success of this operation

* Field-Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., Colonel Commandant, R.E.

† "Major Siddons, R.E., the historian of the Siege," writes Sir Herbert Edwardes, "makes justly honourable mention of Lieutenant A. Taylor, the officer in charge of the Engineer's Park who, with a singular zeal and ingenuity prepared all kinds of contrivances for facilitating siege operations, making his Park quite a show."—H. Edwardes, "A Year in the Panjab," II., 537.

being largely due to his extraordinary knowledge of the enemy's ground and positions.

When the breaches in the walls of Mooltan were completed, he was allowed by Robert Napier to act as guide to the party assaulting the left breach, a perilous honour which was not his by right of precedence. The assault was successful, but he was severely wounded.

At the decisive Battle of Goojerat (February 29, 1849) he was orderly officer to General Sir John Cheape, the Chief Engineer, and had his horse disabled under him. He joined in Gilbert's pursuit of the broken enemy from Chenab to the mouth of the Khyber, and was present at the submission of the Sikhs near Rawul Pindee. After this campaign he was thanked for his services in despatches, and received a medal with two clasps.

In May, 1849, Robert Napier, the Chief Engineer of the newly annexed Panjab, entrusted him with the construction of a new military road destined to connect Lahore and Peshawur—a distance of 290 miles. This great work had to be commenced, *ab initio*; the country was wild and unsurveyed; no regular roads existed; no maps; no machinery; and no organised body of labour, skilled or otherwise. The Lahore-Peshawur Road is now the first military road in India, and in its extent, and in the dimensions of its bridges can be compared only with the grand military roads over the passes leading from Italy to Switzerland. The first project was to open a main line of trunk road from Delhi to Peshawur. The viaducts over the Five Rivers were to be postponed,

but the bridges of all the lesser streams were to be undertaken, and a good passage made through the rugged region between the Jhelum and the Indus. The roadmakers under Lieutenant Taylor immediately grappled with all the engineering difficulties over the whole length of this extensive line, connecting most of the important stations of the province with each other, and with the other provinces of India. From this trunk line there radiated branches in every direction; the most noteworthy of which was the road from Lahore, the capital, leading southwards to Mooltan and immediately connecting the Punjab with Sind. Taylor worked unremittingly on this road from 1849 to 1857.

The young roadmaker, with the experience and lessons of Mooltan fresh in his mind, joined the force before Delhi on June 27, 1857, and was present throughout the greater part of the rest of the operations as second in command of the Engineers, under Colonel Baird Smith, the Chief Engineer.

It is unnecessary, in this short and inadequate account of Sir Alex. Taylor's great services, to dwell on the so-called "controversy," of which the subject is the degree of credit for the happy issue of the Siege due respectively to Colonel Baird Smith, and to his second in command, Captain Taylor. The subject was irksome and painful to Sir Alexander himself, who, though naturally pained by certain miscarriages of justice of which he was the victim, always begged his many friends to neither speak nor write on his behalf.

Certain letters bearing on the points in dispute

have been kindly placed at my disposal by Lady Taylor. They were written by Sir Alexander Taylor, under the pressure of circumstances and in reply to direct questions, to Sir John Kaye, after the publication of his history of the Mutiny. As they will probably be published shortly, in their entirety, the quotations made from them here will be confined to passages containing technical matter relating to the Siege, which may be of use to Engineer officers engaged in siege warfare.

Before giving these extracts I would call the reader's attention to a short note by Sir Frederick Maunsell on this group of letters, a note which I publish with his permission. It bears witness to Alex. Taylor's chivalrous and self-sacrificing nature, and runs: "Sir Alex. Taylor's letters give the best evidence concerning his action and work in the Siege. I knew him first at Mooltan, and afterwards at Delhi. These defensive replies were forced from him by those who demanded the facts from him directly. Never was he one to claim more than his due. At Delhi he simply did as a duty, what was laid on him, and humbly let others . . . take the credit and honour really due to him."

The following extracts are taken from a letter to Sir John Kaye, dated November 29, 1875, in which Alex. Taylor describes the manner in which the plan of attack was gradually evolved.

"It will be convenient," he writes, "to consider separately the time we were on the defensive, and that during which we were the assailants. During the first period the engineering works were, as

compared with the second, on a smaller scale. Our general routine was the following:—The work to be done to-morrow was decided upon to-day, generally on my return to camp in the evening; but, sometimes, on the report of the Engineer officers who came off duty; or on the requisition of an officer commanding a post. The detailed orders, when drawn up, were placed on record, and issued. Anything emergent was dealt with on the spot, generally by me, and reported to Baird Smith on my return to camp. This arrangement worked excellently. I do not remember meeting any difficulty in having what I wished done,—'put in orders,'—or that I was ever directed to carry out what I did not approve of.

"But beside the current work there was the big question ever present: 'How is the attack eventually to be made?' I often talked the matter over with Baird Smith. We both agreed as to the front which was to be attacked; and it was also clear to us both of what immense value *time* would be when once we had taken such a step as would disclose our intention to the enemy.

"An attack in full form, with trenches, etc., was clearly out of the question. We could not hope to have the men for it . . .

"Before a project could be framed which involved the formation of a breach it must be clearly ascertained that the walls could be seen from a distance so low down as to admit of their being breached. If they could not be thus seen, then an attack of this kind would be impracticable.

"Again, in a race against time it was evidently necessary that the proposals, whatever they might be, should have been critically examined beforehand *on the very ground*. There must be no question as to whether the objects to be fired at by the different batteries proposed would be visible from the sites

intended for the aforesaid batteries. There must be no room for error . . .

"The ground we purposed to operate on had been in the hands of the enemy since May; and part of it at that time was studded with large buildings and trees. What had the enemy done? Had he levelled the Custom House? The Khoodsia Bagh? Ludlow Castle? Had he fortified them? Did he occupy them in force? A time project could be prepared only when all these questions could be answered with certainty . . .

"The first thing to be done was to get on to the ground on which our work would lie. But how to do it? It had long been in the enemy's hands, and he had a large piquet of perhaps a regiment in Ludlow Castle. But we wished, carefully, to avoid alarming him in this direction; it would not do therefore to ask the General to drive in this piquet; nor, even if this were done, were we likely then by open force, to be able to carefully examine the ground we wanted:—to get into the Khoodsia Bagh, and to examine the Custom House, and the ground round it, lying close, as they all did, to the ramparts. The prospect was not encouraging.

"Watching Ludlow Castle, however, one day from the Ridge, it seemed to me that the old piquet had been vacated, and that the new one had not arrived. I thought I had now a chance of examining the ground personally. Disencumbering myself of my sword, and armed with a pistol only, I took a party of sixteen men from a piquet of the "Guides" and advancing from Metcalfe's piquet passed between Ludlow Castle and the river, and reached the Khoodsia Bagh. Leaving the men in extended order outside, with strict orders on no account to fire, I entered the enclosure with the havildar, and explored it thoroughly; then, mounting on the wall next the city, I could see

the sentry on the ramparts, seemingly so close, that it was difficult not to think that he *must* hear the noise my climbing unavoidably made. The Custom House, 180 yards from him, lay immediately in front of me, and for more than an hour, lying on my face on the top of the wall, behind a small shrub, I carefully examined it, and the ground around it. Finally, after a stay in the Khoodsia Bagh of about two hours, we effected our retreat without having been observed.

"This work was of course of extreme risk and danger. We knew that our left flank was safe, as it rested on the river; but, obliged as we were to keep ourselves strictly in the dense cultivation—chiefly groves of orange-bushes—we could not know what was happening on our right; and with the enemy's piquet-house between us and our nearest post—more than a mile off—escape would be hopeless should we be discovered.

"I learned on this occasion that the roof of the Custom House had been burnt, and had fallen in, but, that the brick walls remained standing (this was eventually the site of Battery No. 3); that the ramparts could not be breached from the Khoodsia Bagh; that neither the latter place, nor the Custom House were, or had been, occupied by the enemy, the vegetation around them being fresh and untrampled; and that the only place in the vicinity outside the walls which was occupied in force was Ludlow Castle.

"Other opportunities similar in character seemed to offer at intervals throughout the operations in July, August, and September; and I always tried to take advantage of them, though not always with success. Sometimes we stumbled upon the enemy, and had to fall back.

"On one occasion, when far in front of our most advanced posts, we were allowed to march to within 60 yards of a low stone wall which crossed our path

at right angles—myself and twenty men—when suddenly a couple of hundred men—who, seeing us coming, concealed themselves behind it—sprang up; delivered a volley in our faces; and jumping over the wall, tried to close with us. After a little hesitation, we turned, and took to our heels, with a lead of perhaps 30 yards (fortunately in the hurry and excitement the fire had been bad, and only one of our men had been touched—grazed in the knee, but not crippled), and after an exciting race of more than half a mile I should say, we escaped uninjured into Metcalfe's piquet.

"On another occasion, Ludlow Castle seeming to be unoccupied, and an escort not being readily procurable, I made my way to it alone, and was using my eyes from the *top of its roof*, when the head of a regiment appeared; I saw it entering the gateway, literally only a few yards off; I succeeded in getting downstairs; out at a door on the other side of the house; and over the garden wall; fortunately without having been observed.

"On most of these explorations I was not accompanied by any officer. The work was of a very dangerous and risky kind, and lives in those days were very valuable. But Greathed, I remember, was with me on one of my failures; and Lieutenant Thomason, R.E., on another day, when we succeeded in getting into the Khoodsia Bagh.

"In this laborious way I was able to mature a project which would bear scrutiny.

"The breaching batteries were placed where alone they could be successful, *i.e.* on the prolongation of the right flank of the Cashmere Bastion.

"The other batteries were all placed where their guns could clearly see to do the duty assigned to them.

"The Khoodsia Bagh, which still remained

unoccupied by the enemy, and unimpaired, provided a secure and well-sheltered post close to the ramparts, for the troops required to protect the advanced battery, No. 3.

"Ludlow Castle similarly afforded a good cover for the guard to protect the breaching battery, No. 2.

"Battery No. 1 would not only silence the Moree Bastion, but would also close the open plain between that Bastion and the Ridge against a sortie in force; it would also prevent a similar sortie being made through the Cashmere Gate.

"Every one of these points I made sure of in broad daylight. There was no room for error.

"This project I unfolded to Baird Smith from time to time as the different facts on which it rested became established.

"When laid, by the Chief Engineer, before General Wilson, the latter doubted—I learnt this from General Nicholson—that I could possibly have visited Ludlow Castle and the Khoodsia Bagh, and he questioned the information I gave concerning them; to which, however, he attached so much importance, that General Nicholson undertook to go to them under my guidance, and to report the result. Accordingly I took him at midnight into Ludlow Castle, which we had the extraordinary good fortune to find unoccupied; then, to the Khoodsia Bagh; and finally got him safely back to camp.

"Of the nature of his report I can have no doubt, and I never afterwards heard of any objections to my project.

"We now come to the execution of the attack. The project was strictly adhered to. Our only trouble was with the old brick walls of the Custom House at Battery No. 3. These caused more trouble than we expected, and the battery took longer to construct than we anticipated. . . .

"Early in the Siege some delay occurred in searching for the Officer Commanding in the trenches for the purpose of having certain orders issued (the importance of *time* at this juncture must be remembered). General Nicholson, hearing of this, afterwards passed *every* day—I think—of the Siege with me on the works, in order to give me the benefit of the weight of his authority. He was also in constant communication with Baird Smith on siege questions both before the attack and during it. We certainly all worked together with the greatest harmony."

In another letter Alex. Taylor refers again to the excellent relations which obtained between him and General Nicholson during the operation preceding the assault. He describes himself as "on the Works every day, from an hour before dawn till sunset, with General Nicholson beside me for nearly the whole of the time;—any movement of the troops I wanted effected, he at once arranged for; the rapidity of action, which, under the circumstances, was of such importance, was thus secured."

The following extracts are taken from a series of notes made by Alex. Taylor in November, 1875, on one of his own reports, unexpectedly put into his hands by Sir John Kaye. This report deals with events subsequent to the Assault; it records the movements made by his orders on September 18th, and illustrates the unusual independence of action accorded him on account of the circumstance that his chief was incapacitated by sickness from active work.

It records *four* steps taken by him on Sept. 18—

"Nicholson had lost his life in attempting to carry

Burn Bastion," so this note runs, "the attempt had been renewed under Colonel Greathed, and had again been unsuccessful. The aspect of affairs was gloomy. Under these surroundings the Officer Commanding on the spot, on my personal application to him, placed a large body of men at the disposal of Lieutenant Geneste (the Engineer Officer on duty at the spot) to enable him to make a further attempt.

"In the centre I had had the large block of houses, between the workshops and the Begum's gardens, occupied by our men. I had seen that the enemy held this block of buildings weakly. We had just experienced a very serious repulse on the right, which would give him confidence, and we might soon expect a hot time, during which any advance would be difficult. The opportunity that now offered should not be lost. I applied therefore at once to the Officer Commanding on the spot to have the 'block' occupied before the conditions should change to our disadvantage. He complied with my recommendation. Wilde's regiment was moved forward, and took possession.

"I announced my intention to move the detachment then in the Magazine up to the Canal.

"With regard to the occupation next day of the Sahiba Mehal; I would have to examine the ground once more, and have it occupied, or not, as I thought best. I well knew that Baird Smith would not make any objection to what I wanted done. I had by far the best means of judging, and he *quite knew it.*

"This report clearly shows that I did not feel I required any support from Headquarters to enable me to carry out on the spot any work or movement of the troops likely in my judgment to become desirable. I was satisfied that I had sufficient influence with the Officer Commanding. I would also say that the General in giving me authority next day to attempt to carry the Burn Bastion, after the previous failure with

the troops, who detested street fighting, gave a strong proof of his confidence in my judgment."

The following is Sir John Kaye's lucid account of the events of the same day, and of that following:—"Ever to the front, ever active, ever fertile in resources, the Engineer Brigade had much work to do, and did it well in this conjuncture. It had been terribly shattered during the assault. One after another, the subalterns attached to the different columns had fallen beneath the fire of the enemy. Few had escaped the perils to which they had been exposed.* But happily Alexander Taylor was alive, though not unhurt, as a bullet had struck him painfully on the chest on the morning of the assault. And there was work for his active brain in devising the best means of securing what we had gained, and in superintending their execution. All the professional resources of 'those who were left' were brought into play, to entrench the different commanding positions, as they fell from time to time into our hands. . . .

"Much had been done, but the Lahore Bastion† was still in the enemy's hands. No advance had been made in that direction since Nicholson had fallen. It was evident that the appetite of our troops for street fighting had not been improved and that our attempts to gain our ends by open force must be superseded by

* At the assault on the 14th September Lieutenant Tandy was killed; Lieutenant Salkeld died a few days afterwards, from wounds received when blowing in the Cashmere Gate; and eight other Engineer officers were wounded.

† Or "Burn" Bastion.

some more insidious method of attack. . . . So Alexander Taylor, . . . suggested at headquarters that each brigade should be ordered to work, under guidance of the Engineer officers attached to it, not *along* the open streets, but *through* the sheltered houses during the advance; using them as a means of fortification; fortifying all commanding buildings as soon as they could be secured; and placing garrisons in them. The project met with willing concurrence and consent; and Taylor and his subalterns went to their work with the thoughtful activity which had characterised all their proceedings. But the progress was not yet rapid. On the evening of the 18th they were more advanced than in the morning. The cause was not very remote; nor was it very unintelligible. The veterans of the different brigades did not fall in very readily with the views of the Engineers, or cheerfully recognise their temporary supremacy. So situated, Taylor, with the concurrence of the Chief Engineer, went to the General, and drew from him an order to the Brigadier of the Kabul Gate to place at the disposal of the Field Engineer a force of some 500 men, European and Native, to carry out the above-mentioned design; and early on the 19th the advance began in earnest. This was not the least of the great services of Alex. Taylor. Some thirty houses, important both by their size and position, fell into his hands, and were duly garrisoned and barricaded. Nothing could have been more satisfactory than the result. . . . Working onwards in this insidious but most effective way, our people towards nightfall found themselves in possession of a building which so entirely commanded

the Lahore Bastion, that the enemy, seeing their danger, were fain . . . to escape . . . and so the Bastion became our own! . . . Taylor reported the success of his operations." *

Alex. Taylor's services at Delhi, though their full extent was known to few, were appreciated not only by those behind the scenes, but by the great mass of his brother officers in the camp. "He was one who thought nothing impossible; all men worked under him with the heartiest good-will, for he animated and inspired all who came into contact with him in battery or in trench." "The younger officers of the Engineers swore by him." "Those who were above him were equally impressed by his noble exertions," writes Sir John Kaye, summing up the testimony of the many witnesses he had heard.

I feel I cannot bring this section of my paper to an end more fitly than by quoting the very words in which men whose commanding ability, high position, or circumstances gave weight to their verdicts, expressed their consciousness of the importance of the *rôle* played by Alex. Taylor at Delhi.

Lord Lawrence, the *deus ex machina* of the Siege, wrote to Lord Dalhousie on January 14, 1858—*i.e.* before the fall of Lucknow, and the complete suppression of the Mutiny: "We have indeed had a terrible time. Up to the capture of Delhi, the scales were trembling in the balance. The Panjabis of all classes have behaved admirably, and the zeal and the courage of the Punjab troops far surpassed my hopes and expectations. Still, if Delhi had not fallen, we must

* Kaye, "Sepoy War," iii., 624, 625, 626, 627, 631.

have been ruined. Had the troops retreated all must have been lost.

"To Nicholson, Alexander Taylor of the Engineers, and Neville Chamberlain, the real merit of our success is due.

"Chamberlain was severely wounded soon after his arrival at Delhi, and, until the actual storm, was in a great measure laid on the shelf. But when our troops got inside, and Nicholson was mortally wounded, Chamberlain came again to the front, and kept up the spirits of our people, and directed the movements of the troops.

"John Nicholson from the moment of his arrival was the life and the soul of the army. Before he went down he struck the only real blows which the mutineers received in the Punjab, he led the assault and was the first man over the breach.

"Alexander Taylor, though only the Second Engineer before Delhi, was really the officer who designed and arranged all the scientific operations which led to the success of the assault, and in the actual attack was as forward as any man that day." *

To Taylor himself he expressed himself warmly.

"*October* 8, 1857.

"I have to congratulate you on your success at Delhi. I look on it that you and Nicholson, poor fellow, are the real captors of Delhi; particularly after Chamberlain was wounded. I think the world also gives you credit for the part you played." †

* Bosworth Smith, "Life of Lord Lawrence," vol. ii. p. 286.

† *Ibid.*, vol. ii. p. 251.

Brigadier-General John Nicholson—whose whole-hearted collaboration with Alex. Taylor throughout the Siege proper ensured the erection of the siege works with the rapidity essential to success—has characterised the young Engineer's services in well-known words.

"He was indignant against wrong or injury, against untruth of any kind, and knowing well the brave part that Alex. Taylor took in the engineering difficulties and triumphs of the Siege, was indignant at the thought that he had not had justice done to him, and said, 'Well, if I live through this I will let the world know who took Delhi . . . that Alex. Taylor did it,'" writes Lady Edwardes, quoting from Sir Herbert Edwardes' Journal.*

General Sir Frederick Maunsell, the Engineer officer in charge of the Right Attack, and therefore of the construction of No. 1 Battery, the key of the position, writes: "It is certain that even Nicholson's determined and magnetic leading would have been ineffectual, had it not been chiefly used to back Taylor's scientific knowledge, reconnaissances, and resolution. I was not the next senior officer to Taylor, but was one of the senior engineers at Delhi, and I can frankly state that none of us were capable of doing what Taylor did. We doubtless all thought ourselves fine fellows—more or less—but as to a

* Lady Edwardes, "Life of Sir Herbert Edwardes," vol. ii. p. 62. These words were spoken in Chamberlain's tent towards the end of the siege, the late Sir Henry Daly being present. On the return of the Guides to Peshawur (1857) Sir Henry Daly reported the conversation to Sir Herbert Edwardes (who was writing a life of John Nicholson) by whom it was immediately committed to writing.

mastery or control of the great questions and issues involved, we were nowhere as compared with him. We all believed in him as a first-rate man, and as a resourceful engineer, but it was just in the conception and grasp of the great issues, and of the means necessary to their realisation, that his superiority made itself fully felt. A master of engineering detail, civil and military, and cognisant of the means available in artillery and soldiers; untiring in bodily energy, and unsparing of himself, he, in fact, was the hero of the Siege, and the common saying, 'Taylor took Delhi,' was perfectly true.

"Colonel Baird Smith, the Chief Engineer, filled his place alongside the General in command most suitably. He had a *diplomatist's* duty to perform, to the success of which his knowledge of India, and his exceptional powers of speech and pen contributed immensely.

"I think that the Siege of Delhi and the immense issues depending upon it were never fully appreciated. The great anxiety as to the fate of Lucknow, which filled all hearts, fixed public attention on the beleaguered garrison; while the despatch of large forces from England and Persia to its relief naturally led the home public to ascribe the salvation of India to them, and tempted it to rather ignore Delhi; yet it was the success of the Siege of Delhi which alone saved India to the British Crown. There can be no doubt of this whatever." *

* "A Few Notes on the Siege of Delhi," *R. E. Journal*, July, 1911; see also "The Siege of Delhi, a Reminder from One Who was Present," *Nineteenth Century*, October, 1911, both by General Sir Frederick Maunsell, K.C.B., Colonel Commandant, R.E.

In his "Notes on the Siege of Delhi," published in the *Royal Engineer Journal*, the same officer writes:—"The real interest of the Siege of Delhi centres in the *heroic and hazardous way in which the scheme of attack was slowly pieced together*; and in the gallantry—equally displayed by all—which enabled a much-tried General to utilise to the fullest extent the inadequate means at his disposal. . . .

"It seems a curious fact that the most striking feature of the Siege of Delhi has never been noted. It is surely unprecedented in warfare that not only in *the face of*, but also, almost in *the midst of* a watchful enemy, what was obviously the site for the final struggle was *completely surveyed*, and the positions of every gun; of the attacking force itself; and of all the approaches were clearly marked out on the ground, and the *action finally carried out exactly as originally planned*."

The following statement, signed Felix,* is embodied in the "Narrative of the Campaign of the Delhi Army," officially published by Major Henry Norman, in 1858 †:—

"For the complete success that attended the prosecution of the Siege the chief credit is undoubtedly due to Colonel Baird Smith, the Chief Engineer, and to Captain Taylor, the Director of the Attack. On this latter officer, in fact (in consequence of the Chief Engineer being wounded), devolved the entire superintendence of the siege works; and his energy and activity will doubtless meet with their due reward.

* The late Lieut.-General Julius George Medley, C.B.

† The late Field-Marshal Sir Henry Norman, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Queensland.

Throughout the operations he seemed to be omnipresent, and to bear a charmed life, for he escaped without a wound. The plan of the attack was bold and skilful; the nature of the enemy we were contending with was exactly appreciated, and our plans shaped accordingly.

"Pandy * can fight well behind cover, but here he was outmanœuvred, his attention being diverted from the real point of attack, until the last, and then the cover, which might have proved such a serious obstacle to us, was seized at the right moment, without loss, and all its advantages turned against him. With plenty of skilled workmen the siege works might have been more speedily constructed; but, with the wretched means at our disposal, the wonder is that so much was done, with so little loss."

The late Major-General Thomason, who, in 1857, was one of the Engineer officers attached to the Left Attack, and consequently accompanied Alex. Taylor on more than one of his dangerous reconnaissances in the Khoodsia Bagh, and in the neighbourhood of Ludlow Castle, writes of Colonel Baird Smith as an officer "whose position as the head of a very important Government department gave him a power and influence such as was exercised by no one else"; and, as "an unrivalled administrator," adding: "In nothing was this ability better evinced than in the completeness, vigour, and steadfastness with which he backed every proposal of his second in command, Alex. Taylor."

* The name given to the rebel sepoys from Mungul Pandy, the mutineer of the 34th Native Infantry at Barrackpore, who when the mutiny broke out in that regiment fired at the adjutant, Captain Baugh, and was afterwards executed.

Alex. Taylor himself pays the following tribute to the services of his chief: "He did all that could be done by a Chief Engineer of great capacity, but crippled by heavy sickness. Indeed, he did more. He was a master of organisation; took a sound view of our position, and its requirements; gave firm and wise counsel to General Wilson, more than once, at very critical times; accepted and carried an immense load of the very heaviest responsibility; and, lastly, provided the engineering means without which the work could not have been done. For all this grand work he deserved the thanks, not only of the Delhi Field Force, but of every white face to the north of Delhi, whose fate depended on our success."

NOTE.—The compiler of this short Memoir was on duty engaged on fortifying the houses and loopholing the parapets of the buildings opposite to the King's Palace throughout the night of September 20. The enemy kept up a desultory fire.

The last stronghold was stormed by the 60th Rifles on the morning of the 21st.

Duncan Home of the Engineers, who, with Philip Salkeld, had blown in the Cashmere Gate on the day of the assault, advanced with a small party of Sappers, and blew in the outer gate.

At sunrise on the 21st we were again masters of Delhi, and the British flag waved over the Palace of the Great Mogul.

On September 21 the King and Palace fell into British hands. On the same day the Engineer Headquarters were established in the Palace of Nawab

of Juggar. Colonel Baird Smith left the city for Rurki two days later, too ill to travel except by bullock cart, and Taylor took up the command of the Corps at Delhi, somewhat to his disappointment, for he was burning to serve with one of the columns destined to put down rebellion in the North-West Provinces. His work in the Mogul Capital was to restore and re-model its battered fortifications, etc.; place the bastions in a state of defence; block up gates not in use, and strengthen the Palace.

His projects had the complete approval of General Wilson, but not that of Lord Lawrence, who considered them too belligerent and on too large a scale.

The following informal letter to him from the Chief Commissioner preaching moderation in armament sheds a light on their differences—

"*October 8th.*—I have just been reading your Memorandum as to the best mode of defending Delhi. Now I want to say a few words to you on this matter. It seems to me that General Wilson and you on one side, and I on the other desire two very different objects. The point seems to be, which of the two is really desirable? If the object be to defend the town of Delhi, then you are both quite right. I have nothing further to say. But suppose it be desirable to let the inhabitants return, which I think it is, as far as the great majority go, could we not manage to mount a few guns on the walls of the Palace, if it were merely for show? Walls 9 feet wide at the top would surely bear 9-pounders; and a few peeping over would have a sedative effect. If we are to defend the outer line, then of course we must keep out the mass of the people. But against whom is the place to be defended? There is no force that I am aware of which can come

against it. Our reputation in having taken it guards us against attack, even if an enemy existed, which it does not. My idea is that we should let the people back under proper restrictions. And this being admitted, can we not secure ourselves . . . by improvising a mode of arming the Palace with a few guns so as to overawe the town? Answer this please when time admits." *

In November Taylor marched to Agra in command of the Engineer Brigade, and on December 10 joined Seaton's Column at Alighur (near which the enemy were said to be collecting), just in time to take part in the brilliant cavalry engagement at Khasgunje, in which the Carabineers and Hodson's so greatly distinguished themselves.

The character of his activity at this time is suggested by the events occupying the morning hours of December 17. It was the grey of the morning. The column was in movement, and in the neighbourhood of Puttiali, when distant shots were heard. Taylor and Hodson with some of his sowars rode forward to reconnoitre; they came on an apparently deserted village, the gates of which had been built up. Taylor sent back for some powder-bags, with which to effect an entrance. The two officers dismounted; Taylor disposed himself for a nap, while Hodson, armed only with a hog-spear, embarked on a voyage of discovery. "While waiting," writes Taylor, "Hodson wandered alone into an enclosed yard, at one end of which was a long low one-storied house. . . . Forcing in the central door, he found himself

* Quoted in Bosworth Smith's "Life of John Lawrence," vol. i. p. 252.

without sword or firearms in the presence of ten swordsmen who immediately attempted to attack him. He stepped back one pace into the yard, and, as each swordsman came through the narrow doorway, so low that it impeded the immediate use of his sword, met him with a fatal spear-thrust. This occurred within a few yards of where we had been sitting. He had been away for a few minutes only, and when he took me to see what had happened in that short interval, I found ten armed men, dead and dying, lying on the floor of the room." *

Taylor, to whom this incident was distasteful, went alone to the gateway to see how he would dispose of the powder-bags, and then strolled along the base of the village wall. He succeeded in climbing into a low tower springing out of this wall from which he emerged on to the flat mud roofs of the place. Not a sound was to be heard, or a soul seen. He was advancing cautiously, when he became aware of a man on a neighbouring roof on the other side of the street who was kneeling and taking aim at him with his matchlock. Without a moment's hesitation he rushed straight at him, clearing the narrow alley with a shout (his long jumps were celebrated) his disconcerted antagonist dropped his weapon and vanished. He then made his way to the wall with all possible speed, and was glad to see his men with powder-bags appearing on the scene! Having blown in the gates, and satisfied themselves that the village was deserted, they pressed on to Puttiali.

* The compiler of this Memoir who was attached to Seaton's Column saw Hodson mounting his horse soon after this incident.

"Hodson's regiment," writes Taylor, "came on the enemy . . . entrenched in front of the village. It was still early morning. Our infantry and the General were a few miles in the rear. The entrenchments seemed to be a parapet and ditch in a straight line. It was of importance that we should ascertain the positions of the guns . . . whether they were distributed along the face, and so, probably, immovable, or concentrated, and so, perhaps, movable. I got this information by riding along the front at a suitable distance. The whole thirteen guns were tempted to fire on me in succession as I came opposite each of them. The result was a sketch of the position sent back to the General, with a suggestion that our field battery should come up with a suitable cavalry escort, place itself on the prolongation of the front, and open fire. This proposal recommended itself to the General; the artillery hastened to the front; placed itself suitably, and enfiladed the line of trench. Before our infantry could arrive and take part in the fight, the enemy, some 5000 strong, broke and fled, leaving all his guns, camp equipage, and carriage in our hands."

They were pursued by our cavalry—the Carabineers, the Lancers, and Hodson's Horse—for seven miles.

Among the trophies were the elephant, silver howdah, and sword of the hereditary Commander-in-Chief of the Nawab of Furrukabad.

All these events occurred before noon on December 17.

Ten days later was fought the action of Mynpure,

in which Taylor again took part, and with which one of Hodson's most brilliant reconnaissances is associated.

Towards the end of the year Taylor joined the force under the Commander-in-Chief, and was sent to Cawnpore to prepare an Engineer Park for the Siege of Lucknow, and a bridge of casks for the passage of the Gúmti River.

He was in command of the Bengal Engineers at the capture of Lucknow; led the main assault, and was wounded at the taking of the Begum Koti, a bullet passing through the leg a few inches above the knee. He never completely recovered from the effects of this wound.

"The hurt came to me," he writes to his old Addiscombe friend, Dan Robinson, "in carrying the Begum's Palace on the afternoon of March 11. We had got in and had made good headway. I had mounted up to the highest pinnacle of the Palace to see what was ahead of me, and what further could be done. Pandy, in an adjoining house, took advantage of me!"

Hodson, also, was wounded (mortally) on the same day. "Captain Hodson of the Irregular Cavalry," writes Colonel John Chalmers, from Lucknow, on the 12th, "the best cavalry officer in this, or, indeed, I think, in *any* other service, is very dangerously wounded (mortally it is feared). . . . Major Taylor of the Engineers is also wounded, and although not so seriously, he has had to lie up, and is a great loss. As in reality he was the man who planned the taking of Delhi, so here . . . he has pushed on in the face

of opposition . . . the immediate consequence of his wound was the giving up of a quarter of a mile of street we had got; as the Brigadier is said not to have felt himself justified in holding it at the risk of so much loss without specific orders." *

On March 11, the day on which Major Taylor was wounded, the artillery and Naval Brigade under Sir William Peel battered and breached the Begum Koti with three 68-pounders.

This was then assaulted by our troops, the enemy losing about 500 men. The writer of this Memoir was ordered to take a party of Sappers to construct a battery at the side of the Begum Koti, and can well remember the storm of bullets. The Begum Koti presented an extraordinary spectacle, the great palace, with its enormous mirrors, lamps and chandeliers, dead Highlanders and Sepoys lying in all directions.

At night a great part of the city appeared to be in flames. Fires were seen in all directions, while the shells from our batteries continued to pour into the city. The losses on our side during the operations were about 25 officers killed and 50 wounded, and 800 men killed and wounded.

As soon as Taylor was well enough to undertake so long a journey, he took his first furlough to Europe after an absence of fifteen years. Before his departure he received a warm letter from Lord Canning, in which the Governor-General expressed his high sense of his services, and expressed his regret both for his temporary departure and its cause.

* "Letters from Colonel John Chalmers," p. 66.

On his return to India in 1861, he was offered the Chief Engineership of the Central Provinces, but preferred to return to his old home and his old friends in the Punjab, and to his old work—the Grand Trunk Road connecting Lahore and Peshawur, known in the Punjab as "Taylor's Road."

It was five years since he had left this Road, the supreme and sustained interest of his life, to join the camp before Delhi, and during those five years certain changes had been made in his plan, of some of which he disapproved; he longed to have the work in his hands again, refused the better appointment, and returned, as Superintending Engineer only to the Road which had begun to rise into being under his auspices twelve years previously. Among his most valued assistants during this phase of his work were Lieutenant James Brown,* Lieutenant Blair,† Mr. H. A. S. Fenner, and Captain Dundas, V.C., his personal assistant, who was killed in Kabul in December, 1879, by the untimely explosion of a mine.

In 1863 Alex. Taylor was appointed Chief Engineer to the Umbeyla Field Force, despatched under General Neville Chamberlain, to chastise the Hindustani fanatics who had stirred up ill-feeling on the Yusafzai frontier in 1857, had been driven from their stronghold Sitana in 1858, but had returned in 1861, had erected a new stronghold at Malka, whence they raided with impunity.

Taylor accompanied the Peshawur Column, which

* Maj.-General Sir James Browne, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., R.E.

† Colonel Henry Blair, R.E.

moved by the Umbeyla Pass and Chamla Valley past the territory of the Bunerwals, a large tribe reported friendly by the political officers. The column entered the Umbeyla Pass on October 10 and reached its highest point without meeting resistance. Its baggage and rear guard, however, owing to the badness of the road and the incompetence of drivers, did not reach camp till after the 22nd. This delay gave the tribes time to assemble on our front.

On October 22, Chamberlain, considering that the preliminaries to a forward movement might be safely taken, ordered a reconnaissance to be made under the command of Colonel Alex. Taylor. He was accompanied by two companies of Sappers, whom he set to improve the road. He found that the Pass was about two miles in length, unoccupied by any enemy, and the road fair. Shortly after noon he was joined by a detachment of cavalry under Colonel Dighton Probyn, V.C., and the 20th P.I. under Major Brownlow. The latter occupied the foot of the Pass, while Taylor rode on with the cavalry. The hills through the midst of which the party passed were occupied in force by the Bunerwals but, as far as Taylor could ascertain, none had descended into the valley, or attempted molestation.

On arrival, without incidents, at their destination, a village four miles from camp, Taylor "considered it desirable to take advantage of favourable conditions to push down the valley as far as was compatible with the General's order to be in camp by sunset." Leaving the main body of the cavalry behind, he pressed on with a small escort to a point seven miles distant,

made important observations, and rejoined the cavalry at 4.30.

The aspect of things, however, had changed. The Bunerwals had descended from the heights in great numbers with the object of preventing the party from returning to camp. Colonel Probyn * charged them in a most spirited way, and was supported by Major Brownlow. †

"By this time daylight had quite gone, and the latter part of the return journey was effected in dim moonlight. The enemy pressed Major Brownlow quite closely, and several times got in amongst his men, sword in hand. Eventually, as we drew into camp, the camp piquets became engaged, and Major Brownlow's trying duties ceased," reports Colonel Taylor, adding: "Nothing could have been better than the way the whole affair was conducted, nor than the conduct of both men and officers." ‡

The fruit of this characteristic reconnaissance was reliable knowledge of twelve miles of road and its surrounding country.

At the end of the campaign it was decided that Malka should be burned in the presence of seven British officers, Alex. Taylor and Captain Roberts § being of their number. Their escort consisted of four companies of the Guides Infantry; twenty-five Sowars; four Buner Khans, with 2000 followers—the numbers

* Right Hon. Dighton Probyn, V.C., G.C.B.

† Field-Marshal Sir Charles Brownlow, G.C.B.

‡ See Lieutenant-Colonel Alex. Taylor's report: dated Umbeyla Pass, October 23, 1863. Published by Field-Marshal Sir Charles Brownlow. "The Umbeyla Despatches."

§ Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, V.C., K.G., etc.

of the latter, however, actually fell to 60, a sinister symptom. "Sir Hugh Rose," writes Lord Roberts, "was very angry that such a small party should have been sent to Malka and placed at the mercy of the tribes: 'It was madness,' he said, 'none of them will come back alive!'" The hazardous undertaking was carried through, however, successfully.

From the spring of 1865 to 1867 Colonel Taylor officiated as Chief Engineer of the Punjab; took furlough to England from February, 1869, to February, 1871; and again officiated as Chief Engineer of the Punjab from March, 1871, to March, 1872. In 1872 he was appointed Chief Engineer, his office being at Simla during the hot weather, while during the cold season he was engaged on tours of inspection.

"A Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel (in 1858) with fifteen years' service, with an established reputation for high military capacity, and judged by men like Lord Napier, and Sir Henry Norman, to be equal to rising to any call on his powers, Taylor seemed to be clearly marked out for the highest place in his profession," writes the always well-informed *Pioneer Mail*,* in March, 1912. "In 1876 he was designated for the Quartermaster-Generalship at Simla, a much more prominent post than it has become now, but he was attacked by an affection of the eyes which under mistaken medical advice was held to be something which would threaten his sight if he remained in the East, and under this warning he returned home." The

* Edited by George Chesney, son of General Sir George Chesney, K.C.B., C.I.E., C.S.I., M.P., R.E.

trouble proved nothing serious, but in the next year the Afghan War broke out, and had Taylor stayed on at Simla, possibly he, like his contemporary Sir Donald Stewart, might have ended his career as a Field Marshal.

When he returned to India in 1876, his sight completely restored by the wise treatment of the great German oculist, Dr. Meurer, he was appointed Deputy Inspector-General of Military Works and President of the Defence Committee of India, appointments which he held until his retirement in 1878.

In 1878 he was appointed Secretary to Government in the Public Works Department. His name being mentioned in connection with this post before the appointment was actually made, the editor of the *Pioneer* wrote: "As a good administrator, as one of the best engineers in India, as a man whom the department would receive with cordiality, as one to whom England and India owe much . . . the appointment of Sir Alex. Taylor will be as welcome to the public as to the official world at headquarters."

He was, however, prevented by urgent private affairs from entering on the duties which would have given so wide and suitable a field to his abilities, and left India.

"Sir Alex. Taylor, K.C.B.," writes the *Pioneer* again, "is now on his way home, and the troops of friends he is leaving behind him in India will be heartily wishing him happiness in his well-earned retirement. When he was lately appointed Secretary to Government in P.W.D., we referred to the services

by which his Indian career has been distinguished, but the cordiality with which members of his own corps seem always ready to enlarge on these is a sufficient evidence of qualities on the part of Sir Alexander Taylor, that cannot be recorded in Hart."

He succeeded Sir George Chesney as President of the Royal Indian Engineering College in 1880, and filled that office for a period of sixteen years. Sir George, who had been Brigade-Major to the Engineer Corps during the operations before Delhi, in 1857, introduced him to the College as "the man who took Delhi."

"During General Chesney's previous tenure of office," writes the editor of the *Cooper's Hill Magazine*, "the College had pursued the even tenor of its way in gradually completing the establishment of the Public Works in India; from forty to forty-five officers were yearly added to the Department, with the result that it quickly became completely staffed, and fresh officers were only required when vacancies were caused by natural wastage.

"During this time also the College curriculum was so arranged that all students were trained solely from a point of view of service in India. Shortly after Sir Alexander's entry into office, the number of appointments in the P.W.D. was very greatly reduced, and the problem then arose of trying to keep the College on a paying basis, when the previous attraction of an almost certain appointment in India became precarious. With this object in view the curriculum was modified, the purely Indian side of

the educational programme was reduced, and the College was thrown open so as to attract students in engineering who had no intention of taking up a Government appointment.

"This change of policy necessitated considerable alterations in the course of study, and involved courses of instruction in subjects that had hitherto been entirely ignored, or at best only very casually alluded to. Under these conditions, expansion became necessary in two directions, viz. additional accommodation and increased staff.

"In addition to expansion on the engineering side, further progress was made by the establishment of a School of Forestry: and it speaks volumes for Sir Alexander's ability as an administrator that all these expansions were carried out and produced the fullest measure of success in all directions."

"When Sir Alexander Taylor came to Cooper's Hill," writes one of the most distinguished of its professors, "he became at once a favourite with all members of the College Staff. There was nothing of the 'President' about him; he regarded the Professors as his colleagues, in the strict sense of the word; they had their duties which were distinct from his, and in any changes in those duties, and in anything relating to the educational work of the College, he consulted them without reserve.

"In all matters relating to the scientific studies of the College he acted on the best advice that he could get. When vacancies occurred on the Staff, he suppressed any desires that he entertained with regard to the new appointments, and made such

appointments entirely on the recommendation of his colleagues.

"This strict conscientiousness characterised the whole of his *régime;* he always acted with loyalty to the India Office, and especially to its requirement that expense was to be avoided.

"It was thought by some, that when the number of students at the College was greatly reduced, owing to congestion in the Indian Public Works, he should have recommended the Government to send the Royal Engineers to Cooper's Hill, where the training was in many ways most suitable. He was rather in favour of this plan; but there were of course some difficulties, and he thought that the military authorities would regard them as insuperable, and refuse his request. Subsequent events, however, proved that there was at least a reasonable chance of acceptance at the time.

"He was an intensely religious man, and he regarded moral discipline and example as the highest interest of the College. His life was in accordance with his religion, which was a simple system, aloof altogether from rites, ceremonies, and ritualistic observances. His conscientiousness and strict honesty were the visible expression of his religion. He attached great importance to regularity on the part of the students in their attendance at the College Chapel.

"It was always very pleasant and instructive to discourse with him on the events of the Great Indian Mutiny; but from his account no listener would ever imagine the important part that he took in them.

"His last months at Cooper's Hill were spent in revising the College rules, even down to the most minute details, for the guidance of his successors, and when he left it, it was felt by all at the College, both professors and students, that they had lost not a President only but also a companion and friend."

Though no longer young when he succeeded Sir George Chesney he was "in spirits, the youngest member of the College Staff. He was an enthusiast in all that concerned the interests of the place, and having been a keen yachtsman threw himself into boat sailing on the Thames with boyish recklessness on the subject of capsizes." *

"It is said that the students sometimes turned his enthusiasm for yachting to their own advantage, and on being summoned to the 'Duke's study for a carpeting,' would maliciously introduce the subject of sailing, and, by propounding some new 'gym' hoped that they might escape the full penalty of their misdeeds. . . .

"Shortly before he resigned the Presidency of the College, and when he was not far short of seventy years of age, he was seen on one occasion to climb up to a third-floor window of what was known as the New Block at Cooper's Hill, with the object of testing by personal trial the possibility of obtaining ingress to the College by other routes than that of the Porter's Lodge!

"Sir Alexander was loved and respected by every one with whom he came into contact; he was a firm friend, and always did his best to help those who

* *Pioneer Mail*, 1912. Obituary Notice.

were in any sort of trouble. He was a strict disciplinarian, but generally had a strong tendency to take a merciful view of a case. But in the event of anything of grave importance taking place, he was the very last person any student of Cooper's Hill cared to meet."*

The students knew that their President had been a noted athlete in his young days: a "record" long jumper, a redoubtable football player, an enthusiastic fisherman and sailor, and they had been told by distinguished visitors, whose names are among those of the men who made Northern India, of some of his famous exploits: of the swim across the Indus at Attock, for instance, and of the adventurous journey in a coracle down the unnavigable mountain torrent, the Punch, during which he was accompanied only by an Attock boatman on a mussuck, etc.

The personality of such a man could not fail to appeal to young men, and the Cooper's Hill men of his day will always think with regret and admiration of their old chief.

On leaving Cooper's Hill, Sir Alex. Taylor gave up all public work. His doctor put a stop to sailing; and, cut off from his work, and from the active pursuits which had been the salt of his life, he gradually lost all muscular strength, though not health.

The few friends of his early strenuous Punjab days who still survived now rallied about him: Field-Marshal Sir Charles Brownlow, Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, Mr. James Macnabb, Sir Donald Macnabb,

* *Cooper's Hill Magazine*, March, 1912. Obituary Notice.

Mr. George Ricketts, Sir F. Maunsell, Sir Dighton Probyn, and others; the associations clustering round them bringing the brightness of happy memories into his life.

He passed away at midnight, February 25, 1912, at the age of 86, in his own home and surrounded by those he loved.

The War Office proposed that he should be buried with military honours, but his family felt that he would have preferred to be laid at rest as unostentatiously as he had lived. He was buried in the village churchyard of Englefield Green, a large concourse of friends from the neighbourhood being present, and many of his Cooper's Hill subordinates as well as a few of his old Delhi comrades: General Sir Frederick Maunsell, K.C.B., Colonel Commandant, R.E.; General Sir John Watson, V.C.; Maj.-General Pemberton, and others. Lieutenant-General Sir J. S. Ewart, Aide-de-Camp General-in-Waiting to the King, Adjutant-General to the Forces, was also present, having been graciously sent by His Majesty the King to represent his high sense of the value of the services of his loyal servant.

It is, of course, impossible in the space available to make more than a passing allusion to many of the distinguished services rendered by Sir A. Taylor during his long career.

But his old comrades and brother officers have determined that these services shall not be allowed to pass into oblivion, for, in addition to the portrait the Corps has decided to put in the Headquarters Mess, a strong committee has been formed, with Lord

Roberts as chairman, Sir F. Maunsell as vice-chairman, and Colonel H. Finnis as hon. secretary, and has decided to erect a monument to him at Delhi. By this means his memory will also be preserved at the place where more than half a century ago he contributed so largely by his valour, foresight, and professional ability to the capture of the city, and, consequently, to the maintenance of the British Empire in Northern India.

CHAPTER III

HODSON, OF HODSON'S HORSE *

JUNE 8, being the date of the battle of Badle-ka-Serai, fought fifty-seven years ago, is commemorated annually by a dinner given by a few survivors of the siege of Delhi, who are rapidly dwindling in number. At the dinner in London on the above date this year, which was presided over by Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, K.G., etc., there were nineteen officers present.

It may be remembered that the battle mentioned above took place near to Badle-ka-Serai, a small village situated on the Grand Trunk Road about six miles from Delhi. The rebel Sepoys were assembled in great force, and occupied the village, which they had fortified and defended with thirty guns, with the intention of opposing the force under the command of General Sir Henry Barnard, which was marching on Delhi. But it is not proposed in this short memoir to give a detailed account of this fiercely fought action, which resulted in the total defeat and rout of the rebels, the capture of their guns, and the occupation on the same day of the historic ridge which overlooked the city of the Great Mogul. The action is only mentioned on account of it being the first time during

* From the *Cornhill Magazine*, October, 1914.

the Indian Mutiny that the famous soldier, Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, had the opportunity of displaying his brilliant qualities as a leader of irregular horse, and as an officer of the Intelligence Department unsurpassed in the annals of history.

It was from information brought by Lieutenant Hodson that General Barnard heard that the enemy intended to oppose his march to Delhi.

Hodson, who had previously done good service for the Commander-in-Chief by opening communication with Meerut, had been sent to reconnoitre the road. He reported that the rebels were in force at Badle-ka-Serai, about halfway between Alipore and Delhi. Orders were accordingly issued for an advance at midnight on June 7, 1857. Fifty Jheend horsemen under Lieutenant Hodson accompanied three squadrons of the 9th Lancers under Brigadier Hope Grant with the object of turning the enemy's flank.

Lieutenant William Hodson, of the 1st Company's Fusiliers, was a man of rare energy of character. On the outbreak of the Mutiny at Meerut he volunteered to carry despatches there and to bring back the much-needed information as to the state of Wilson's Brigade. General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, discerning his many fine qualities, offered him a place in the Department of the Quartermaster-General, and especially charged him with the intelligence branch of its duties, in prosecution of which he was to raise a body of a hundred horse and fifty foot. This order was subsequently extended to the raising of an entire new regiment of irregular horse.

Hodson was appointed to the Punjab Guide Corps

in 1847, and among those who rejoiced in his appointment was Captain Herbert Edwardes, who had lately been transferred to Lawrence's staff. Writing to his mother in the autumn of 1847, Edwardes thus speaks of his brother officer—

"Young Hodson has been appointed to do duty with our Punjab Guide Corps, commanded by Lieut. Lumsden. The duties of a Commandant and Adjutant of Guides are at once important and delightful. . . . In short it is a roving commission, and to a man of spirit and ability one of the finest appointments imaginable. I think Hodson will do it justice. He is one of the finest young fellows I know, and a thorough soldier at his heart."

After the cruel fate which overtook Mr. Vans Agnew and his military colleague Lieutenant Anderson, at Mooltan, Hodson writes in a letter to his father from Lahore on April 26, 1848—

"I mentioned to you that Sir F. Currie's plan of sending me to assist Agnew at Multan had been altered, and that Anderson had gone with him in my stead. At the time I was disposed to be disappointed; but we never know what is for our good. In this case I should doubtless have incurred the horrible fate of poor Anderson and Agnew. Both these fellows have been barbarously murdered by the Multan troops."

Hodson's services in the campaign of 1848 were gratefully acknowledged by Brigadier Wheeler in his dispatch of October 15, 1848—

"Lieutenant W. S. Hodson, with his detachment of the Corps of Guides, has done most excellent service, and by his daring boldness and that of his men gained the admiration of all."

He writes about this time—

"I have had loads of work;" and adds, "what with soldiering, providing supplies for the force, and all the multifarious duties which come on the shoulders of a 'political' out here, I am quite well and the weather is lovely, so work is easy comparatively, and an active life like this is, as you know, my particular weakness."

A few days after he wrote—

"I have had also to feed an army of 3000 odd fighting men, 2000 odd horses, and 14,000 to 15,000 camp followers. Also to take care of and work my Guides, to point out the haunts, and obtain information of the strength of the 'enemy' and give him over to the tender mercies of fire and sword."

During the whole period of the siege of Delhi, from June 8 to September 20, 1857, Hodson watched every movement of the enemy with the utmost vigilance. Every one relied upon him. Tall, fair, and handsome, with light blue eyes, a magnificent rider and swordsman, he won the admiration of all who served there.

A few days after the action at Khasgunje, which was fought by the force under General Seaton, then marching from Delhi to Cawnpore, Hodson volunteered to ride across the country occupied by the enemy to carry dispatches to the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Clyde. He rode this distance of about fifty-five miles through a district where not a single European had been seen since the beginning of the Mutiny at Meerut in May. On his return he learnt that some of his men whom he had left in a village

had been attacked by a large force and killed. Hodson, however, succeeded in skirting the village unobserved. The writer saw and spoke to him as he came into camp on his return after safely delivering the dispatches. He looked fresh and smart as if he had come back from an ordinary morning ride. The men cheered him as he walked through the camp.

Detachments from Hodson's regiment took part in many of the fiercely fought actions around Delhi during the siege, including the severe fight of July 14. A few days before this the enemy had been foiled by Hodson in an attempt to cut off our communication with the Punjab. On the day of the assault—September 14—Hodson, with his newly raised regiment, was with Sir Hope Grant's brigade, which suffered severely in loss of men and officers by the fire from the walls of the city.

One of the most notable achievements of Hodson was performed at Rohtak during the siege of Delhi. On the morning of August 17 he marched to Rohtak, the chief civil station of the district. On reaching Rohtak, he writes to his wife—

"We found the Mussulman portion of the people and a crowd of Irregulars drawn up on the walls, while a considerable party were on a mound outside. I had ridden forward with Captain Wise and a few orderlies to see how the land lay, when the rascals fired and ran towards us. I sent word for my cavalry to come up, and rode slowly back myself in order to tempt them out, which had partly the desired effect, and as soon as my leading troop came up we dashed at them and drove them helter-skelter into the town, killing all we overtook. We then encamped in what

was the Kutcherry compound, and had a grateful rest and a quiet night. The representatives of the better disposed part of the population came out to me, and amply provided us with supplies for both man and beast."

But a yet more trying ordeal awaited Hodson and his little force. About 7 a.m. on the 18th he learnt that Babar Khan had brought into Rohtak a body of 300 Rangar horsemen, who a few minutes later were seen dashing out from the town towards Hodson's camp, followed by some 900 footmen, armed with swords and matchlocks. A small party of Jhind horsemen, coming up at that moment to reinforce Hodson, were in time to receive and check the brunt of the rebel onset.

Meanwhile Hodson, who had kept his horses saddled, lost no time in turning out his men. With twenty of these he charged the assailants and drove them back in disorder towards the town. To quote his own dispatch—

"Directly the whole detachment was ready and formed up, I sent what little baggage we had to the rear under a sufficient escort, and prepared for a further attack. I formed the main body on the road in three lines, the Guides in front, sending a troop out to the right front under Lieutenant Wise, and one to the left under Lieutenant McDowell, ready to take the enemy in the flank should they again charge up the roads (of which there are three leading from the town to our position). These movements were covered by skirmishers and by the excellent fire of the Jhind horsemen armed with matchlocks, whom I desired to dismount and drive back by their fire any part of the

enemy who might come from under shelter of the buildings. This service they performed exceedingly well and most cheerfully."

Finding that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, and seeing that nothing could be gained by fighting against walls lined with matchlockmen, he "determined to draw them out into the open country, behind our position, and endeavour to bring on a fight there."

This perilous manœuvre, on which Hodson may be said to have staked his fame as a great military leader, was carried out with perfect success. It was a manœuvre which would have tasked the steadiness of tried veterans, and two-thirds of his men were little better than raw recruits. But Hodson knew that his untrained soldiers were ready to go wherever the Guides and his English officers might lead.

"Everything," he says in his dispatch, "turned out as I had anticipated. My men withdrew slowly and deliberately by alternate troops (the troop nearest the enemy by alternate ranks) along the line of the Behar road, by which we had reached Rohtak, our left extending towards the main road to Delhi. The Jhind horsemen protected our right, and a troop of my own regiment the left. The enemy moved out the instant that we withdrew, following us in great numbers, yelling and shouting and keeping up a heavy fire of matchlocks.

"Their horsemen were principally on their right, and a party galloping up the main road threatened our left flank. I continued to retire until we got into open and comparatively dry ground, and then turned and charged the mass, who had come to within

from 150 to 200 yards of us. The Guides, who were nearest to them, were upon them in an instant, closely followed by, and soon intermixed with, my own men.

"The enemy stood for a few seconds, turned, and then were driven back in utter confusion to the very walls of the town, it being with some difficulty that the officers could prevent their men entering the town with the fugitives. Fifty of the enemy, all horsemen, were killed on the ground, and many must have been wounded.

"Nothing," he adds, "could be better than the conduct of all concerned. The Guide Cavalry behaved with their usual dashing gallantry, and their example was well emulated by the men of my new regiment, now for the first time engaged with the enemy. They not only remained under fire unflinchingly, but retired before the enemy steadily and deliberately, and when ordered turned and charged home boldly."

Meanwhile a rumour had reached General Wilson's camp that Hodson had been driven by superior numbers to take refuge within the walls of the jail at Rohtak, but the consequent alarm was not shared by the Civil Commissioner, Harvey Greathed. Charles Thomason,* on the 19th, was proceeding on duty along the Grand Trunk Road, "very down," as he described it, at the sad news of the supposed disaster at Rohtak, when, "looking up, I saw some native cavalry coming down the road towards me. I was not at all sure who they were, but went on my way until we met," when to his great delight he recognised Hodson and McDowell chatting sociably together at the head of Hodson's Horse.

* The late Major-General C. Thomason, R.E.

In this short memoir, which only relates to Hodson's valuable services as an officer of the Intelligence Department and as a leader of Irregular Cavalry, it would not be fitting, and it is not proposed, to enter into the subject of the detraction from Hodson's splendid career which has been made in some quarters on account of his action in shooting the Princes after their capture at Humayun's tomb on September 22. The writer can only affirm that he never heard a contrary opinion expressed at the time by those who had served during the siege, but that the punishment of these royal Princes who had instigated the cold-blooded massacre of the Christians at Delhi in the previous month of May was justified under the circumstances, and that if Hodson had not acted as he did the prisoners would have been rescued by the mob and would have escaped. There was no breach of faith on Hodson's part, as he steadily refused to give any promise to the Princes that their lives would be spared.

After the capture of Delhi a detachment of Hodson's Horse commanded by Lieutenant Hugh Gough, afterwards General Sir Hugh Gough, G.C.B., V.C., consisting of 180 men, formed part of the columns which left Delhi on September 24 to proceed to Cawnpore; and the squadron did excellent service in the fight near Bulandshuhur on September 28 and at the battle near Agra on October 9.

The writer of this short memoir, being a young subaltern of Engineers at the time of the Siege of Delhi, and several years junior to Hodson, and being constantly on duty in the trenches, had not a great

many opportunities at that time of seeing Hodson, who was scouring the district in his capacity of Intelligence Officer, thus obtaining that knowledge of the enemy's movements which proved of such value to General Wilson.

But occasionally Hodson would ride to the Observatory on the Ridge or to the "General's Mound" and would explain to us what he had succeeded in learning; and on some of these occasions I remember talking to him and admiring his cheerfulness under difficulties, and his wonderful energy and resourcefulness—particularly after the actions of Badle-ka-Serai and the several combats of June 19 and 20.

Being attached to the column under General Seaton which marched to Lucknow in December, 1857, after the capture of Lucknow I had several opportunities of seeing and talking to Hodson, who commanded his regiment with the column. On December 12 this column came up with the rebels, who had taken up a strong position near Khasgunje, and the day after the action at that place Hodson pursued them for several miles, leaving 500 dead on the field and capturing their guns.

General Seaton, who rode himself in their pursuit, gave permission to the Engineer officers who were attached to his column to accompany Hodson, among them being Major Alex. Taylor, afterwards General Sir A. Taylor, G.C.B., in commemoration of whose great services a statue is now being erected at Delhi.

Hodson was killed at the capture of Lucknow in March, 1858.

On the 11th, the Artillery and Naval Brigade,

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under Sir William Peel, had battered and breached the Begum Kotee with three 68-pounders. This was then assaulted and carried by our troops, the enemy losing about 500 men.

It was after this assault that Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, lost his life. He was the finest leader of irregular cavalry in India, and his loss was greatly mourned by every one in the force. We had arrived at Bankes's house just as the party going to attack the Begum Palace had started, and fell in with them. Previous to this he had said in a laughing manner to his friend Brigadier Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala), who was directing the attack, "I am come to take care of you; you have no business to go to work without me to look after you." The place had been taken before he was wounded. When the soldiers were searching for concealed sepoys in the courtyard and buildings adjoining, he said to his orderly, "I wonder if any of the rascals are in there?"

He turned the angle of the passage, looked into a dark room which was full of sepoys; a shot was fired from inside. He staggered back some paces and then fell. A party of Highlanders, hearing who had been hit, rushed into the room and bayoneted every man there. He was shot through the right side of the chest, the ball entering in front and going out behind. He was taken in a dooly to Bankes's house, where his wound was looked to and dressed. At daylight the following morning he was much better, his hands being warm and his pulse good. The officer in medical charge of the regiment hoped

that if the bleeding, which had ceased, did not return he might recover. At 10 a.m., however, bleeding came on again profusely, and he rapidly became worse. He sent for General Napier, to whom he gave directions about his property, and sent messages to his wife.

After this he sank rapidly, though he remained sensible, and was able to speak until he became too weak, and at twenty-five minutes past one he died. He was buried that evening by the Rev. W. Clarke, the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff being present. Thus, on March 12, 1858, in his thirty-seventh year, closed the earthly career of this brave and gifted officer. One of those best qualified to judge declared that Hodson with his regiment would have been worth almost a whole division, had he been spared to take part in the subsequent operations in Oude. His particular qualifications for Asiatic warfare would have found an appropriate field for their display.

Sir Colin Campbell, in a letter of condolence to his widow, dated March 13, thus expressed himself:—

"I followed your noble husband to the grave myself, in order to mark in the most public manner my regret and esteem for the most brilliant soldier under my command, and one whom I am proud to call my friend."

Hodson was educated at Rugby School in the time of Dr. Arnold, and as there has been some discussion regarding the identity of Hodson with the "Harry East" of "Tom Brown's School Days," an extract is here given from page 118 of a "History

of Rugby School" by Lieutenant-Colonel Sydney Selfe, C.B., showing that this could not have been the case—

"Now let us take the popular 'good-hearted and facetious Harry East,' in many people's opinion the finest character in the best description of school life ever written.

"Here again, as in the Stanley-Arthur myth, tradition, which asserts that Hodson, of 'Hodson's Horse,' was the original of East, is entirely at fault. In the first place, Hodson was not in the School House, but at Price's. Secondly, he did not go to Rugby until he was sixteen, so that it was impossible for him to have participated in those youthful escapades which so frequently resulted in Tom and East being flogged; while at that age (16) Tom certainly, and East probably, had sobered down, for, as the book tells us, they were in the Fifth Form, 'great strapping fellows, but still thorough boys, filling about the same place in the house that young Brooke filled when they were new boys, and much the same sort of fellow.' Lastly, it is to be noted that his name has never even been hinted at in connection with East by any one of those pupils of Dr. Arnold who have supplied the information on which these notes are mainly based. Nor is this all, for Mr. Seton Karr scouts the idea emphatically thus—

"'I knew Hodson intimately at Rugby,* and afterwards in India. He was actually married from my house in Calcutta, and he himself would have been much staggered at any suggestion that he was the Harry East of the book. I could name at least three younger boys at the School House who have a sort of general resemblance to the friend of Tom

* They were both in Price's House.

Brown, but Hodson certainly was not one of them. I may say that I discussed this very point with my contemporary, the late Dean Bradley, and he entirely agreed with me in everything that I said.' . . . 'Rough and tumble' as the Rugby of Arnold's time appears when compared with the Rugby of to-day, still it produced such men as Deans Stanley, Vaughan, and Bradley, A. H. Clough and Matthew Arnold, Hodson of Hodson's Horse, W. P. Adam, Bishop



Valpy French, Lord Cross, Lord Aldenham, Sir Richard Temple, Sir Charles Hobhouse, and Tom Hughes himself."

The above diagram represents the strength of the storming columns at the Assault of Delhi, September 14, 1857.

A copy was presented by Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, K.G., O.M., etc., to each of the surviving officers present at one of the Delhi banquets.

CHAPTER IV

THE CAPTURE OF LUCKNOW, APRIL, 1858 *

In December, 1857, Sir Colin Campbell commenced to concentrate his forces for the final operations of the capture of Lucknow; and it was at this time that the outlines of his plans were drawn up. In a memorandum to Lord Canning, dated December 22, 1857, Sir Colin wrote:—

"Colonel Napier has given his deliberate opinion in which I coincide as regards numbers, that 20,000 men will be necessary for the first operation of subduing the city. That having been performed, it will be necessary to leave a garrison in occupation, consisting of at least 10,000 men, viz. 6000 in the city, and 4000 in a chain of posts on the Cawnpore roads, until the whole province should have been conquered, and the rebels driven out of their last stronghold."—"Life of Lord Clyde," Vol. II., p. 68).

Early in January, 1858, Colonel Napier returned to his post as Chief of the Staff to Sir James Outram at the Alumbagh, where that General had been left with a force to hold the ground pending the return of Sir Colin. Whilst there he soon formed the opinion that the attack should be made on the east

* From the *Royal Engineer Journal.*

side, accompanied by a flank movement on the north across the river Gúmti, which would take the enemy's fire in reverse. He therefore devoted the intervals between his arrival at the Alumbagh, and that of Sir Colin with his force, to a careful inspection of the ground on both sides of the river. The following reasons for these views were published in the "Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers," Vol. X., New Series, 1861, p. 68.

"The east side offered: first the smallest front, and was therefore the more easily enveloped by our attack; secondly, ground for planting our artillery, which would be located on the west side; thirdly, it gave also the shortest approach to the Kaiser Bagh, a place to which the rebels attached the greatest importance; more than all, we knew the east side and were little acquainted with the west."

Everything was decided in accordance with Napier's view, and on the 10th he was appointed to the command of the Engineer Brigade.

The city of Lucknow being upwards of twenty miles in circumference, it was utterly impossible to attempt an investment or a siege under ordinary conditions. The town is bounded on the north by the Gúmti, and on the east by a canal which runs northward from that river. About halfway between the canal and the Residency stands the King's palace—the Kaiser Bagh. This was the citadel of defence, and was covered by three lines. The first was a flanked rampart on the main side of the canal, which formed a wet ditch to it. The second, with a circular trace, enclosed a large building called the Moti Mahal,

whilst the third consisted of a line of rampart to the north of the citadel. The first and second lines rested on the river to their left, and terminated on the right in the town itself, where it was impossible for an enemy to advance or turn them. Indeed, the only possible point of attack was from the east, supported by a corresponding advance on the other side of the river to take the lines in reverse. In front of the canal, and about a mile from it, was an extensive block of buildings called La Martinière, about five miles from Alumbagh.

Lucknow at this time was in the hands of the rebels, and had been occupied by them since the removal of the garrison with the ladies and children by the relieving force under Sir Colin Campbell. The Alumbagh, distant about three miles from Lucknow, however, was still held by a garrison under Sir James Outram, consisting of 4000 men. At Futtegurh there were about 5000 men at this period, and about 3000 on the Ramganga. Materials had been collected to form a bridge to cross this river, but the orders to cross were not issued.

A serious attack had been made on General Outram's position at the Alumbagh on the 16th January. In the morning a body of the enemy, of which the strength is not mentioned in the dispatch, led by a Hindu fanatic, attired to represent the Monkey-god, made a sudden attack on the Jellalabad halfway picquet, at the time commanded by a subaltern, and was received by musketry fire, which drove them back with the loss of their leader, who fell mortally wounded into the hands of the picquet,

and of more killed and wounded than the enemy could carry off. Two 9-pounder guns, brought up from camp under the escort of a subaltern and 25 men from the right brigade to support the picquet, compelled an abandonment of the cover in front which the enemy had used as a *point d'appui*. The left front and flank were threatened throughout the day, and after dark the enemy's infantry assembled in great strength in front of picquet No. 5, reinforced to 200 men, commanded by a major, who allowed the rebels to approach within 80 yards, and then opened fire with three guns, and his infantry. As they withdrew with loss, he followed them up with shells from a mortar. Attempts by cavalry against the left rear had been watched and checked throughout the day by four horse artillery guns. The division had a bombardier killed and eight men wounded.

The successful repulse of this attack and the prospect of the arrival of the Commander-in-Chief now moving towards Lucknow relieved the General of much anxiety; but still he felt it necessary to warn headquarters that, owing to the enormous numbers of the enemy and the extent of his position, he was obliged to keep his men in readiness, and as there was a perceptible change in the temperature, the hospitals would begin to fill under so much exposure. Moreover, that unless reinforced ere compelled to detach another convoy, he would have hard work in repelling the incessant attacks of the increasing hosts of the enemy, headed by the many territorial chiefs reported to be in the city or

immediate vicinity. It must not be supposed that the General allowed his anxiety to be shared by his troops. Seldom has duty of any sort been performed with greater confidence and cheerfulness by all ranks. In the intervals between the attacks, as much as possible was done to relieve the monotony of camp life. Officers off duty were allowed to go for short distances shooting, and to get up races. During Christmas week the usual sports were organised for the men.

About this time the Intelligence Department received news that a grand assault was being planned, and that a particular day, the opening one of a festival, had been fixed for the purpose. The assault, however, did not come off, much to the disappointment of the General, who having been rejoined by the convoy escort and reinforced by some cavalry, had hoped to inflict a severe defeat on the rebels, and to capture some of their guns. The spies reported a day or two afterwards that the enemy's troops and guns had taken up positions during the night; that in the morning their generals had ensconced themselves at a respectable distance in the rear, that the men were accoutred, and all were apparently in readiness. They did not advance, however, and the rebel leaders sent for the chief officers of divisions, to inquire the reason. They replied that they would attack, since it was better to die fighting than to be hanged, but they must have their pay first.

From this period till February 15 the rebels evinced a nervous restlessness, which betrayed itself in constant assemblies of cavalry and infantry, and

by demonstrations of attack, which were instantly stopped by a few rounds from the guns at the supports. About this time the concentration of troops and material for the projected attack on the city had commenced, and on the Cawnpore Road stood a succession of detachments at intervals of an easy day's march, somewhat resembling the system of stages by which a German field army maintains communication with its base. The continued movement of troops and stores was known to the enemy, and caused the activity on his part which, though occasioning few casualties to the British division, constantly necessitated the turning out and remaining under arms.

On February 13 the news from the *Court Journal*, as the epitome of daily intelligence was styled in the British camp, was to the effect that an attack on all points of the position was planned for the 15th. It seemed probable that under the mingled taunts, promises, and threats of the so-called "Queen Mother" the rebels might be induced to make one desperate last attempt, and that if, as was expected, she should come out, it was possible that the whole force then collected in Lucknow, regular and irregular, might be inspirited to join the attack.

The General, with a view of being able to inflict a heavy blow, requested when passing on this intelligence to army headquarters, now returned to Cawnpore, that the order for a battalion to be withdrawn from his command in exchange for a raw one of native sappers might be countermanded. The request was complied with, but the next day it was

reported from the city that the expected movement of the rebels had been abandoned, and a message was sent to the bridge post for the battalion to resume its march on Cawnpore.

Notwithstanding, however, the failure of the rebel Court to induce their troops to come out in mass, a demonstration took place on the day in question, concealed to some extent by a violent dust-storm, round the left of the British position against the high road, along which a convoy was at the time marching. The horse artillery escorted as usual by cavalry, and dashing well out, supported also by the nearest battalion of the left brigade, sufficed to disperse the enemy's cavalry and infantry, wounding their chief, a Mussulman dignitary, who rode in a litter. The division had only one man wounded.

Next day, February 16, the rebels, while they threatened, as on former occasions, the left flank with cavalry and infantry, filled their trenches and the groves in rear of these with the latter arm, but although they began their demonstration in the morning, they did not muster resolution enough for the attack till about 5.30 p.m. when they suddenly issued in clouds of skirmishers against the guns of the centre and left, and in large bodies advanced against the village where the picquet had been reinforced to a strength of 200 men under a lieutenant-colonel. This picquet had three men wounded before it repulsed the enemy. For a couple of hours after dark a heavy musketry fire was kept up against the north and east faces of the Alumbagh without occasioning any loss to the defenders, who aimed

grape and shrapnel against the line indicated by the flashes of the muskets.

On the 17th, while a partial advance against the right and left picquets was repulsed by artillery fire, some 2000 infantry, sent by the enemy towards the right rear, withdrew towards the city on the appearance from camp of a couple of squadrons and two guns. The information received at this time was to the effect that the rebels proposed continuing these attacks daily and from all quarters. Consequently the picquets had to be maintained at abnormal strength, and the troops were harassed by being constantly turned out.

In échelon behind the line of two picquets, both of which were armed with guns, was established a fresh battery guarded by an escort. The Jellalabad halfway picquet was furnished from camp, strength 2 subalterns and 50 infantry. The Alumbagh detachment was increased to 275 rank and file. The proportion of men at the outposts to those in camp was, however, now so great that the reliefs of many of the picquets could only be effected every three days, sometimes only weekly. The General again remonstrated against his troops having under these circumstances to furnish the convoy escorts halfway to the bridge posts in rear.

On the morning of February 21, while the strength of the division, particularly in cavalry, was reduced by such an escort, a simultaneous movement took place threatening both flanks, as well as the whole front of the position, the points actually attacked being the north-east angle of the Alumbagh

and the fort of Jellalabad with the halfway picquet. The troops holding these posts were reinforced, while a body of about 250 cavalry with two guns was sent to the rear of the fort, and coming suddenly on about 2000 of the rebel cavalry drove them back on their infantry some 5000 strong, which latter after advancing to within range of grape, retired with loss. The left flank was threatened by 8000 to 10,000 infantry with 500 cavalry, against which force were sent with the usual result, four horse artillery guns escorted by about 120 troopers, and supported by the available strength of the left brigade.

The division had 9 men wounded, while the reports from the city gave the loss of the enemy as 60 killed and 200 wounded in front of Alumbagh, with some 80 or 90 casualties near Jellalabad.

A few days before the 25th, the first instalment of troops composing the force which the Commander-in-Chief was concentrating for the capture of Lucknow arrived within the lines of this division, and were temporarily at the disposal of the General. These consisted of a battalion which had for some days past been distributed on the line of communication with Cawnpore, of several squadrons, and of a troop of horse artillery. By this time a large quantity of combustible stores had been collected in the fort of Jellalabad. An attack was expected on the 29th, but did not come off.

On March 2, the advance of the Commander-in-Chief began with a second division of infantry, a brigade of cavalry and four batteries, from the

Cawnpore Road, by a line leading east from Jellalabad, into a position of which the right rested on the river Gúmti behind Dilkoosha, followed on the next two days by the closing up of the siege train and of a third division of infantry causing the withdrawal of the bulk of the rebel forces to the extensive defences which they had constructed along and in advance of the eastern end of the canal, and thus removed the pressure on the front of the 1st Division, which had stood for three months unsupported. It had been for some time previously made movable by provision of carriage for baggage and tents, and it was now gradually reduced by the withdrawal from its organisation of the greater portion of the cavalry, of which part was sent to preserve communication between Jellalabad and the Commander-in-Chief's camp, while the remainder, made up from fresh arrivals to the strength of a brigade, was extended westward to watch the exits from the city in that direction, and by the successive despatch of battalions and guns to reinforce the main attack from the east. The General was summoned on the 5th to conduct a turning movement on the north bank of the Gúmti. On the 12th there remained in his former camp but one brigade of infantry, and on the 16th only two battalions with the horse artillery.

Meanwhile the advance, from the eastward, of the army by a movement in échelon from the right, as the entrenchments and palaces held by the rebels were successively turned or stormed, had the effect of causing the old pressure on the Alumbagh position to be renewed to a serious extent. On the 15th most

of the army was established on a line fronting to the south-west, and, therefore, towards the Alumbagh, from which post the left was distant three miles as the crow flies. The space between the Commander-in-Chief's inner flank and the canal was filled by a body of Nepaulese troops, which had arrived on the 12th as allies against the Oudh Pretender, and had come into line with a force of about 9000 infantry and 24 field guns drawn by men. On the 15th one of their detachments after a short fight took possession of the Yellow House, a building midway between Alumbagh and the canal, but withdrew from it after dark without giving notice to the British outposts, who were in the sequel somewhat embarrassed by uncertainty as to whether that point was held by friend or foe.

During the whole time Sir James Outram held the position at Alumbagh, from November 22, 1857, to March 17, 1858, Capt. Olpherts (afterwards General Sir William Olpherts, V.C., G.C.B.) commanded a battery and was present at all the engagements at this time. The previous services of Sir William Olpherts at Benares, and at the Relief of Lucknow by Havelock are well known.

On the 16th, the Commander-in-Chief's right led by the former General of the 1st Division gained another mile to the westward. "And in short," as was the language of His Excellency's dispatch, "the city was ours." With like brevity it is stated that on the 16th, for the last time, the enemy showed in some strength before Alumbagh; that the Goorkha leader was requested to move to his left up the canal

and take the position; that His Highness executed this very well, and that he seized the positions, one after another, with little loss to himself, the enemy's guns falling into his hands. Some details, however, of this, the last brush that took place on the front of the position, may not be uninteresting. They are produced in nearly the identical words of the field officer who commanded in the Alumbagh enclosure.

Between 8 and 9 a.m. he observed from the roof of the palace a large body of cavalry coming out of the city, while infantry manned the batteries and trenches along the front of the position. An orderly was immediately despatched to the brigadier in camp, who in consequence of this, and information subsequently received, telegraphed in the course of the day to the Chief of the Staff with Army Headquarters:—"The enemy are coming on in immense force, both cavalry and infantry, with field guns on my left front and towards the dense wood close to Alumbagh. Nothing seen of the Goorkhas. I have drawn up my infantry and field guns, and my batteries have opened upon them. I have only 140 cavalry here." The rebels' movement continued to be observed from the Alumbagh roof, their cavalry in most regular order proceeding along the rear of their batteries. A few shots were fired from the heavy guns of the outpost, but the range of the nearest point of their line of march was upwards of 2000 yards. They were accompanied by three horse and two bullock guns, and their numbers were estimated at not less than 3000 sabres. The cavalry continued its march until it had passed the left flank

of the position some distance, and then, developing upon the plain in order of battle, was seen to charge down in the direction of the village held by picquet No. 5. During this time the batteries and trenches in front of Alumbagh had become crowded with infantry. About 1000 men with colours came out and took position in spite of the fire of the British rifles, about 400 yards in front of the Mosque picquet, and kept up a warm matchlock fire upon it and the enclosure. Some discharges of grape from all the available guns caused them severe loss, as appeared from the bodies found next morning. The enemy's trenches had on the previous occasion been seen by the field officer to be crowded, and he estimated the strength of their infantry in front of him to be not less than 5000. This attack commenced simultaneously with the cavalry charge, and was not abandoned till about noon. As heretofore the more open left flank was freed by the dash and fire of the horse battery, supported by the available infantry from camp.

Thus the important duty of covering the Cawnpore Road which still formed the line of communication for the British Army Corps until the course of operations in the city had brought the left forward to the westward of Alumbagh, was successfully performed up to the last by the remnants of the 1st Division.

After the evacuation of Lucknow, Lieutenant McLeod Innes, who had greatly distinguished himself during the defence, was posted to General Franks' column during his march through Oudh and gained the

V.C. at the Battle of Sultanpore. He afterwards joined the army before Lucknow, and was severely wounded on the day of joining. The amount of labour expended on the works by the rebels was enormous. Streets a mile long had almost every house loopholed, and guns pointed from many of them. The bridge across the Gúmti had also been ruined.

On the night of March 4 two bridges of casks were completed across the Gúmti, a very troublesome and difficult operation. General Outram with his division, consisting of the Queen's Bays, 9th Lancers, and the Highland Brigade and other troops, crossed the river on the 6th and met with little opposition. The remainder of the army being posted at Dilkoosha about 1000 yards in rear of La Martinière.

Brigadier Franks joined the army about this time with Jung Bahadur and 4000 Goorkhas. This manœuvre of crossing the river was a splendid success, and completely baffled the enemy. The rebels' earthworks on the south side of the river were enfiladed by the guns of Outram's Division on the other side of the river.

On the 7th the Sepoys made a sharp attack on General Outram, but were repulsed without difficulty, and retired within their lines, leaving him free to push forward.

While referring to La Martinière, special mention should be made of the excellent service rendered by the boys of the Martinière College, whose gallantry in the defence of the post assigned them in the Residency has rarely been surpassed, and forms a bright page in the history of that long siege. In

the grounds of the Bailey Guard there may still be seen a masonry pillar with a marble slab inserted, on which are inscribed the words Martinière Post. The three companies formed from the students of the College wore as a badge on their accoutrements a turreted castle with the words "Defence of Lucknow," the same honour as was awarded to the 16th, the Lucknow Regiment of Bengal Infantry, which was formed in 1858 from the loyal remnants of mutinous native regiments who fought throughout the siege by the side of the British, and held firmly to the post called the Bailey Guard.

On March 9 the Martinière was assaulted and captured with very little loss. The Engineer officers who accompanied the assaulting column were Lieutenants A. M. Lang, J. G. Forbes, E. T. Thackeray, Swetenham, and H. J. Nuthall. Each officer was in command of a detachment of sappers, and formed up in rear of the Dilkoosha. At the signal the troops raced across the space between the Martinière and the Dilkoosha. After capturing La Martinière the column pushed on to a village on the right close to the enemy's first line of entrenchments. Here, an officer of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, Lieutenant Butler, was seen standing alone on the bastion waving his hand. He had swam across the river, and had climbed the parapet, remaining there until the work was occupied by our troops. For his conduct on this occasion, Butler was awarded the Victoria Cross.

On the evening of the 9th, Sir Colin Campbell, who had secured La Martinière in the morning, was able to advance on the canal line which had been

enfiladed and taken in reverse by the batteries already established by General Outram. He secured the line without loss. The forward movement was now continued, the houses and palaces being used as approaches. In this way the second line was turned to the left. Batteries were then thrown up to break a large block of palaces called the Begum Kotí on the right, which were then stormed and carried.

From thenceforward the Chief Engineer, Brigadier-General Napier, pushed his approaches with the greatest judgment through the enclosures by the aid of the sappers and heavy guns, the troops immediately occupying the grounds, and the mortars being moved from one position to another as ground was won on which they could be placed. (Sir Colin Campbell's dispatch.) At length the third line was turned, and the Kaiser Bagh entered. Supports were quickly thrown in, and the Mess House, the Tara Kotí, the Motee Mahal, the Engine House, and the Chattar Munzil, were rapidly occupied by the troops, while the Engineers devoted their attention to securing their positions towards the south and west. Owing to being taken in flank by the fire from the guns with General Outram's Division, and to our advance, the enemy had not only evacuated the Martinière, but their first line of entrenchments as well. So the first line up to Banks's house was captured without great loss. While advancing from the Martinière to the village rather a heavy fire was met with from the village, and here the Highlanders lost a few men. The Sepoys could be seen running along the ramparts in hundreds.

On the 11th, the Artillery and Naval Brigade, under Sir William Peel, had battered and breached the Begum Kotí with three 68-pounders. This was then assaulted and carried by our troops, the enemy losing about 500 men. Lieutenant McBean, Adjutant of the 93rd Highlanders, here gained the V.C., and greatly distinguished himself, killing 11 of the enemy with his own hand in the main breach.

It was after this assault that Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, lost his life. He was the finest leader of irregular cavalry in India, and his loss was greatly mourned by every one in the force. He had arrived at Banks's house just as the party going to attack the Begum Palace had started, and accompanied them. Previous to this he had remarked in a laughing manner to his friend Brigadier Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala), "I am come to take care of you, you have no business to go to work without me to look after you." The place had been taken before he was wounded. When the soldiers were searching for concealed Sepoys in the courtyard and buildings adjoining, he said to his orderly, "I wonder if any are in there." He turned the angle of the passage and looked into a dark room which was full of Sepoys; a shot was fired from inside. He staggered back some paces and then fell. A party of Highlanders hearing who had been hit, rushed into the room and bayoneted every man there. Hodson was shot through the right side of the chest, the ball entering in front and going out behind. He was taken in a dooly to Banks's house, where his wound was dressed. At daylight the following morning he

was much better, his hands being warm and his pulse good. The medical officer hoped that if the bleeding, which had ceased, did not return he might recover. At 10 a.m., however, bleeding came on again profusely, and he rapidly became worse. He sent for General Napier, to whom he gave directions about his property, and sent messages to his wife. After this he rapidly sank, though he remained sensible, and was able to speak until he became too weak, and at 25 minutes past 1 he died. He was buried that evening, the Commander-in-Chief and his staff being present. Thus, on March 12, 1858, in his 37th year, closed the earthly career of this brave and talented officer. One of those best qualified to judge declared that Hodson with his regiment would have been worth a division, had he been spared to take part in the subsequent operations in Oudh. His particular qualifications for Asiatic warfare would have found an appropriate field for their display. Sir Colin Campbell, in a letter of condolence to his widow, dated March 13, thus expressed himself: "I followed your noble husband to the grave myself, in order to mark in the most public manner my regret and esteem for the most brilliant soldier under my command, and one whom I am proud to call my friend."

In the evening a battery was constructed by the sappers at the side of the Begum Kotí. The place presented an extraordinary sight with its palace, gardens, and lamps with enormous mirrors and chandeliers, dead Highlanders and Sepoys lying in all directions. The Engine House was captured by

the 20th Regiment. The Sepoys seemed paralysed by the suddenness of the attack, and had not time to escape. They were piled in heaps among the machinery. A portion of the room had caught fire, and this added to the horrors of the scene. At night a great part of the city appeared to be in flames. Fires were seen in all directions, while the shells from our batteries continued to pour into the city. The enemy was badly supplied with shells. This was the last day of regular fighting, but the rebels hung about the native city for a few days. The losses on our side during the operations were about 25 officers killed and 50 wounded, and 800 men killed and wounded.

The force under General Outram which had been advanced on the other side of the Gúmtí, now re-crossed on a bridge of casks, and pushed forwards to capture the Residency. This was the last move and the enemy abandoned the defences. Still there were detached forts held by desperate bands of natives, and it was not till the 21st that all fighting ceased.

During the operations a most unfortunate accident happened. At the Jumma Musjid nine cartloads of powder were found in a courtyard which the General directed to be destroyed. As there was a well on the spot it was considered that the best method of destroying the powder, which was in tin cases, would be to throw them down into the water. A line of men was formed and the cases passed from hand to hand as quickly as possible. By some fatality one of the cases exploded in falling. A flame of fire flashed up, and ignited case after case along the line

until the carts were reached when they also exploded. Captain Clarke, R.E., and Lieutenant Brownlow, R.E., who were superintending the operations, received such injuries that they both died during the night. With one exception every man forming the party, to the number of 22, were killed. Strangely enough the only man to escape was the man who was throwing the cases down the well. He was rendered senseless, but eventually recovered.

The duties of the Engineer officers during the Capture of Lucknow, although arduous, were not of such a dangerous nature as at Delhi, and the operations lasted only for fifteen days. The Kaiser Bagh at the time of its capture was a splendid mass of buildings with large gardens and gilt domes and statues.

The amount of loot obtained by some of the regiments was considerable. Diamond necklaces, shawls, and swords of great value were sometimes obtained by private soldiers, and sold for a few rupees. For two or three days after the capture of the town the troops were employed in extinguishing fires and destroying loose gunpowder, an immense quantity of which was found in the positions occupied by the rebels.

The late Lieutenant-General James John McLeod Innes, V.C., C.B.

One of the most distinguished of the officers of the Lucknow Garrison to whom the successful defence of the Residency was due, was Lieutenant-General

James John McLeod Innes, V.C., C.B., who died in December, 1907, was born on the 5th February, 1830, and was the son of James Innes, Esq., Surgeon, Bengal Army. He joined the H.E.I. Company's Military College at Addiscome in February, 1847, and passed out at the head of his term, and with the Pollock Medal, in December, 1848. He was the second cadet to receive the Pollock Medal, the first recipient being the late General Sir Edward Sparshot Williams, R.E., Colonel Commandant, Royal (Bengal) Engineers, whose death only preceded that of General Innes by two months.

Lieutenant Innes arrived in India in November, 1850, and was employed in the P.W.D. on the construction of the Baree Doab Canal, in the Punjab ; but, on the annexation of Oude, he was transferred as Assistant to the Chief Engineer in that Province, and consequently served throughout the Mutiny Campaign, in Oude, from May, 1857, to April, 1858.

At the outbreak of the Mutiny he was placed in charge of the Muchee Bhowan at Lucknow, with orders to fortify it so that it might serve as a place of refuge.

After the action at Chinhut, the post had to be evacuated and the whole force concentrated at the Residency. The troops were successfully withdrawn, and the fort blown up under the direction of McLeod Innes. He served throughout the defence of the Residency, and was especially distinguished in the direction of the mining operations. One of the defences was known as Innes's post, and it was unsuccessfully attacked by the enemy on several

occasions. On the relief of Lucknow by Havelock, McLeod Innes took part in several sorties, and was then placed in charge of the mining operations in the new position occupied by the relieving force.

Early on the morning of July 20th, 1857, the officer on the look-out tower of the Residency reported that the enemy was moving in large masses, and was evidently assembling for a vigorous attack. Every man was at his post, when suddenly a mine was exploded by the enemy in the direction of the Redan Battery, leaving an enormous crater. Innes's post bore the brunt of the attack. The enemy advanced boldly, leaving a scaling ladder in the ditch, but were repulsed and driven off by hand grenades.

As an instance of the heavy fire brought to bear on the position in September, shortly before Havelock's relief, may be mentioned the cutting down of the upper story of a brick building by musketry fire only. This building was in a most exposed position just behind the Cawnpore Battery. All the shots which just missed the top of the rampart cut into a dead wall almost in a straight line, and at length cut right through and brought the upper story tumbling down. The upper structure on the top of the Brigade Mess also fell in. The Residency house was a wreck. Captain Anderson's post had long been knocked down, and Innes's post also fell in. These two were the most exposed positions in the garrison, and were riddled with round shot. The effect of the rains, too, was to bring down all the shaky buildings to the ground, leaving the defenders only some shattered

defences to cling to. The mining was continuously persevered in; defensive mines were resorted to, and were exploded in several directions, thus destroying the enemy's underground approaches.

After the relief by General Havelock the defence was chiefly confined to mining and countermining operations. General Outram wrote on the subject in his dispatch dated November 25th—

"I am aware of no parallel to our system of mines in modern war. Twenty-one shafts, aggregating 200 feet in depth, and 3291 feet of gallery have been executed. The enemy advanced 20 mines against the palaces and outposts; of these they exploded three, which cost us loss of life, and two which did no injury; seven have been blown in, and out of seven others the enemy have been driven, and their galleries taken possession of by our miners, results of which the Engineer Department may well be proud."

In March, 1858, Lieutenant Innes was attached to the Jownpore Field Force, under Brigadier-General Franks. This force joined the army under Sir Colin Campbell before Lucknow on March 5th, after a march of 150 miles. Whilst with it Lieutenant Innes performed an act of gallantry for which he received the V.C. The incident is thus narrated by General Franks: "I have already mentioned his distinguished conduct in the attack on Dhowrara" (he had been severely wounded whilst endeavouring to burst open the door of a house, within which some mutineers had barricaded themselves). "It is now his due to relate that at the action of Sultanpore, far in advance

of the leading skirmishers, he was the first to secure a gun which the enemy was abandoning. Retiring from this, they rallied round another gun further back, from which the shot would in another instant have played through our advancing columns, when Lieutenant Innes rode up, unsupported, shot the gunner about to apply the match, and remained undaunted at his post, the mark for a hundred match-lockmen sheltered in some adjoining huts, and kept the artillerymen at bay until assistance reached him. For this act of gallantry, surpassed by none within my experience, it is my intention to recommend him for the honourable distinction of the V.C."

When Addiscombe was finally done away with in June 7, 1861, Sir Charles Wood—who was Secretary of State for India—presided at the last examination and delivered an address on the breaking up of the College. He drew attention to the success of the establishment, which was to be found in the number of distinguished officers who had been trained within its walls, and proceeded in his address as follows :—

" Without going back to the more recent times, I may refer to the severe trials which fell upon our Indian Empire by the Mutiny of 1857, and on that occasion those who were the most remarkable for their exertions, gallantry, bravery, and skill were those distinguished officers who were trained within the walls of Addiscombe College. I hardly know whether I should be justified in naming particular persons, as it might appear invidious, when all have behaved so well, to select them; but I will venture to speak of Sir Henry Lawrence, Sir Robert Napier,

Sir Archdale Wilson, to whom Delhi fell, and other officers whom I would willingly name; but I am afraid, if I were to do so, it might appear that I had selected them with less discrimination than I should like to show on the present occasion. In every branch of the Service the warmest testimony has been given by the Authorities of India to the gallant conduct of the gentlemen educated in this College. Recently Lord Canning, in conferring the V.C. on one of the Engineer officers, spoke of him in the highest and warmest terms, for, whether in civil or military engineering, Addiscombe has never been excelled, and I may say that the skill with which the sieges have been conducted by the Engineers of India exceeded that of any other country in the world."

The Engineer officer referred to by Sir Charles Wood was Major McLeod Innes, and it may not be inappropriate to quote the words used by the Viceroy when presenting the Victoria Cross in 1858. Lord Canning said: "I must add that it is a peculiar pleasure to me to present this cross to an officer of the Bengal Engineers, for I say to you—not as a compliment, but in the words of sober truth—that I do not believe that there has ever existed, in any army, a body of men who have rendered, individually and collectively, more constant and valuable services to their country than the Engineers of Her Majesty's Indian Forces. Men, all of them of proved ability and highly cultivated intellect, they have been unceasingly called upon in peace, as much as in war, to achieve great tasks for the protection and advancement of India, and they have never been found

wanting. That, when summoned to meet an enemy in the field, they can carry their lives in their hands as lightly as any man your own deeds, and those of many of your brother officers, have abundantly proved. It is in itself a distinction to belong to such a Corps, and you, Major Innes, have the proud satisfaction to know that while you have derived honour from being enrolled among the Engineers of the Army of Bengal, you have done all that a gallant soldier can do to repay that honour in augmenting, by your own acts, the lustre and reputation of your distinguished regiment."

After the conclusion of the Mutiny Campaign, Major Innes was appointed Garrison Engineer of Fort William, and served in various grades in the P.W.D. in the Central Provinces and Punjab until 1867.

In 1868 he was employed on the Commission for investigating the failure of the Bank of Bombay; and in 1869 he started the upper section of the Indus Valley Railway. In 1870 he was appointed Accountant-General of the P.W.D., and held this important post for 10 years. In 1881 he was appointed Inspector-General of Military Works, and as such drew up designs for coast and frontier defences, and carried out most of the new internal defences.

He received a Brevet Majority on the 28th August, 1858, attained the rank of Major-General, November 28, 1885, and retired in March, 1886, as a Lieutenant-General.

In the *Gazette* of June, 1907, he was made a C.B.

After his retirement General Innes devoted himself to literature, and published, among other works,

"Lucknow and Oudh in the Mutiny"; "The Sepoy Revolt, 1857"; "Sir Henry Lawrence" (Rulers of India Series), 1898; "Life of Sir James Browne, K.C.S.I., R.E."

General McLeod Innes suffered from severe illness during the latter years of his life. He was married in 1855 to the daughter of Prof. Hugh Macpherson, of Aberdeen, and died on the 13th December, 1907.

I am indebted to Colonel H. M. Vibart, R.E., for many of the above details, which have been derived from his excellent book, "Addiscombe: Its Heroes and Men of Note."

CHAPTER V

BRASYER OF BRASYER'S SIKHS *

At the present time during the great war with Germany, when the new and excellent system has been introduced of promoting large numbers of warrant and non-commissioned officers from the ranks, it is interesting to recall the important services rendered to the State by a very gallant and distinguished officer—the late Colonel Jeremiah Brasyer, C.B., of the Ferozeshah Regiment of Sikhs, who from the position of sergeant-major of the 26th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry rose to the command of his regiment, and held the fortress of Allahabad at the most critical time of the Indian Mutiny.

Jeremiah Brasyer was brought up as a gardener in Kent, and enlisted in the Bengal Artillery in 1833.

Under the old system that obtained in the H.E.I. Company's service one or two European non-commissioned officers, holding the position of sergeant-major or quartermaster-sergeant, were attached to each regiment of native infantry, and in September, 1837, we find Brasyer serving as sergeant-major of the 26th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry.

* From the *Asiatic Review*, July, 1915.

In 1842, with his regiment, he served in the expedition under the command of Major-General Sir George Pollock—afterwards Field Marshal—which proceeded to relieve Sale at Jellalabad, forced the Khyber with his army of retribution, and relieved Sale on April 16. When ordered by Lord Ellenborough to withdraw from Afghanistan, General Pollock remonstrated, and was allowed to advance at his own discretion, and, with Nott, to retire to India "by way of Kabul." Brasyer was present at the actions of Mamu Khel, Jagdalak, and Tezin, with the Artillery; and in the Sikh Campaign at Mudki, Ferozeshah, and Sobraon with the 26th Native Infantry.

In recognition of his services during these campaigns Brasyer was promoted to be Ensign in 1846, and was afterwards appointed to be interpreter to the Ferozeshah regiment of Sikhs, which he afterwards commanded, and which was subsequently for some time known as Brasyer's Sikhs.

When the Indian Mutiny broke out the storm broke at Allahabad with overwhelming force. Hindus and Mussulmans rose against us. The roving bands of sepoys and sowars and escaped gaol-birds who were flooding the surrounding districts wholly disorganised our police, and what was said to be a Muhammadan conspiracy was hatched in the very heart of the city.

It was fortunate that the bulk of our people were shut up in the fort, where no external perils could assail them. But there was danger within the walls. A company of the Sixth formed part of the garrison,

and the temper of the Sikhs at that time was doubtful. The story of the outbreak of the Mutiny at Allahabad is related in Kaye's "History of the Sepoy War." When the noise of firing in the city was first heard it was believed that the mutineers from Benares had arrived, and that the sepoys of Allahabad were having a warm reception. But at a later hour the truth broke in upon them, and all doubt was removed by the appearance of the Commandant, Simpson, smeared with the blood of his wounded charger.

His first care was to order the sepoys of the Sixth to be disarmed. This duty was entrusted to a detachment of the Sikh corps, under Lieutenant Brasyer—an officer who had won for himself a commission by his gallantry in the great battles of the Punjab, and who now proved his mastery over his men by forcing them to do a distasteful service. Then came the news that the Benares sepoys of the regular army had been mown down by the white troops. It was therefore fearfully probable that the offended nationality of the Sikhs at Allahabad would rise against their Christian masters, partly in revenge, and partly in fear. Happily, the treasure was outside the fort. Had the design of bringing it within the walls not been abandoned the love of loot and the thirst for blood would have prevailed together, and Allahabad might have been lost.

It was, in truth, a most critical moment. Had the men of the Sixth Regiment and the Sikhs then in the fort made common cause with each other, the small Christian garrison could have made but feeble

resistance against such odds. The sepoys who were posted, for purposes of defence, at the main gate had on the first sound of firing in cantonments been ordered to load their pieces, so they were ready for immediate action. The Sikhs were drawn up fronting the main gate, and before them were the guns, manned by the invalid artillerymen from Chunar, in whom the energy of previous days was revived by this unexpected demand upon them. And at a little distance, in overawing position, were posted little knots of European Volunteers, armed and loaded, ready on the first sign of resistance to fire down from the ramparts upon the mutineers.

The sepoys, charged to the brim with sedition, would fain have resisted the orders of the white men, but these arrangements thoroughly overawed them. They sullenly piled arms at the word of command, and were expelled from the fort to join their comrades in rebellion.

The first danger was now surmounted. Those who knew best what was passing in the minds of the native soldiery of all races clearly saw the magnitude of the crisis.

It is impossible to over-estimate the disastrous consequences that would have ensued from the seizure and occupation by the enemy of the fortress of Allahabad, with all its large munitions of war. One officer, however, was prepared at any risk to prevent this catastrophe by precipitating another. Stimulated, perhaps, by the noble example set by Willoughby at Delhi, Russell, of the Artillery, laid trains of gunpowder from the magazines to a point at

which he stood during the disarming of the Sikhs near the loaded guns, and if mutiny had been successful, he would have fired the trains and blown the magazines with all the surrounding buildings into the air. The expulsion of the Hindustani sepoys, effected by Brasyer's cool courage and admirable management, averted for the moment this great calamity, and all that was left undone was afterwards set right by the help of the rational character of the Sikhs.

Brigadier-General Neill had arrived at Allahabad on June 11. The news that Neill was coming did more than anything to establish confidence in the garrison. The old spirit of self-reliance had never failed, and it was felt that a handful of European soldiers under a commander with a clear head and a stout heart might hold Allahabad against the whole world of mutiny and rebellion. As he entered the gates of the fort the sentry exclaimed: "Thank God, sir, you'll save us yet!"

On the morning after his arrival he opened fire from the fort guns on the village of Darah-gunge, which was held by a large body of insurgent rabble, and then sent forward to the attack detachments of Fusiliers and Sikhs, who cleared the village, burnt it, and regained position of the bridge, which Neill afterwards repaired. Neill's Journal relates—

"*June* 10.—The tone and bearing of the native officials bad; evidently a good deal of plundering; villages burning in all directions; the country almost deserted; plundered by the Zemindars about. The revenues just about to be collected; the toll-house

on road to Saidabad plundered; nearly destroyed; the body of the murdered man, an European, in the house, his daughter said to be taken off by a neighbouring Zemindar."

Neill now felt himself strong enough for any emergency. The first suggestion of this increased strength was the removal of the Sikhs from the fort. The stores of the European merchants had been plundered, and beer, wines, and spirits were as plentiful as water in the fort. The Sikhs sold large quantities of liquor of all kinds to the Europeans, and a reign of intoxication set in which subverted all military authority. This was an enemy for which Neill was not prepared, but his clear brain soon discerned the means of meeting and subduing it.

He directed the commissariat officer to purchase at the prices asked by the Sikhs all the liquor remaining in their hands, and to lodge it securely in the Government stores. This done, the removal of the Sikhs to quarters outside the fort was comparatively easy; but it was not to be done by force. He had taken counsel with Brasyer and with the energetic magistrate, Court, and the Sikhs were persuaded to take up a position in some old Government buildings outside the fort commanded by the guns on its ramparts.

On the 18th Neill marched out again with his whole force. Sending one detachment to attack the Pathan village of Dariabad and the Mehwattee villages of Saidabad and Russelpore, he led the main body into the city, which he found deserted, and afterwards halted them in the now desolated

cantonment on the old parade-ground of the Sikhs. The fighting was now over; the work had been done. The English were masters, not merely of the fort, but of the recovered city and the European station, from which they had been driven scarcely two weeks ago.

"Over the whole history of the sepoy war," writes Sir William Kaye, "over the whole length and breadth of the country which witnessed its manifold horrors, there is no darker cloud than that which gathered over Allahabad in this terrible summer." And it was only by the firmness, resolution, and courage, of men like Neill, Russell, and Brasyer that a great disaster was averted.

CHAPTER VI

FOUR MONTHS IN AFGHANISTAN

On the news of the massacre of the Envoy, Sir Louis Cavagnari, with his escort at Kabul, reaching India in September, 1879, General Sir Frederick Roberts who was at the time at Simla, immediately started again for the front. Reaching Ali Kheyl in a few days, by great exertions on the part of all the officers and men of the force who were animated by the example of their chief, the force was ready to advance from Ali Kheyl towards Kabul in a few days.

The force reached Charasiab on October 8, and found the Afghans occupying a position on the heights and ready to oppose them. Beyond the camping ground is a district abounding in cultivated enclosures and walled gardens. An active enemy would have lined the edges with skirmishers, and posted his squadrons behind the villages. But the Afghans had no cavalry, and the infantry had a dread of being caught in the open. As usual they had posted themselves along the crests of the hills, their position roughly speaking resembling a horse-shoe. The left segment was formed by a lofty range of hills, ending in a precipitous conical-shaped peak beneath which road and river run side by side through

a narrow gap. A lower range, with gradually falling, rounded slopes, completed the right segment.

General Baker's brigade—composed of the 72nd Highlanders, 5th Goorkhas, and the 5th Punjab infantry—and a mule battery—succeeded in rolling up the enemy's right and working steadily up and down hill, towards the Pass. The ground was bare and destitute of cover; at one point our losses were heavy, and a slight check occurred.

Meantime G Battery, 3rd Brigade, Royal Artillery, with a small escort of cavalry and infantry, went straight up against the Pass where the guns were posted. Barring the passage were two steep isolated hills, one below the other, covered with stone breastworks.

Some time afterwards G Battery, 3rd Brigade, opened fire. Major White,* of the 92nd Highlanders, brought a company close under the first hill, and then made a rush against the enemy above. It is said to have been a fine sight to see the Highlanders straining doggedly on without firing a shot. Now and then the Afghans swarmed out in front of their defences, but the artillery fire was always sufficient to turn them flying under cover again. About halfway up the little storming party found shelter behind some rocks, when they made the last rush with the bayonet that made the hill their own. After this exploit, Major White, reinforced by some men of his own regiment, and some of the 23rd Pioneers cleared the second hill, and then made for the centre of the

* Afterwards Field Marshal Sir George White, O.M., V.C., G.C.B., etc., etc.

enemy's position, where he took the guns. As soon as it was seen that the enemy were in retreat the 5th Punjab Cavalry and a sqaudron of the 9th Lancers rode into the Pass. The ground here is very much enclosed intersected with broad ditches, and the road and river together find their way through the narrow pass. The troopers were obliged to dismount but made good use of their carbines.

Before evening, the tribes who had occupied the heights on the right of the camp were driven off, and during the night both the Pass and the camp were held by our troops.

After defeat at Charasiab, the Afghans offered comparatively little opposition to the advance. Roberts advanced and captured the city of Kabul, the magazines with sixty guns; the Bala Hissan and the Sherpun Cantonment. Detachments were left at the various posts between Gundamuk and Kabul, *viâ* Soorkhab, Jugdalak Kotul, Jugdalak and Lataband.

In the month of September the corps which I commanded—the Bengal sappers and miners—received orders to proceed at once by rail to Jhelum, and thence to march to the Khyber Pass. At Gundamuk we were in camp for six weeks and were employed in laying a line of field telegraph, in preparing huts for the troops, and other duties. Gundamuk is situated on a stony plain that slopes gradually towards the mountains occupied by the Hazarehs. Near Gundamuk on the right of the road leading to Kabul is the hill on which the remains of the 44th Regiment made their last stand on the retreat of the army from Kabul in December 1841.

Our time at Gundamuk was too fully occupied to allow of sport, even if there had been any ; but there is not much shooting to be had on these stony plains. Sand grouse I believe are occasionally seen, and during one of the attacks made by the Afghans on a convoy I noticed a small deer scampering off alarmed by the firing, and believe it to have been a ravine deer—Chinkara—of the species commonly found near Gwalior and in Central India. On one of the afternoons allotted to the brigade for field sports some fortunate ones enjoyed a good ride after a large dog that belonged to one of the officers. The dog was an enormous creature, and had been bought from an Afghan, but he evinced a most surly disposition to Europeans. He would allow no one to approach him and frequently refused his food.

I was riding with a friend through the camp when we saw several officers galloping at full speed. We joined in the hunt and found that the animal had broken his chain and was the object of pursuit. After about seven miles over very rough and break-neck ground the dog seemed to be going as easily as at the commencement. He did not appear to be going at a great pace but at a swinging sort of canter, looking with his rough shaggy coat like a huge wolf. Whenever we put on a spurt and came to close quarters, he seemed without effort to draw a little ahead. As it was now getting dusk, and we were seven or eight miles from camp, and in an enemy country, we were reluctantly obliged to give up the pursuit, after marking the position of the village to which we had chased him. On the following day he

was, however, brought back. He was taken to India at the end of the campaign, but could not stand the heat of the plains. He was a magnificent animal and I have never seen his like for size or speed. The dust-storms at this period were very severe, sometimes continuing for two days. During the height of these storms it would become quite dark, and a thick sediment of dust covered one's food, bedding, and everything else.

The bullocks used in this campaign were wonderfully strong and docile, but were liable to attacks of pneumonia, and diseases of the lungs. A large number of these valuable animals died from this cause.

At Gundamuk the treaty of peace was signed by the Amīr, Yakoob Khan in May, 1879. The Amir was received by the General, Sir Samuel Browne, and the whole of the troops, who were drawn up in line.

In November of the same year, Yakoob Khan again passed through Gundamuk, being escorted as a close prisoner to India after the massacre of the Envoy, Sir Louis Cavagnari, and his suite at Kabul.

The climate is very variable. By February 26 the willow had blossomed. About the early part of March, the first flower of spring, a kind of small sweet-smelling iris, makes its appearance, and in the beginning of April the apricots show their blossoms. Nevertheless it snowed on the 27th March, and tradition says that Ghazni was destroyed by snow nine days before the vernal equinox. The superior coolness and salubrity of most parts of

Afghanistan would seem to be due less to the differences of latitude than of elevation.

The following are the heights of four places on the route from Peshawar to Kabul, and the climate may be said to improve in proportion to the increase of altitude: Jelalabad 1964 feet, Gundamuk 4619 feet, Jugdalak 5375, and Kabul 6247 feet.

On the Kabul route the temperate climate begins at Gundamuk, beyond which snow usually covers the ground during the middle of winter.

Snow begins to cover the hills around Kabul, but seldom visits the plains before December, when it accumulates fast upon the ground until the end of January or middle of February, from which period there is usually a fall of rain until the end of April. The remainder of the year is dry.

The water in the brass basins or chilumchees, which we used for washing, was frequently frozen into a solid mass in the tents during the night.

There are no active volcanoes in Afghanistan, but earthquakes are very common. I have felt several shocks of earthquake both in Afghanistan and in Kashmir.

On the evening of December 14, the native adjutant came to the mess tent, and placing his ear to the ground declared that he heard heavy firing in the Kabul direction.

We received orders the same evening to march at daybreak the following morning with the force under the command of Major-General Sir Charles Gough.

The enemy, during the week ending December 23,

made three attacks on the post at Jugdalak Kotal, where Sir Charles Gough had left me in command, but were repulsed with loss on each occasion.

On the last occasion the Ghilzais attacked in great force, and my native orderly, by name Sultan Ali, was killed by my side while I was giving him some orders. I was wounded at the same time by a heavy Enfield bullet, which entered at the wrist of my right arm and lodged in the elbow. The bullet was extracted on the following morning, but I was wearing a poshteen—sheep-skin coat—at the time, and a large piece of the coat was carried in with the bullet, and this was not discovered until four weeks afterwards. A bad abscess formed, and the piece of coat had to be removed by my old friend the late Colonel McNalty, C.B., I.M.S., and this saved amputation, but I was incapacitated from active service for several months and had to be invalided to England.

A rather amusing incident happened while I was being carried in a dooly to Peshawar. One of the medical officers had most kindly given me a small tin of potted meat, and on arriving at the end of the stage I was rather exhausted and told my servant—Boodhoo—to bring the potted meat. After a long delay he came into the tent with an old rusty tin soup-plate filled with some luke-warm greasy water in which lumps of the potted meat were floating! The poor fellow I think had quite lost any wits that he ever had from the hardships he had to undergo in Afghanistan.

Five years afterwards I was riding through the bazaar at Mupooree when a man ran out of one of

the shops and seized my stirrup with exclamations of delight at seeing me. It was the faithful Boodhoo, but although he had recognised me he seemed in the same hazy state as when I parted from him at Peshawar. This brings to my recollection another incident of somewhat the same kind.

After the capture of Delhi in September, 1857, when marching down to Lucknow with a column under the command of General Sir Thomas Seaton, there was in my service a native whom I trusted and who had been with me during the siege. One day I gave this man a chit—a note written hurriedly on a half-sheet of note-paper—on which was an order to pass through the camp with two camels that had to be sent back to Alygurh. I had not seen the man again. Twenty-two years afterwards, in 1879, at Naini-Tal I was told that some one wished to see me, and a portly spotlessly dressed native wearing a heavy gold chain come in and salaamed in an effusive manner. I had not any idea who he was and asked him what he wanted, when he produced the identical chit—rather discoloured—which I had given him during the Mutiny twenty-two years before. He then explained that the chit had been the cause of his good fortune and advancement. It had proved his loyalty in the trying times of the Mutiny, and owing to this he had obtained various situations, and he was then holding some good appointment under the Naini-Tal Municipality.

His Last Duty *

At about four o'clock on an afternoon towards the end of November, 1879, a convoy could have been seen winding its way along the Peshawar and Kabul road, and at a distance of a few miles beyond Jellalabad. The short wintry day was fast closing in, and a furious dust-storm blowing: it was almost dark, and the air was filled with the sharp blinding particles of dust which made it almost impossible for men or animals to distinguish the road.

The convoy was not a very large one, and consisted of two companies of a native regiment with some camels, mules carrying tools, stores, and telegraph equipment, and forty elephants.

The Commissariat officer at Peshawar had taken advantage of the detachment moving to the front to send on the elephants which were urgently required for the transport of the heavy guns to Kabul.

Riding in front of the convoy was the English officer in command of the detachment and convoy, Captain Pruce, with his subaltern officer, followed by the main body of the detachment, stumbling along in the blinding obscurity caused by the dust-storm, and the mules, camels, and elephants, with Jemadar Faiz Khan, followed with the rearguard.

At length, after a long and tedious march, the convoy reached its encamping-ground, and the work of pitching the tents and running up the shelters began ; but now it was reported that all the elephants

* From the *Cornhill Magazine*, April, 1914.

had not arrived, and that some had probably strayed from the road owing to the blinding dust. A party had to be sent back to search for the missing animals, which were not found for some hours. When they reached the camp it was past midnight, and pitch-dark. The dust-storm was still blowing furiously. Those elephants that were already at the camp, hearing the sounds made by the returning animals, broke away from their fastenings and were trampling about in the darkness among the tents, and the two English officers who were in a small field-service tent expected the collapse of the tent at any moment.

At last the dusky morning broke, the dust-storm had somewhat abated, the elephants were all secured, and the convoy was able to proceed, arriving at its next encamping-ground without further incident.

The English officers were having their breakfast, when shots were heard in the distance, and soon after a sowar* was seen riding very slowly up the steep road that leads to the camping-ground, and leading a riderless horse. The man, who belonged to one of the cavalry regiments serving with the Khyber column, was unable to dismount, and was lifted from his horse, when it was seen that he had been shot through the ankle. He reported that he had formed one of a party of four sowars proceeding to Kabul with dispatches and a chest containing chloroform which was urgently required there. On reaching the ravine about three miles from the encampment, they were fired upon by a party of Afghans concealed behind rocks close to the road.

* Native trooper.

One of his comrades was killed, and the sowar was himself shot through the leg, the bullet also passing through the body of the horse. Although badly wounded, he stayed behind to try to render assistance to his comrade. He fired five or six shots from his carbine, and it was not until he found that further resistance would be useless that he seized his comrade's horse and rode off.

The whole of the country between Jellalabad and Kabul was at this time in arms against us, and the convoy duties were not carried on without risk and loss of life, for although the natives of the country—whether Ghilzais or Hazarehs—would not meet our troops in the open, they were sufficiently numerous to harass very considerably the long line of helpless baggage-animals and camp-followers, which entailed their protection by a considerable force of all arms. A small force was told off daily to meet the convoy, and rarely a day passed without a skirmish, in which, however, our loss was as a rule very trifling.

The force that advanced through the Khyber, and from Lundi Kotul after the massacre of the Envoy, Sir Louis Cavagnari, and his escort, was divided into three brigades. Although a large part of the Khyber Field Force was not so frequently engaged in the early portion of the second phase of the Afghan Campaign, the duties performed by this force were none the less arduous and important. The line of communication from Lundi Kotul to Kabul was continually attacked and harassed by the Ghilzais, Hazarehs, and other tribes. Telegraph-wires were cut, posts attacked, stragglers murdered; and it was

only by incessant care on the part of the commanders, and the steadiness and excellent behaviour of the troops under their command, that the convoys to and from Kabul were able to move. Defensive posts had to be constructed and garrisoned, and the supplies of food for men and cattle, and ammunition, were entirely dependent upon the keeping up of this line of communication. One of the brigades was encamped for a month at Gundamuk, and, a lengthened stay being anticipated, arrangements were made for hutting the troops. A large fort and other works were also begun.

Near Gundamuk is the hill on which the remains of the 44th Regiment made their last stand on the fatal retreat of the army from Kabul in December 1841. The Sepoys, who composed the principal force of General Elphinstone's army, had nearly all sunk under the hardships which they experienced, or were killed long before arriving at this place. The wreck of the army, which consisted of about one hundred and seventy men, principally Europeans, being unable to proceed further, determined to come to bay, and sell their lives as dearly as they could. They had expended their ammunition, and the enemy poured upon the exhausted and worn-out soldiers by thousands, and, after a bloody conflict, the enormous numerical superiority of the Afghans gave them the victory.

Every one of the survivors was killed except Dr. Brydon, who succeeded in making his way to Jellalabad, where his horse dropped dead. Captain Souter and a drummer of the 44th were taken

prisoners. The gallant Captain Souter owed his life to having saved the colours of his regiment. He had them wrapped round his body, and an Afghan chief, taking him from his extraordinary trappings to be a person of great distinction, ordered his life to be spared, thinking, probably, that there would be a good ransom for the prisoner.

Building with bricks and mortar is hardly known in Northern Afghanistan. The houses and walls are of sun-dried bricks laid in mud, or a sort of pisé and mud, which seems to last wonderfully well when once dry. The mud is stirred up and trodden into a good consistency, it is then further manipulated and dabbed down on the wall; about eighteen inches is thus built at a time and left to dry. All the defensible walls of forts and towns are made thus, the mud being sometimes mixed with straw. Forts constructed in this manner are commonly met with in the valleys about Peshawar and Kohat, as well as near Kabul.

The small square towers so common in Afghanistan are generally entered only by a ladder, which is drawn up at night when the family retires to rest; but the larger forts have gateways with flanking defences strongly barricaded with stout beams and iron bolts.

A large fort of the latter description was occupied by the notorious freebooter, Mozuffur Khan, with his retainers. Mozuffur Khan had long enjoyed a high place in the opinion of the occupants of some of the neighbouring villages who were not averse to predatory expeditions, and was well known for his

hatred of the British Raj. Issuing from his stronghold with a large number of retainers armed with rifles, matchlocks, and Afghan knives, he frequently raided the more peaceful villages, his raids sometimes even extending to British territory; and from the information obtained by the political officer with the column, it was clearly proved that the attacks on the convoys, the cutting of the telegraph-wires, and the murders of defenceless mule-drivers and camp-followers was instigated by this man.

As the main body of the brigade that was on its way to Kabul had now arrived at the encamping-ground, orders were received that the stronghold held by Mozuffur Khan and his tribesmen should be assaulted on the following morning.

The night was very dark and the silence only broken by the sound of the grunting of the camels and the loading of the mules, as the order for the march had been issued for 4 a.m.

"Now, Tillok, quick with those powder-bags. The Captain Sahib is waiting to see that all is ready, and we have to blow in the fort gate at dawn." The speaker was Faiz Khan, Jemadar in the corps of sappers and miners. Risen to his present rank after fifteen years' service and decorated with three medals, he was a fine specimen of a thoroughly faithful and trustworthy Indian native officer, and were it not for the darkness of the night a look of pride and resolute determination might have been seen to light up his features. And now the last of the powder-bags had been filled, its mouth securely tied, and all was ready.

A reconnaissance of the fort had been made on the previous day, and it had been ascertained that it was one of the ordinary type of which there are so many in Afghanistan, and a description of which has been previously given.

Although it was barely dawn and every advantage had been taken of the little cover that existed among the rocks and few scanty shrubs in the vicinity of the open ground or glacis in front of the fort, on reaching this position several of the advanced skirmishers had been shot down by the heavy fire of the rifles and jinghals from the fort walls before the main attack could be ordered.

"Now," said the Brigadier, who had momentarily halted the advance and was consulting with his staff-officers on one of the neighbouring knolls—"now is the time;" and turning to the Engineer officer by his side, "You have the instructions for blowing in the gate, and there is no time to be lost." "Very well, sir," replied Captain Pruce as he turned his horse and galloped to the spot where the small detachment of sappers was in waiting with their tools and powder-bags, the Jemadar Faiz Khan at their head. Quickly dismounting from his horse, which was held by a faithful syce, he placed himself at the head of the small party carrying the powder-bags, gave a sharp order, and they advanced at a quick run towards the fort gate, passing the bodies of the men who had fallen in the first advance. The risks incurred by engineers and sappers in the operation of blowing up the gates or walls of fortified places are well known. Among many instances may be mentioned two fatal

accidents that occurred near Kabul on December 23, 1879, when Captain James Dundas, V.C., and Lieutenant Charles Nugent, both of the Royal Engineers, were unfortunately killed while engaged in blowing up the towers of some villages, owing to an untimely explosion caused by a defective fuse.

Although the attack had been discovered, and a heavy fire opened from the fort walls which wounded an English sergeant and three sepoys who formed part of the explosion party, Captain Pruce and the Jemadar had so far escaped unhurt, and succeeded in placing the powder-bags at the foot of the heavy ironbound gate which afforded the only entrance to the fort. Two more bags were placed by the sepoys in the same position, and Captain Pruce, rapidly striking a match, lighted the port-fire attached to the fuse. "Now, run all," cried the Captain; and the party retired a short distance, throwing themselves on their faces and waiting for the explosion. But there was no explosion! Another minute passed, but still all was quiet. Then the Captain and the Jemadar rose to their feet and raced towards the gate. The Jemadar was a fast runner and of rather slighter build than Captain Pruce, whom he outdistanced by a few yards. He reached the gate first, and was bending over the bags, when the fire from the burning fuse, which from some defect had been retarded in its ignition, reached the powder. There was a dull roar, and the gate was shattered to fragments. Through the opening rushed the storming party which had been awaiting the explosion a little in the rear, followed immediately by the main body,

and the fort was captured with small loss, a few only of the defenders escaping by jumping from the walls. Captain Pruce had been partially stunned by the explosion, but, recovering almost immediately, his first thought was for the Jemadar. But the brave Jemadar Faiz Khan had accomplished his last duty and lay on his face, motionless and dead, his head shattered by the falling beams, and his body pierced with three bullets.

The Repairer of the Taj Mahal*

The following short memoir of a very gallant and talented officer, the late Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Taylor, of the Bengal Engineers, who carried out extensive and important repairs to the Taj Mahal at Agra in 1810, and to the tomb of the Emperor Akbar, and to other buildings of architectural and antiquarian interest in India, may, it is hoped, be of some interest to the readers of the *Asiatic Review*.

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Taylor arrived in India in 1808, his first commission as Lieutenant being dated in October of that year; he was almost immediately posted to Agra as Assistant to Captain Steele, the Garrison Engineer, to whose appointment he eventually succeeded, retaining it till 1826, between which period and 1830, when he returned to Agra as

* From the *Asiatic Review*, January, 1916.

Superintending Engineer of the North-Western Provinces, he successively filled the situations of Executive Engineer at Dinapore, Garrison Engineer and Civil Architect of Fort William, and, for a short period, that of acting Chief Engineer.

In the early part of his service at Agra, Lieutenant Taylor was frequently employed in the reduction of the numerous small forts in the vicinity of this station, at that time occupied by refractory Zimeendars, whom the recollection of successful resistance to the attempted collections of former Native Governors, and ignorance of our power, occasionally led to vain opposition to the British Revenue Authorities, or an endeavour to protect the hordes of freebooters by which the Agra district was then infested. The cool and determined courage of Lieutenant Taylor was manifest in all these affairs, and opportunity was not wanting for its conspicuous display on more than one occasion.

In the year 1810, Lieutenant Taylor was selected by the Government to repair the Taj, and when the limited sum granted for that repair, as compared with the extent of work executed, is considered, the praise bestowed by his superiors, on his completion of the duty, must meet with general assent. The repairs of the tomb of the Emperor Akbar at Secundra was another of his duties, and although during the many years that have elapsed since the task was completed nothing has been done to maintain the state of repair in which he placed it, the structure bears full evidence of his zealous exertions. Many other public works of beauty and utility might be

instanced, as well at the Presidency as at Agra, in proof of his taste and ability in this branch of his profession.

But it was not in the execution of his civil duties alone that this gallant officer merits our notice. He was found a volunteer at Hattrass in 1817, and was present during the siege and reduction of that fortress, the last and infinitely the strongest of the forts of this class that had occasionally defied our power since the provinces of Agra and Dooba had become subject to the British rule. He was promoted to the rank of Captain on September 1, 1818, and in this rank was among the most distinguished of the officers of his corps. At the siege and capture of Bhurtpoor in 1825 and 1826, he was severely wounded in an attempt to blow up a gallery made by the enemy into the ditch, which greatly impeded the operations of the attacking force. For the gallantry displayed by Captain Taylor on this occasion, he received the personal and written thanks of the Commander-in-Chief. His services at Bhurtpoor were further acknowledged by his promotion from the date of the fall of that fortress to a Brevet Majority.

His promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel took place on June 18, 1831, and as the senior officer of this grade in his corps, he died, at the early age of forty-five, at Agra, on the morning of April 20, 1835, from an apoplectic attack, leaving behind him a general feeling of respect for his memory and of sympathy with those by whom his loss must be most severely felt.

Operations of the Bengal Army in India and on Foreign Service—The Siege of Bhurtpoor*

Enemy dislodged from a Gallery.—The gallery in the enemy's rampart, from which our miners had been obliged to retire, having since been observed to be occupied by the enemy, it was this night (January 9, 1826) resolved to dislodge them. For this duty Captain Taylor (Engineers), Sub-Conductor Richardson, and ten Sappers, gallantly stepped forward. Having entered the ditch by the debris of the three, four, and five mines, the party cautiously advanced to the mouth of the gallery. Voices heard and light seen in its interior having indicated the necessity of silence and celerity, 350 lbs. of *powder*, carried over in sand-bags, was placed in the narrow opening communicating from the gallery, made by the garrison, to that which had been ours. A *hose* having been laid, and the entrance tamped with sand-bags, the explosion, not an instant deferred, proved entirely successful. Both galleries were destroyed.

The planning and manner of executing of this exploit merited, and, as the annexed letter to† Captain Taylor proves, received just praise. Spirited as had been the conduct of the natives, the advantage, on such a service, of having *one* well-instructed

* From *The Englishman and Military Chronicle*, May 25, 1847.

† The letter must be in the Adjutant-General's office. Some years before, when Captain Taylor was the Engineer officer at Agra, and was repairing the dome of the Taj Mahal, he took his wife up the rope ladders to the top of the dome. He was always very bold.

European Sapper had been again experienced. Sub-Conductor Richardson, of the Sappers and Miners, who had been trained at Chatham by Colonel Pasley, was, for the cool and systematic assistance he here afforded, promoted to the grade of Conductor.

[From Lieutenant W. N. Forbes' Journal.]

Operations of the Bengal Army in India and on Foreign Service—The Siege of Bhurtpoor *

Attempt to destroy Enemy's Gallery [January 12, 1826].—Captains Taylor and Irvine (Engineers) having made the preparations requisite for an attempt to destroy the enemy's gallery in the North Rampart, when the moon had set, entered the ditch and advanced towards the adjacent cotton-bag parapet.

Here the officers in advance of a covering-party of Goorkhas and Europeans got hand-to-hand engaged with a guard of the garrison found lining a rear trench. In the confusion (heightened by darkness) that ensued, Captain Taylor, taken by some of his party for one of the enemy,† received several severe

* From *The Englishman and Military Chronicle*, May 27, 1847.

† "He had on a Lascar's cap and a drab greatcoat." One of our men thrust his bayonet with so much force into one of the enemy that he could not pull it back again, and the fellows in the cavern were pulling in opposition to him at the wounded, or dead, man to get him away, so that the bayonet was unscrewed and carried off in

wounds. Captain Irvine, after passing through an opening in the parapet, having temporarily been disabled by a bruise (inflicted by a Jaat with a matchlock wielded as a club), it for the night became necessary to abandon the enterprise. In retiring, the cotton-bags (previously scattered by the fire of the ravine battery) were set on fire.

[From the *Artillery Journal*, January 12, 1826.]

Lieutenant Irvine's (Engineers) private letter to Colonel —— (most likely the Hon. Colonel Finch, Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief)

[*January* 14, 1826]

Enemy's Gallery blown up.—On the morning of the 10th it was observed that the enemy had made a parapet of cotton-bags across the ditch, about forty yards to the right of the gun-breach.

On the morning of the 12th, with a view to discover the nature and object of this work, I entered the ditch, accompanied by a party of Goorkhas under Lieutenant Spottiswoode, and found that this parapet was connected with a gallery leading completely through the ramparts, thus

the wound. Our soldier, finding the bayonet going, made a grasp at the sword-belt of his foe, which gave way, and he brought off the sword in exchange for the bayonet [*Letter*, vol. vi., p. 441, E.I.U.S.J.]. Captain Taylor saved himself by calling out, "I am Captain Taylor of the Engineers."

enabling the enemy to enter the ditch at pleasure, and keep a watch on our mining operations.

This parapet, which had a trench cut in rear of it, also flanked the approach to the breach. They had not, I found, commenced any countermines in the counterscarp, as had been supposed. Having observed the size and shape of the opening, the party retired.

On the night of the 12th it was determined, if possible, to destroy this gallery. Captain Taylor volunteered to conduct the enterprise, and I offered to assist.

After ten o'clock we moved out of the trenches with twenty men of His Majesty's 14th, under Captain Bertrand, and twenty Goorkhas, with a party of sappers and miners carrying a mantlet made to fit the gallery, and sand-bags, some filled with earth and some with powder.

The men of the 14th were intended to be sent in advance, and the Goorkhas to be posted a short distance in the rear, while the sappers were engaged in loading the gallery.

Captain Taylor and Irvine were a few paces in advance of the party, and on reaching the trench found it occupied by the enemy. The alarm being given, the men came rushing on in some confusion, and mistaking Captain Taylor (who was at that time engaged with the fellows in front of him) for one of the enemy, gave him fourteen bayonet wounds. One rascal peeled the skin off my shins, defending himself with the butt-end of his matchlock.

Both Europeans and Goorkhas commenced firing (which they had been positively forbid to do), the Sappers dropped the sand-bags, and, finding it impossible to restore order, I was forced to withdraw my party.

[Extract from the Journal of January 12, 1826.]

CHAPTER VII

UPPER ASSAM

Notes on Natural History

In travelling up the Brahmapootra River from Goalundo to Dibrogurh the steamers formerly stopped at Goalpara, Gowhatty, and Terpore. At Goalpara there is a fine view extending for many miles over the river and forests. The district on the side of the river opposite to the station was formerly considered the best shooting district in India, and for variety of game perhaps the best in the world, with the exception of Central Africa.

At the time of which I am writing, it abounded with tigers, rhinoceros, elephants, deer, and buffaloes, and I believe the quantity of large game has not greatly diminished.

Gowhatty is one of the most beautiful places on the river, and has been often described. Several small islands are dotted about on the river, and the view at sunset is not unlike that of the Italian lakes.

During the time that I was stationed at Dibrogurh I shot several buffaloes, but never saw a rhinoceros, although their tracks were sometimes met with.

An unfortunate accident happened to a friend, Major K——, at Sudiya. He was beating a dense

patch of jungle in which it was thought there was a rhinoceros, with two elephants, one of which he was riding. The other elephant was sent into the jungle to try to drive the rhinoceros out. The elephant became alarmed from some cause, and in spite of the efforts of the mahout, he rushed crashing out of the jungle, and Major K—— fired at the animal under the impression that it was the rhinoceros. The elephant was so badly injured by the shot that he died a few days afterwards, and I believe Major K—— had to pay eight hundred rupees as compensation. I once nearly underwent an unfortunate experience, not while shooting, but from an elephant joining a wild herd. I was travelling to Luckimpore, about three marches from Dibrogurh, to visit some Government buildings. I had only one elephant for the journey, and he was a bad-tempered, ill-conditioned animal. His tail was of the shortest proportions, and the mahout affirmed that it had been bitten off in a fight with another elephant. The first march was through a dense forest inhabited by wild elephants, and although we did not see any, we noticed many tracks and boughs of trees which had evidently been lately broken by the animals. On the following morning, having struck the tent and arranged the loads ready to be placed on the elephant, I called to the mahout to bring him. He came up holding the elephant by the ear, but just as he reached the packages he turned aside and bolted into the forest, followed by the mahout.

After waiting some hours and hearing nothing of the mahout or elephant, I determined to return on

foot to Dibrogurh, and walked back through the forest, a distance of about twenty miles. The elephant was not caught for three weeks, and after being caught by the commissariat elephants which were sent out in pursuit, and being fastened to a tree, he again broke away and was not caught for two or three days. A reward of fifty rupees had to be offered for his capture.

On another occasion, when riding this elephant through a swamp near Sīb Saugor, returning from snipe shooting, he became violent, and with a great shake at a time when I was not quite prepared, he flung me into the marsh with the gun and all I had about me. Shortly after I left Assam the animal had to be shot, as his temper became too violent and he had injured his mahout.

It happened that when I left Dibrogurh to return to Calcutta that one of the commissariat elephants had died at that station the day before, and the carcase had been thrown into the river. The steamer always stopped for the night, to avoid the danger of the snags or trunks of trees which were obstacles to navigation, and just as we were sitting down to dinner the carcase of the elephant, which had been thrown into the river the day before, arrived, floating along and bumped up against the steamer. It was pushed off from the side and continued its journey, travelling with the rapid stream of the Brahmapootra at the rate of four or five miles an hour. On the following evening, when we again stopped for the night, the same thing happened at the same time, and the same uninvited guest came bumping along, giving us the benefit of its unpleasant

company, and the same operation had again to be performed. The stream during the rainy season runs at the rate of four or five miles an hour, so that the carcase of the elephant travelled about a hundred and twenty-four miles in twenty-four hours, while the steamer, travelling at the rate of ten or twelve miles an hour for only twelve hours, our unpleasant companion always arrived at dinner time!

I once came across a party of Government elephant catchers in the forest near the Dehing River. There were fourteen elephants, each having a mahout and some two riders. They said that they had been out for a month and had not caught any elephants. Their appearance was very wild and ragged, the few clothes that they possessed being worn to tatters, and they had very little rice. The method of catching wild elephants at that time in the district of which I am writing was to run them down with tame elephants, and after noosing them to secure them to trees. For the mahouts and attendants this way of catching elephants was extremely arduous and rather dangerous. Elephants now are usually caught in kheddahs, the accounts of which have so frequently been made that it is unnecessary here to repeat the description.

Tigers are not very frequently met with in Upper Assam, but this may be owing to the denseness of the jungle. I have often, when camping out or travelling down the Brahmapootra in boats, heard their roars, but never saw one.

Once when travelling down the river in a boat from Dibrogurh we secured the boat on a dry sand bank at the edge of the forest. While taking a stroll

I noticed the tracks of deer, wild pigs, and buffaloes at the edge of a small creek at some distance from the river, and thinking to obtain a shot at some animal, I contrived, with the assistance of the "dooms" or boatmen, to rig up a small screen of boughs and bushes from which I proposed to watch as soon as the moon had risen sufficiently to give light to see an animal coming to the water to drink. Unfortunately the boatman did not wake me, and by the time I had reached the screen of bushes there was but little moonlight, and I could scarcely distinguish objects close to the screen. I had not waited long before I heard a heavy suppressed sound as of an animal taking a long breath just in front of the screen, but a little to the right.

Straining my eyes, I tried to catch sight of the animal, but could see nothing, and I then heard the same sound on the left side of the screen. This not seeming very healthy, I got up from the screen and gave a loud shout and went off to the boat, which was not very far distant. In the morning, on going down to the creek, we found the footprints of a large tiger within a few feet of the screen.

It has been my good fortune to have been invited to several tiger-shooting parties in Central India and the Upper Provinces, and was once charged by a wounded tiger when shooting on foot in the Buhampore jungles. The tiger had six bullets in him, and rolled over dead almost at my feet.

That distinguished officer, the late General Sir Henry Tombs, V.C., K.C.B., who was in command of the Gwalior district in 1867, kindly invited me to join

a tiger-shooting party in the jungles about fifty miles from Gwalior. We had very good sport, the bag consisting of five or six tigers, a bear, and several sambhur. Two lions were also shot by the party. Lions disappeared from these jungles not many years after this, and there are none there now. I believe lions are now only found in the Kattywar district.

One of these small lions only measured five feet three inches from the tip of the nose to the tip of the tail, the hair is very short, of a light fawn colour. I am unable to say what cause has led to lions becoming extinct in that part of India.

An amusing incident happened during this trip. One of the party, I think Sir Henry Tombs, had fired at and wounded a tiger. The animal was in one of the deep ravines or "Kohs," as they are called in this part of India. The elephant that I was riding was an unsteady animal, not accustomed to shooting, and on hearing the tiger he turned and bolted over the stony rough ground. He ran for more than two miles before the mahout could stop him. Fortunately the howdah was a strong one, and although we several times came into violent contact with the trees, it did not break, and no damage was done beyond a rather severe shaking.

The late Maharajah Scindia had a small bungalow at a place called Rolhait, about eight miles from Gwalior, and he used kindly to give permission to the officers to go out there for fishing. A large tame alligator was kept in the river. A goat was tied to a stake near the river bank. The alligator sprang out of the water and carried away the goat and disappeared under the water in an instant. It was a cruel and

unpleasant sight, and the alligator should, of course, have been supplied with food by some other means.

The Great Bustard was formerly found in considerable numbers in the Gwalior district, and, I believe, still frequents that locality. They are very wary birds, and can only be shot with a rifle and after careful stalking. Their flight is very slow and heavy. I have heard that it is possible to ride these birds down, as after the first or second flight they soon become exhausted. Jerdan states that the Indian bustard (*otis bengalensis*), when courting the female, rises into the air with a hurried flapping of his wings, raising his crest, and puffing out the feathers of his neck and breast and then drops to the ground. He repeats this manœuvre several times, at the same time humming in a peculiar tone. Such females as happen to be near obey this saltatory summons, and when they approach he trails his wings and spreads his tail like a turkey-cock. I saw no bustard in Assam, but found several florican on an island in the river near Sudiya.

The wild buffalo is or was very common in the jungles near Sīb Saugor. The grass grows to such a height that an elephant is an absolute necessity to shoot from. I have seen a large bull buffalo charge the elephant I was riding three times, altogether receiving two bullets at each charge.

The large hornbill, or toucan, is frequently met with in the forests of Assam. The enormous bill, with its incomprehensible appendage, although heavy, is much lighter than it looks, being composed of a kind of light honey-combed structure. The upper protuberance is hollow, and the only conjecture formed

of its use is that it serves as a sounding-board to increase the reverberation of the air while the bird is uttering its peculiar roaring cry. In spite of the apparently unwieldy bill the bird is very active, and hops about the branches of the trees with much ease.

The appendage to the upper mandible is small when the bird is young, and only attains its enormous size when the hornbill has reached its full growth. No satisfactory explanation has ever been offered of the immense size and still less of the bright colour of the toucan's beak.

Mr. Bates, the naturalist on the Amazon, states that they use their beaks for reaching fruit at the extreme tips of the branches; and likewise, as stated by other authors, for extracting eggs and young birds from the nests of other birds. But, as Mr. Bates observes, the beak can scarcely be considered a very perfectly-formed instrument for the end to which it is applied. The great bulk of the beak—as shown by its breadth, depth, as well as length—is not intelligible on this view.

Mr. Belt, another naturalist, believes that the principal use of the beak is as a defence against enemies, especially to the female, while nesting in a hole in a tree. The naked skin at the base of the beak is also brilliantly coloured; and Mr. Gould, in speaking of one species, says that the colours of the beak "are doubtless in the most brilliant state at the time of pairing." There is no greater improbability that toucans should be encumbered with immense beaks, though rendered as light as possible by their cancellated structure for the display of fine colours—an

object falsely appearing to us unimportant—than that the male Argus pheasant and some other birds should be encumbered with plumes so long as to impede their flight.

The female hornbill is protected during incubation with extraordinary care, for she plasters up the hole on which she sits on her eggs, leaving only a small orifice through which the male feeds her; she is then kept a close prisoner during the whole period of incubation; yet female hornbills are not more conspicuously coloured than many other birds of equal size which build open nests.

The bill of the hoopoes present a somewhat analogous peculiarity, as when the bird is young the bill is short and pointed, and increases with the size of the bird. From this circumstance, with some other peculiarities, some naturalists imagine that there is an affinity between the hornbills and hoopoes. Hornbills seem to be omnivorous—fruits, eggs, birds, reptiles, etc., forming their food. Darwin says that it is not incredible that toucans may owe the enormous size of their beaks to sexual selection for the purpose of displaying the diversified and brilliant stripes of colours with which they are ornamented.

Hoopoes are common in Assam as in other parts of India. The male hoopoe—*Upopa epops*—combines vocal and instrumental music; for during the breeding season this bird, as Mr. Swinhoe observed, first draws in air, and then taps the end of its beak against a stone or the trunk of a tree, "when the breath being forced down the tubular bill produces the correct sound." If the beak is not then struck against

some object the sound is quite different. Air is at the same time swallowed, and the œsophagus then becomes much swollen; and this probably acts as a resonator, not only with the hoopoes but with pigeons and other birds.

The leaf insect "Foliata" is rather common in the forests of Assam. Not only does it closely resemble a leaf in shape, but even in colour, and its legs may easily be mistaken for dry twigs. Even the ramified veinings of the leaf are preserved on its wings. Mostly connected with this insect is the "Praying Mantis," so called from the curious way in which it holds its fore legs. It is very voracious and exceedingly quarrelsome, fighting with its fore legs, which it uses like a sword. These insects attain a great size in Assam. The Chinese keep them in little bamboo cages and set them to fight like quail.

Beetles, ants, spiders, scorpions, and butterflies of the most beautiful varieties swarm in all the forests. On the banks of the Dehing River I have frequently seen the ground covered with gorgeous swallow-tailed butterflies, and other kinds, to such an extent as to resemble the appearance of a variegated carpet of the brightest colour.

While travelling through a forest from Dibrogurh to Sudiya I once watched an immense flight of locusts. It lasted for several hours, and extended as far as one could see in every direction. These pests belong to the order "Orthoptera"—Greek, *orthos*, straight; *pteron*, a wing, because the wings are not folded transversely. It has been observed that a bright-coloured Indian locust was invariably rejected

when offered to birds or lizards, and conspicuous colours may be of use to these insects by giving notice that they are unpalatable.

I once came upon a large river turtle basking on the sand on the bank of the river opposite Sudiya. On being disturbed, the turtle partly raised itself and snapped viciously at the elephant I was riding, all the efforts of the mahout failing to induce the elephant to approach it.

Conclusion

In concluding this attempt to relate some of the incidents that have happened to me in India during the course of a long life, I would like to mention one or two important events of which I was an eye-witness in Europe.

On November 18, 1852, when a boy at school, kept by Dr. Greig at Walthamstow, and preparing for Addiscombe, I witnessed the funeral of the Duke of Wellington. My relations had secured a seat for me in a shop window in the Strand, and I walked up to London from Walthamstow in the early hours of the morning. The crowds were so great even at that early hour that I had the greatest difficulty in making my way through the streets.

In November, 1861, when on my way to England on furlough from India, I stayed for a few days at Venice, which was at that time occupied by the Austrians. I remember hearing twenty-two massed Austrian regimental bands playing in the Piazza.

The treatment of the Italians by the Austrians was most severe, and the Austrian sentries in the

streets were frequently shot. For three or four days I was unable to obtain a ticket to travel by rail to Milan and had to return to the hotel, the trains being all taken up for the conveyance of troops. I visited the battlefield of Magenta. Bullets and other relics of the great battle were being sold on the field.

Besides witnessing the funeral of the Great Duke, I had the good fortune to see the Diamond Jubilee procession of Her Majesty Queen Victoria in 1897; the Coronation processions both of His Majesty King Edward VII. in 1902, and of His Majesty King George V. in 1911. A few days after the former event I was summoned to Osborne to receive the honour of knighthood—K.C.B.—and special seats in the train from Waterloo and a special steamer were provided for those to be invested. There were twenty-five recipients of this honour, and among them were Sir William Huggins, F.R.S., the astronomer; Sir William Richmond, R.A.; General East, General Howard Jones, R.M.

Sir William Huggins kindly gave me a seat in his carriage to the station, and I had the pleasure of sitting next to Sir William Richmond at luncheon in the great dining-hall.

Her Majesty, who was looking very well, addressed a few kind words to the recipients of the honour when investing them with the badge and stars of the Order.

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